soundest and wisest reasons, which we have on record from their own lips."1 Mr. Spence has, however, failed to give us "the reasons" that justify his assertion : we must, therefore, resort directly to the Constitution; there we find that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." Among the powers prohibited to a State, we find it thus written: "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with any other State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in immediate danger." Have not all these prohibited powers been exercised by the seceding States? Is not the raising of armed forces for the express purpose of obstructing the laws of the Union, and investing and taking forcible possession of national arsenals and fortresses, "levying war against the United States," and therefore treason? Where, then, we ask, is to be found The American Union, 217. this boasted immunity of a State from its possibility? Again, it is stated by Mr. Spence, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated the right of secession, when they provided no force to prevent it. "Other questions," says he, "might be referred to the Supreme Court, but a retiring State withdrew from its jurisdiction; other forms of delinquency could be visited on individuals, but here was the action of a whole community No force was to be created adequate to an undertaking of this nature;" and then he cites Madison and Hamilton to prove its deliberate omission.1 * * * * Omission and authority are both in his own imagination. Mr. Madison's opinion is thus cited by Mr. Spence: "In the constitutional Convention, Mr. Madison declared, that the use of force against a State would be more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts: a union of States containThe American Union, 218. ing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction." 1 On turning to Mr. Curtis's account of the speech here referred to, we are at no loss to explain its meaning in quite an opposite way to that of Mr. Spence. Mr. Madison was not opposed to force against a delinquent State; but he desired to effect the same object in a less objectionable way. This could be done by making the Constitution act upon individuals through its Judiciary. But he did not abandon the right of coercion, though he endeavoured to obviate its use. He approved the Constitution which distinctly gives power to Congress to provide and maintain and regulate armies, a navy, and militia, for, among other objects, the suppression of rebellion. And he was no less clear in the ratifying Convention of Virginia upon the right of forcing a State, if need be, to conform to the Constitution. "Congress," said he, "ought to have the power of establishing a uniform system of discipline throughout the States, and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress 1 The American Union, 218. 2 Hist. of Const., CURTIS, ii. 62. * * with insurrection, and repel invasion; out a general controlling power to call forth the strength of the Union for the purpose of repelling invasions, the country might be overrun and conquered by foreign enemies. Without such a power to suppress insurrection, our liberties might be destroyed by intestine faction, and domestic tyranny be established." 1 It has indeed been said, that the insurrections here spoken of are those within and not of a State. What then is the meaning of the phrase "in cases of rebellion"? Besides, we have evidence of Madison's opinion, as to what the Constitution ought to provide for in such a case, before that document was framed. In the letter to Washington, before referred to, he says, "An article should be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquillity of the States against internal as well as external dangers. In like manner the right of coercion should be expressly declared. With the resources of commerce in hand, the national administration might always find means of exerting it by sea or land. But the difficulty and awkward Eloquence of the U. States. Madison in Vir. Convention, i. 132. ness of operating by force on the collective will of a State, render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be precluded. Perhaps the negative on the laws might create such a mutuality of dependence between the general and particular authorities, as to answer this purpose; or perhaps some defined objects of taxation might be submitted, along with commerce, to the general authority." "To give a new system its proper validity and energy, a ratification must be obtained from the People, and not merely from the ordinary authority of the legislatures. This will be the more essential, as inroads on the existing constitution of the States will be unavoidable." 1 General Knox also wrote to Washington thus: "I speak entirely of the Federal Government, or, which would be better, one Government, instead of an association of Governments. Thelaws passed by the general Government to be obeyed by the local Governments, and, if necessary, to be enforced by a body of armed men to be kept for the purposes which should be designated. Life of WASHINGTON, ix. 518. |