and in such case, what would be the probable effects upon the banks and the community: and to obtain, from the selected banks, information to enable the Government to judge of their condition, at the time of arrangement, and that full publicity should be given to the proceedings of the agent with them.

In concluding these instructions the Secretary observed:

"It becomes my duty to myself, in order to guard against expectations, on the part of the banks, that may not be realized, or misapprehension elsewhere, distinctly to say, that, my performance of the present act of duty as an executive agent, is not to be understood as an indication of any intention on my part, under existing circumstances, to exercise the power vested in me by law. Whether such an emergency may not arise, as may warrant the exercise of that power, it is unnecessary now to anticipate, it is sufficient to observe that, in my opinion, none such exists at present."

With a design to immediate operations, these instructions are not consistent with the views previously communicated by the Secretary to the President; but the former justified them, as useful, to obtain information which would undeceive the President, demonstrate the impracticability of his plan of financial agency, and be serviceable in any event. The qualification appended to them was, indeed, a protection from injury; for, it was little probable, that any respectable bank would enter into an arrangement, under a declaration that there existed no intention of carrying it into effect.

The effect of this qualification was at once perceived, and objected to, by the President, who, quitting the ground of “inquiry only," on which he had amused the Secretary, now declared, (letter of July 22d, 1833):

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"The great object to be obtained by the inquiry, is to ascertain whether the state banks will agree to become the agents of the Government, on the terms proposed, for the safe keeping and transmission of the public moneys. If they will, the ground taken by the President, should circumstances remain as they now are, is, that it will be then expedient and just to resort to them as a substitute for the Bank of the United States as a fiscal agent." Previously to inquiry, however, (the President continued), you declare that nothing has yet occurred to render necessary the movement anticipated by it; and thus leave me to infer, that should the inquiry establish the competency of the state banks to perform the agency proposed to them, you will not feel yourself at liberty to carry into effect the decision, transferring the public deposits to them, which the President, on his advisement with his cabinet, may make. Please inform me whether I am correct in supposing that this is your determination. If I am, it will then be my duty, in frankness and candour, to suggest the course which will be necessary on my part."

This intelligible threat of dismissal from office, the Secretary considered as a palpable violation of the President's assurance, "that it was not his intention to interfere with the independent exercise of the discretion committed to the Secretary of the Treasury, by law, over the subject;" and he was inclined, pe

remptorily, to adhere to the last paragraph of his instructions. But, as he says, the President still admitted in his letter, that, "all matters connected with the substitution of another fiscal agent," were to be "fully considered; and knowing that the instructions contemplated the President's bank plan alone, and the collection of information as to the effect of the removal of the deposits upon the banks and society; and as he could not, with propriety, declare, that he would not, at a future period, act, because it might become his duty, he consented to give up the offensive paragraph; and after reiterating his opinions, promised, that when the moment for decision, after inquiry and discussion, should arrive, he would concur with the President, or retire.

The promise of the Secretary, it appears, was considered by the President as removing every obstacle to his course. The instructions were, unhesitatingly, altered in many essential particulars; the direction to collect information was stricken out, and the agent empowered to propose or accept new plans. Thus modified, the instructions were signed by the Secretary; flattering himself, "that the President would be undeceived, and that the time of the meeting of Congress would be so closely approximated, ere a suitable inquiry could be made, as to render any action by the President altogether indelicate and improper." He signed them, he assures us, not with a view to retain a post, which had no longer any attraction for him, not to thwart the President in his legitimate course, not to mar a salutary, measure, but to prevent the execution of the scheme which, he believed, would be detrimental to the country and to the President himself. The propriety of the sequence, however, will be apparent, probably, to those, only, who may believe that he who fires the train is no agent in projecting the missile of destruction. But even Mr. Duane, with the opportunities which he now had of knowing the President, could not conceive, that he would so far disregard the dictates of delicacy and propriety as to withhold the deposits against the expressed sense of the legislature; notwithstanding, such an intention was distinctly avowed at his first official interview on the 3d June, with the President, and also in his letter of 22d July. Yet Mr. Duane seems, at this time, or soon after, to have attained a clear conception of the true nature of the service required of him, as he assures us that it "was not to substitute one fiscal agent for another, but to pervert a power reserved by law, for the public protection, into a weapon to punish the legitimate fiscal agent, at such a time, and in such a manner, as to evade legislative and judicial action."

The result of these measures is given by the Secretary:

"The instructions, thus offered, were on the 23d of July sent to the agent, who soon after proceeded on his mission. He returned early in Septem

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ber, and on the 9th of that month his report was submitted to the President. The plan of bank agency, deemed by the President the only safe one, had been almost unanimously rejected by the state banks. materials from which the condition of the state banks was to be ascertained, were very imperfectly furnished. No inquiry, beyond that which resulted in the agent's report and correspondence, was, to my knowledge, made. Nor was there any discussion, in my presence, or otherwise, to my knowledge, as to the agent's report and correspondence, or any plan of state bank agency. If any member of the administration understood what was to be the system of future fiscal operations, I was not that person, although I, attentively, read all that was submitted. Yet it was into this chaos I was required precipitately to plunge the fiscal operations of the country, at a moment when they were conducted by the legitimate agent with the utmost simplicity, safety and despatch."

