were lenient to a degree never exhibited toward the other belligerents.

In proportion as the war progressed England's control of the seas became more and more secure, and Germany was forced to accept increased difficulties in her attempts to obtain supplies and to maintain communication with the outside world. Great Britain also attempted to establish a blockade of Germany which was a long-recognized and universally accepted measure of naval warfare, and one which Great Britain herself had admitted, when at the time of the Civil War we blockaded the Southern ports, even though it ruined her cotton industry and threw thousands of her citizens into poverty and bankruptcy.

It is not our purpose to discuss here whether or not the British did succeed in effectively or legally establishing such a blockade. It is sufficient to say that we recognized and acquiesced in none of her measures which went beyond recognized right, and we protested in every case where her procedure was open to question. As a natural consequence of British naval su

premacy England was in any case able to cut off most neutral trade from Germany, including our own, just as Germany, through the less effective activity of her raiders, attempted to cut off and interfere as far as possible with trade to Britain. Through all this period Germany made much pretense of being the defender of the principle of freedom of the seas. That she was, however, no more solicitous of our rights than her adversaries were, was manifest in the case of the William P. Frye, an American vessel carrying a cargo of wheat to the British Isles. The Frye was captured by the German raider Prince Eitel Friedrich on January 28, 1915, and sunk with her cargo. The sinking was in violation of our treaties of 1799 and 1828 with Prussia, and our government presented a claim for the value of the ship and a protest against the violation. The discussion which followed is particularly interesting, since on November 29, 1915, in the communication which closed the case there occurs the following promise, which should be kept in mind when appraising Germany's good faith in her subsequent negotiations with the United States:

"The German Government quite shares the view of the American Government that all possible care must be taken for the security of the crew and passengers of a vessel to be sunk. Consequently, the persons found on board of a vessel may not be ordered into her lifeboats except when the general conditions, that is to say, the weather, the condition of the sea, and the neighborhood of the coast afford absolute certainty that the boats will reach the nearest port. For the rest the German Government begs to point out that in cases where German naval forces have sunk neutral vessels for carrying contraband, no loss of life has yet occurred.

The fact that the English Navy had practically driven German war-ships from the seas not only made it difficult or impossible for neutrals to land supplies in Germany, but also made it possible for neutral commerce unmolested to carry supplies of all sorts to the Allied governments. There is no obligation whatever in international law upon a neutral government to forbid its subjects or citizens to send supplies to belligerents. Great Britain and France were very far from being prepared for this war

* Scott, "A Survey of International Relations Between the United States and Germany," p. 332.

to the same degree that Germany had been, and, naturally, when the seas were open, they bought from American manufacturers large quantities of munitions of war. There is no question that these shipments were useful to the Allies. There is also no question that they were entirely legal. America was doing only what Germany and Austria had repeatedly done. Prussian subjects sold large quantities of ammunition to Russia during the Crimean War, and since that time German subjects have supplied all belligerents who needed munitions and who had money to buy them. Germany and Austria-Hungary, as Secretary Lansing pointed out, sold munitions of war to Great Britain in her war with the Boer Republics, although the Boers had neither ships nor seacoast, and could consequently not import them. It had in its own practice never fixed any limit to this trade, but it is only fair to say that in the Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, issued in 1902, though she admitted the right of subjects of neutral states to supply belligerents with contraband, she tried to make a distinction between supplying it in small quantities and on a large scale. Yet after this Germany had furnished the Turks

with ammunition in their war against Italy, and both Austria and Germany had furnished munitions to belligerents in the Balkan wars without establishing any limit. Not only, therefore, was there no legal reason why the United States should prevent this traffic, but in permitting it she was merely following "the longestablished practice of the two empires in the matter of trade in war supplies."

There was in addition to the question of principle a practical and substantial reason why the government of the United States has from the foundation of the republic to the present advocated and practised an unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies:

"It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace," wrote Secretary Lansing, "a large military establishment of stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by