had already decided to make war on France and Russia. The German Government was waiting now only for a pretext.

To carry out such a plan, a diplomatic campaign of indirection would certainly be necessary. It is now possible to show, from German testimony, that the German Government had recourse to such indirection throughout the course of its negotiations.

While the world was still under the shock of the suddenness under which the catastrophe came, historians sought eagerly for an explanation in the various white, yellow, and blue papers, published by the different governments, and especially in the White Paper published by Germany, which curiously enough had been prepared and was ready for issue before the war was really under way, on August 3. If we would correctly fix the responsibility for the war, however, we must look to other sources.

From the first Germany was to pretend that she knew nothing about the Austrian ultimatum. Her ambassadors were all instructed to make this statement, and it was repeated by Lichnowsky at London, who received a special

telegram from the government; by Schoen in Paris, and by Von Jagow, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs himself, at Berlin. So frequently was this reiterated that so careful a historian as Mr. Stowell was willing to accept the German statement, in spite of its inherent improbability, for according to the terms of the Triple Alliance, every member is bound to lay before its allies any diplomatic matters which may involve the alliance. Indeed, so well was this understood that in 1913, when Austria had been tempted to take the same action, she laid her proposals for aggressive action against Serbia before both Italy and Germany. If Austria and Germany did not lay them before Italy in 1914 it was only because they had been convinced by Italy's reply in 1913 that she would never admit that such action against Serbia could possibly be defensive in character or bind her to co-operation. If, however, Austria and Germany succeeded in making Russia appear as the aggressor, they hoped possibly to enlist Italian co-operation. It should have struck historians as little short of amazing that two of the partners in the Triple Alliance could go so far

1

without consulting the third, and that in the Austrian and German official papers Italy should scarcely be mentioned. The reason for this curious and significant omission was made plain by the statement of Signor Giolitti, the former Italian premier, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, on December 5, 1914. The Marquis of San Giuliano referred to was Minister for Foreign Affairs in Signor Giolitti's cabinet.

"I feel it my duty to recall a precedent showing how correct was the interpretation of the alliance by the Government when the conflict began. During the Balkan War, on August 9, 1913, being absent from Rome, I received the following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano: 'Austria has communicated to us and Germany that it has been the intention to act against Serbia, defining such action as defensive and hoping for an application of a casus fœderis by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. I am trying to agree with Germany concerning efforts to present Austrian action, but it may be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such eventful action as defensive, and, therefore, do not think that there exists a casus fœderis. Please send a telegram saying whether you approve.'

"I answered Marquis di San Giuliano thus: 'If Austria goes against Serbia, a casus fœderis

evidently does not exist. It is an action she accomplished on her own account. It is not defensive, because nobody thinks of attacking her. It is necessary to declare this to Austria in the most formal manner, hoping that Germany will act to dissuade Austria from a very dangerous adventure.'

"This was done, and our interpretation of the treaty was accepted by our allies, our friendly relations not being in the least disturbed. Thus the declaration of neutrality, made at the beginning of this conflict, is according to the spirit and letter of the treaties. I recall this incident, wishing to demonstrate the complete loyalty of Italy before the eyes of Europe." *

If this collusion between the Austrian and German cabinets can be proved, the insincerity of their entire procedure is evident, and it is no longer necessary to consider their attempted justifications which were issued merely in the attempt to hoodwink their allies and a part of their own population.

Let us see what actually happened. We know from Ambassador Gerard, who was present at Kiel, that the Emperor left hurriedly for Berlin on June 28. Very shortly after he sent

* Cf. Stowell, "The Diplomacy of the War of 1914," pp. 470–1.

telegrams to some of his ambassadors, certainly to Baron von Wangenheim, at Constantinople, and in all probability to Tschirschky at Vienna, calling them to a conference at Potsdam on July 5. In addition there were present Moltke, then chief of staff, Admiral von Tirpitz, and some of the great bankers, railroad directors, and captains of industry, all of whose services would have to be called upon in case of war. What happened we know from the words of Henry Morgenthau, formerly United States ambassador to Turkey:

"Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn: Was he ready for war? All replied 'Yes' except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans.

"In telling me about this conference Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Germany had precipitated the war. I think that he was rather proud of the whole performance; proud that Germany had gone about the matter in so methodical and farseeing a way; especially proud that he himself had been invited to participate in so momentous a gathering. The several blue, red, and yellow books which flooded Europe the few months following the outbreak,

Jee

Fay