"Our lies are coarse and improbable, our ambiguity is pitiful simplicity, and our intrigues are without salt and without grace.

,,

Let us consider the problem as it presented itself to the Kaiser and his staff. The time had come when Germany could secure cheaply and with promising chances of success either a great diplomatic triumph or a swift military victory which would establish her pre-eminence in Europe. Her own army had recently been increased to a point beyond which she could hardly hope to go. Her enemies, Russia and France, were in poor case. There could, there

fore, be no question of the issue if the system of alliance which she had built up could be forced to move. Here was a chance for a war which Austria ardently desired, and it was rather doubtful whether she could be made to co-operate fully in any future action directed merely or primarily against France. If Italy, which did not look with favor on Serbia's desire to reach the Adriatic, would co-operate, and especially if England, which wanted peace, would stand aside, the great stakes would be swiftly won. Italy was a partner

with Austria and Germany in the Triple Alliance. She was bound to co-operate only in a defensive war, and one to which England was not a party (for in that case her coasts would be open to the British fleet).

The one element at home whose enthusiasm it was desirable to enlist was the Social-Democratic party. This could be done if the war, which was to be provoked, could be made to appear defensive in character. The aim of her diplomatic manoeuvres was, therefore, to provoke a war in which

1. Italy would join her.

2. England would remain neutral,

3. The Social-Democrats would be with the government.

How could this end be accomplished?

It would be ridiculous for Austria to make a war on little Serbia, and claim that it was defensive. It could be accomplished, however, if Russia could be made the scapegoat and made to appear the aggressor. The menace of czarism would have a powerful effect upon the masses in Germany. Therefore, plans must be laid to locate the blame in Saint Petersburg.

One of two things would therefore be certain. Austria could safely be allowed to make war on Serbia and reduce her to the position of a vassal state. The frontier of the Central Empires could then start moving southward through the Balkans toward the east, like a creeping barrage, and Middle Europe would be on the way to realization. This in itself would be a large step toward achieving the supremacy of Deutschtum, and would seriously impair the power and prestige of Russia and France. The push must now be made, and if Russia, as seemed highly probable, became involved, the blame must be cast upon her. Austria and Germany had the great advantage in the subsequent diplomatic contest of knowing exactly their objectives, and the possibilities were very probably rehearsed, and the moves in the diplomatic game played out in advance.

Accordingly, to meet the situation Austria would have to issue an ultimatum in terms so harsh that Serbia could not possibly accept it. A time limit must be set, so short that there would be no possibility that the ambassadors of the Powers, who were away on their summer

vacations, could return and act in effective concert. If any extension of this time limit were asked for it must be refused, as it was refused when Sazanoff asked for it.* If any attempt were made to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal it must be rejected. Such a proposal was, in fact, made by Serbia with her acceptance of most of the conditions of the Austrian ultimatum.† Again, on July 29, the Czar himself, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser, proposed that the Austro-Serbian problem be given over to the Hague Tribunal. This was awkward, indeed, for how could one make the Czar the aggressor after this? Any reference to this telegram had, therefore, to be omitted from the memorial submitted to the Reichstag by Von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Any attempt of the disinterested Powers to mediate must be rejected. England made this proposal, Italy and France willingly acceded, but when Germany was asked to unite with them in mediation she refused.‡

*"British Blue Book," No. 13, and "Russian Orange Book," No. 4. Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note. "Serbian Blue Book," No. 39.

"British Blue Book," Nos. 36 and 84; "German White Book," No. 15.

If Germany were called upon to formulate some counter-proposal she must decline to do so, and she did decline when Earl Grey, after Germany's refusal to accept the mediation of the four Powers, asked that she suggest any other plan.*

Germany would be willing only to propose direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. Previous understanding had very probably been reached between Austria and Germany that Austria would refuse to yield.† When later it appeared that England would stand by France and Russia, and that Italy would not join the Triple Alliance, Austria hesitated, and when the Russian foreign minister made his second proposal, on July 31, to allow the great Powers to examine the Serbian satisfactions, Austria seemed inclined to yield, but by that time the matter was already far beyond her control, and the German council of -war, held in Potsdam on the evening of July 29,

*"British Blue Book," No. 84.

† England, France, and Russia agreed to accept any mediation proposals made by Germany and Austria which would preserve peace. Cf. "British Blue Book," Nos. 78, 84, and 111; "French Yellow Book," No. 86; "Russian Orange Book," No. 64.