have therefore seen the developments that led to the conflict somewhat out of focus.

In July, 1914, the world was trying to look into the future through the passes of the Balkans. Events there which in ordinary times would have been of minor consequence loomed large and portentous. When a Bosnian, Gabrilo Princep, who was an Austrian subject, assassinated the Austrian crown prince, Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, and war followed, it was natural under the circumstances and under the stress of the first shock to attribute the war to Princep's crime. Yet the assassination of the archduke was no more the cause of the war in any philosophical sense than the fly on the telescope is the cause of the great spot on the sun. It was not the cause of the war, it was merely the occasion. The causes lay deeper as we have already seen. The war would have come in any case; Princep's crime merely made it certain that it must come in 1914. To understand the reasons for this we must take a rapid glance at the situation in the Balkans.

In 1908 Austria-Hungary had annexed Bos

nia and Herzegovina, violating by this act Article XXV of the Congress of Berlin. Russia, which was inclined to assume the attitude of protector to the Slav states, and whose interests under the Congress of Berlin had been disregarded, had at that time not yet recovered from the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, and was forced to acquiesce when the Kaiser boldly proclaimed that he "took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally." Little Serbia was, therefore, forced to submit, though the discontent at the action of Austria-Hungary was about as keen in the annexed provinces as it was in the kingdom of Serbia itself. This tension, which was the result of a violation of the principle of national self-determination, was bound to continue and to increase. France and England, who had already come to an entente cordiale after the settlement of the Egyptian question, refused to go to war over this increase of Austro-Hungarian influence. In 1911 came the second Morocco crisis, which, as we have seen, had particularly embittered Germany and aroused particular resentment in the German military party. But the great surprise

of this whole period occurred when Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro formed a secret league to expel Turkey from Europe and liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish misrule. They declared war on Turkey in October, 1912, and the great Powers, because of their own divergent and selfish aims, and the fact that they were taken unawares, failed to restrain the new alliance. Contrary to expectations, the Balkan allies met with full success, and Turkey was forced to surrender most of her territory in Europe, by the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913. The Central Empires, Germany and Austria, had of course expected that their ally, Turkey, would emerge victorious, or at least make a better showing.

Only a month later a new war broke out, when Bulgaria attacked her recent allies as a result of disputes over a division of conquered territory. Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, and Bulgaria was defeated. Most of the conquered territory was therefore given to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, though, because of Austrian, German, and Italian objection, Serbia was denied any seaport

on the Adriatic. In both these wars Austria and Germany had failed to diagnose the situation and had supported the losing side, first Turkey and then Bulgaria. The loss of German prestige was the more serious, as the Turkish Army had been trained and equipped by Germans. The Balkans were therefore a sore point, and the increase in Serbia's power was to the Central Empires the more distressing, since it helped to block the way to the East, and made the dream of Middle Europe more difficult of realization. Serbia, furthermore, was beginning an agitation for a greater Serbia which was to include also the Serbs of the inces so recently annexed to Austria-Hungary. England had acquired Egypt, and France Morocco. Germany and Austria-Hungary, hungry for increased power and territory, were far from satisfied.

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Such was the situation when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were shot down in the streets of the capital of Bosnia. Francis Ferdinand had given promise of becoming an able ruler of the Dual Monarchy. It is possible that had he arrived at power, he would

have given at least some rights to the oppressed nationalities in the conglomerate Hapsburg state. There is not the slightest probability, however, that he would have looked with favor on the desire of the Serbs to be united in a kingdom of their own.

His entry into Serajevo was particularly illtimed, for to expect that at the time of the great Serbian national holiday the Bosnian Serbs, who had been forcibly annexed to the dominions of his house six years before, would deck their capital with flags and receive him with honor and gratitude was folly. The Serbian Govern- / ment had warned Austria of the risk and danger. With splendid, if somewhat insolent, courage he had come, he had seen, he had died with his consort. But to imagine that the death of this Austrian archduke, whose name was scarcely known in Brussels, was the reason why Prussian armies four weeks later invaded Belgium is to give up the search for historical causes. Is it for his sake, to keep this proud and lonely ghost company, that over 4,000,000 men have gone to their graves? Is it because of him in any sense that over 1,000,000 Americans have crossed the