and the hundreds of documents which were issued by German propaganda attempting to establish Germany's innocence, never made any impression on me. For my conclusions as to the responsibility are not based on suspicions or belief or the study of circumstantial data. I do not have to reason or argue about the matter. I know." *

It is probable that Helfferich and Krupp von Bohlen were among those present, also that Von Jagow, who was so loud in his protestations of ignorance, though probably not present, knew all that had happened. Helfferich and Krupp von Bohlen certainly did. This we have learned only recently from Doctor Mühlon, a man formerly of the highest social and business standing in Germany, who up to the outbreak of the war was a director in Krupp's. The dishonesty of the German procedure, and the thorough unreliability of the German leaders and the unrighteousness of

*"Ambassador Morgenthau's Story," World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 170-1. Wangenheim told his friend, the Italian ambassador, Signor Garroni, on his return to his post, July 15, 1914, that the conference he had attended had decided on a European war. When Signor Garroni asked what the provocation was to be, Wangenheim replied that Austria was to make demands on Serbia that would surely lead to war. Signor Garroni reported this officially to his government. (Cf. New York Nation, September 6, 1917.) Signor Garroni also informed Mr. Einstein, a member of our legation, who recorded it in his diary at the time. (Cf. London Times, August 4, 1917.)

their course, impressed him so strongly that he resigned his position with Krupp's, and refused for a long time to take any active part in what Germany was doing, except such as might tend toward reconciliation and the establishment of peace. It was he who before Roumania's entrance into the war was chosen by Von Bethmann-Hollweg to conduct the negotiations with that country, which were to bring food-supplies into Germany. After the declaration of unrestrained submarine warfare he became so completely out of sympathy with the German cause that he left for Switzerland, from which country, of his own accord, he issued the following statement:

"In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, then director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice-Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had adopted a negative attitude toward certain large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for business reasonsdelivery of material—had a lively interest. As one of the reasons to justify the attitude of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich gave me among others the following reason:

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"The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any

case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands: such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigations in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia.'

"Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in this case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no hesitation. Helfferich said that the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser.

"When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this uncanny communication converted my fears of a world-war, which were already strong, into absolute certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. But perhaps France and Russia would reconsider the matter. In any case the Serbs deserved a lesson which they would remember. This was the first intimation that I had received about the Kaiser's discus

sions with our Allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's particularly intimate relations with the personages who were sure to be initiated, and I knew that this communication was trustworthy.

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'After my return from Berlin I informed Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, one of whose directors I then was at Essen. Helfferich had, furthermore, explicitly authorized me to do so. At that time the intention was to make him a director of Krupp's. Von Bohlen seemed disturbed that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such information, and he made an unfavorable remark about the members of the Government who could not keep their mouth shut. He then told me the following. He said that he had himself been with the Kaiser in the last few days. The Kaiser had spoken to him also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its result; but he had described the matter as so secret that he (Krupp) would not even have dared to inform his own directors. As, however, I already knew, he could tell me that Helfferich's statements were accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to know more details than he did. He said that the situation was really very serious. The Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect. It was exactly on the day that

Helfferich had indicated to me, that the ultimatum of Serbia appeared. I was at this time in Berlin, and I indicated to Helfferich that I found the tone and the contents of the ultimatum really monstrous. Dr. Helfferich replied that this appeared so only in the German translation, that he had had under his eyes the ultimatum in French and that one could not consider it as at all exaggerated. On this occasion Helfferich also told me that the Emperor had undertaken his trip to the north only to save appearances, that he had not given it its usual extension, but that he had always remained sufficiently near, so that he could be reached and so that permanent communication could be maintained with him. We would now have to see what would happen. It was to be hoped that the Austrians, who did not expect an acceptance of the ultimatum, would act quickly, before the other powers had had the time to discuss it. The Deutsche Bank had already taken precautions to meet all eventualities. It had ceased to return to circulation the gold which came in. They were believed to do it in a manner altogether discreet, and this brought in every day considerable sums.

"Immediately after the ultimatum of Vienna to Serbia, the German Government made declarations saying that Austria-Hungary had acted by itself unknown to Germany. When we try to reconcile these declarations with the facts given above, there is only one explanation,-that