make the mere preparation for war so extensive and burdensome that war itself would be looked upon as a relief. "We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870." This interesting document, certainly symptomatic if not official, also announced that plan of extending German influence through intrigue and the sowing of dissension in foreign countries with which we have since become only too familiar. Its authors likewise contemplated the invasion of Belgium and a very considerable programme of annexations in France and in Russia. Indeed, the war which was being prepared by the military party was in their minds directed against these two Powers who would be the first to be forced to recognize the supremacy of Deutschtum. After their decisive defeat, aggressive action would be taken against England, and possibly against America.

But the question is frequently asked: Was

the Kaiser not in favor of peace? The problem will be an interesting one to the future historian of the World War.

From the time of his accession in 1888 he had repeatedly announced himself in favor of peace, and had seemed to have coveted the distinction, so rare in his house, of being regarded as a prince of peace. In spite of his occasional truculence, I believe that in this he was sincere until the year 1911, or possibly a little later. He had, to be sure, done everything in his power to maintain the army at a high point of efficiency, and he preached to it and to his people the doctrine of its invincibility, and of the high mission of the German people. "We are," he had told his people, "the salt of the earth."* He felt that he owed his throne to the army, that his first duty was to it, and he announced to his officers in pride: "These are the gentlemen on whom I can rely."

In October of 1900, he had dedicated a statue to the Roman Emperor Trajan, on the pedestal of which he had engraved Latin lines to the effect that he, imperator Germanorum, had

* The Kaiser's speech, Bremen, March 25, 1905.

erected this monument to Trajan, imperatori Romanorum. On that occasion he made a speech which proved that he was as conscious as any of his subjects of the great but exceedingly dangerous mission of his country:

"Our German Fatherland, to which I hope it will be granted, through the harmonious co-operation of princes and peoples, of its armies and its citizens, to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world-empire was, and that, just as in the old times they said: 'Civis romanus sum,' hereafter, at some time in the future, they will say, 'I am a German citizen.'"

But for all this, in spite of his extraordinary outbreak on the occasion of the departure of the German troops for China, and his seeming aggressiveness at Tangiers and Agadir, he wanted peace in the sense that he preferred peace to war. The peace which he desired was, however, a German peace, and he did not understand that it involved "either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments." ""* He wished Germany to be feared as well as re

*"French Yellow Book," Document No. 7, Enclosure I.

spected and his whole world policy was based on this desire. Yet until 1911, possibly until a little later, he had kept his own army in leash. After this date a change took place in his own policy as well as in that of the military party. If they did not on all points coincide, it will be plain in the next chapter that the policies were not divergent and that, whatever his apologists may say, the Kaiser himself is personally very largely responsible for the outbreak of the World War. The generation which had grown up under the tutelage of teachers like Treitschke was now occupying most of the positions of power in the empire. Pan-Germanism, with its programme, was a natural outgrowth. This programme of aggressive militarism and annexations had been developing its strength until it would have been almost impossible for the Kaiser, even had he wished to do so, to stem the tide. It was. strongest in the party to which he looked for support, and he was out of sympathy with the Socialists, its enemies.

The settlement of the Morocco question in 1911 marks the final turn of German policy. It was then that the die was cast. That settle

ment was looked upon by the majority of Germans, especially by the army, as a diplomatic defeat and a blow to German prestige. Germany, to be sure, had succeeded in establishing the principle that when others of the great Powers increased their dominions she, by that mere fact, was entitled to compensation and she had received such compensation in the French Congo. But the Germans, unable to forget their victory of 1870, expected from France a much greater humility. She should have spoken to the Imperial German Government with head bowed and hat in hand, instead of presenting herself as a nation with rights that deserved to be respected.

In addition to the regular mobilization of the German Army there is a preliminary measure which consists in warning men and officers of reserve to make the necessary preparations and to hold themselves ready for war. It is a general call.to attention. We learn from the French ambassador at Berlin:

"This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

"Now it has been given again about ten days