ago that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence."*

Plainly the army was growing restive and in need of exercise. Even a considerable wing of the Socialists urged war, as is plain from the statement by Harden, cited in the last chapter. The Emperor was running the risk of being considered more moderate than the Socialists. German aspirations and desire for prestige suffered a further check after the Balkan Wars in 1912-13, through which Turkey, Germany's ally, had been forced to surrender most of her territory in Europe; and especially after the second Balkan War, when Greece, Serbia, Roumania, and Montenegro succeeded in defeating Bulgaria, her remaining friend along the coveted corridor to the East.

Indeed, the Balkan States were beginning to act like independent entities, and seemed to block the possibility of further Austro-German expansion.

* Cf. "French Yellow Book," No. 3.

These outward happenings were serious, to be sure, but to the Kaiser one thing which happened at home was probably even more serious. After the Zabern incident a great outcry was raised by the element in favor of civilian control of the government, and especially by the Socialists. So strong was the movement that a vote of censure was passed against the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag. This, to be sure, involved no consequences, since according to the German autocratic system the chancellor is not responsible to the Reichstag but to the Emperor alone. But at the end of the session, on May 20, 1914, the Socialists had refused to rise and cheer for the Emperor, as had always been done on such occasions. The Emperor was still smarting under this slight when negotiations with Austria concerning the chastisement of Serbia began.

The most striking direct evidence of the Kaiser's change of front was given on November 6, 1913. It evidently strengthened an impression which had already been forcing itself upon Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at

Berlin, for under date of November 22 of that year he wrote as follows:

"BERLIN, November 22, 1913.

"I have received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff-General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

There can be no question of the reliability of M. Cambon's information, for the report of this conversation was given him by Baron Beyens, the Belgian minister at Berlin, who doubtless discussed the matter with King Albert himself. Baron Beyens says:

"On this occasion the Emperor told King Albert that he looked upon war with France as 'inevitable and close at hand.' What reason did he give for this pessimistic statement, which impressed his royal visitor all the more strongly

*"French Yellow Book," No. 6.

since the belief in the peaceful sentiments of the Emperor had not yet been shaken in Belgium? He pointed out that France herself wanted war, and that she was arming rapidly with that end in view, as was proved by the vote on the law enacting a three years' term of military service. At the same time he declared that he felt certain of victory. The Belgian monarch, who was better informed as to the real inclinations of the French Government and people, tried in vain to enlighten him, and to dispel from his mind the false picture that he drew from the language of a handful of fanatical patriots, the picture of a France thirsting for war.

"On the 6th of November General von Moltke, chief of the general staff, after a dinner to which the Emperor, in honor of his guest, had invited the leading officials present in Berlin, had a conversation with King Albert. He expressed himself in the same terms as his sovereign on the subject of war with France, asserted that it was bound to come soon, and insisted still more emphatically on the certain prospect of success, in view of the enthusiasm with which the whole German nation would gird up its loins to beat back the traditional foe. General von Moltke used the same blustering language that evening to the Belgian military attaché, who sat next to him at table. I have been told that later in the evening he showed a similar lack of reserve toward other military attachés in whom he was pleased to confide, or whom he wished to impress.

"The real object of these confidential outbursts is not hard to discover. They were an invitation to our country, face to face with the danger that threatened western Europe, to throw herself into the arms of the stronger, arms ready to open, to clasp Belgium-yes, and to crush her. When we think of the ultimatum issued to Belgium on the following 2d of August, we realize to what an act of servility and cowardice William II, through this Potsdam interview, would fain have driven King Albert.'

The fact that Von Moltke, chief of the General Staff, should have taken the pains to repeat the same views leads us to conclude that he and his imperial master had decided to "feel out" King Albert, and if possible, by convincing him of Germany's strength, induce him to step aside when the time should come for the invasion of Belgium. It is reasonable to believe that William II was already looking forward to this "necessity," and that he had already agreed with his chief of staff upon the terms under which was to be issued the ultimatum which shocked the neutral world.

The only question really open to historians is whether William II honestly believed that France was threatening him with war. In the

* Cf. Beyens, "Germany Before the War," pp. 36-38.