When it was known, early in September, that the Secretary persisted in his refusal to remove the deposits, some members of the cabinet appeared to desire a middle course. He was asked whether he would fix a day on which he would remove the deposits, after the meeting of Congress, in case that body should not act upon the subject. This is not the least extraordinary feature in this most extraordinary history. It supposed a resolution, in the Executive, to control the public funds, not only without the authority of Congress, but even against the repeated and continued expression of the public will; and supposed, also, a claim to power, quite as broad as the Executive has since set up in his presumptuous protest to the Senate. The Secretary refused to fix a day, but consented to remove the deposits in case Congress desired it; and again stated his readiness to retire, as soon as the President should express his preference for that course.

In the meantime, while a grand attack upon the Bank was in preparation, pursuant to a predetermined plan, reasons for justifying the assault were, covertly, sought through the instrumentality of the directors of the institution, appointed by the President; who were instructed by that officer, privately, to make inquisition into the proceedings of the Bank, and whose report, replete with error and perversion, we shall have occasion hereafter to notice.

A cabinet council, destined to be famous in history, was holden on the 18th September, when the President read to the assembled members an exposition of his views, which he delivered to the Secretary of the Treasury for consideration. Four of the members, it is understood, dissented. Of the doctrines and allegations contained in this document, it is unnecessary now to speak at large, since they have been wholly adopted by the successor of Mr. Duane, and reported by him to Congress as his reasons for the removal of the deposits. Some of the closing paragraphs, however, of the address must find a place here. They contain the President's exposition of his

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right to control the Secretary of the Treasury, and his peremptory appointment of a day for the removal of the deposits.

"Viewing it (the change) as a question of transcendent importance, both in the principles and consequences it involves, the President could not, in justice to the responsibility he owes to the country, refrain from pressing upon the Secretary of the Treasury his view of the considerations which impel to immediate action. Upon him has been devolved by the Constitution and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operations of the Executive departments of the Government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed. In the performance of this high trust, it is his undoubted right to express to those whom the laws and his choice have made his associates in the administration of the Government, his opinion of their duties under circumstances as they arise. It is this right which he now exercises. Far be it from him to expect or require, that any member of the cabinet should, at his request, order or dictation, do any act which he believes unlawful, or in his conscience condemns. From them, and from his fellow-citizens, in general, he desires, only, that aid and support which their reason approves and their conscience sanctions.

"The President again repeats, that he begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise, without which, all will unite in saying, that the blood and treasure expended by our forefathers, in the establishment of our happy system of government, will have been vain and fruitless. Under these convictions, he feels that a measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced too soon; and he therefore names the first day of October next, as a period proper for the change of the deposits, or sooner, provided the necessary arrangements with the state banks can be made."

It is really difficult to understand what the President apprehended, when he so repeatedly asserted that he did not mean to coerce the action of any one of his cabinet. These asseverations refer, solely, to the Secretary of the Treasury. The President recognizes the power of that officer as unqualified, as absolute, over the deposits; he claims only to be viceroy over him. We can comprehend, that an absolute prince does not coerce obedience to his command when he does not make the prison, the cord, or the axe, the alternative. But, surely, he is not tolerant, when he expends the whole of his power to produce conformity. Nor can the President be supposed to respect the opinions of a cabinet minister, when expulsion, the greatest punishment he can inflict, is the consequence of disagreement with him.

The decision of the Secretary was, hastily and indecorously, pressed upon the 19th, and though he craved delay until the 21st, that he might prepare a defensive paper, the determination to remove the deposits was officially published on the 20th; thus offering to him a gross indignity as an officer and a man.

On the 21st, he addressed a" brief emphatic letter" to the President, refusing to carry his directions into effect, or voluntarily to leave the post which the law had placed under his charge; conceiving that the latter resolution was warranted by the affront which had been put upon him. He was formally and rudely dismissed on the 23d of September, by a note from the President, saying, "I feel constrained to notify you that your further services as Secretary of the Treasury are no longer required." Mr. Taney, who had sustained the views of the President, as his successor, carried them into effect. Mr. Duane has earned, with his contemporaries and posterity, the reputation of a man of talent, firm in the performance of his duty, incorruptible by ambition, and what is more rare, unseduced by the wiles and claims of party,-an enviable niche in the historic temple.

Thus, was perpetrated in the most vindictive spirit, the most naked and reckless act of power which our annals have recorded. The sense of Congress scorned,-its members shamefully defamed, --the solemn contract with the bank annulled,-the public treasury torn from the legal depositary,--the national currency unsettled, and bankruptcy and ruin widely spread over the land.

II. The lawfulness of the power claimed by the President over the deposites has become a question of grave consideration in Congress; and its exercise has called forth, from the Senate, a rebuke, which is second only to a conviction on impeachment. This power is claimed by the President on the following grounds. 1. That the Executive power is vested in him by the Constitution. 2. That it is his sworn duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 3. That it is his right and duty to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint, all officers of the United States, whose appointments are not, in the Constitution, otherwise provided for. From these premises, he infers, "that the whole Executive power being vested in him, who is responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence, that he should have a right to employ agents of his own choice, to aid him in the performance of his functions, and to discharge them, when he is no longer willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this principle, the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is an original Executive power, is left unchecked by the Constitution, in relation to all Executive officers, for whose conduct the President is responsible, while it is taken from him in relation to judicial officers, for whose acts he is not responsible." The power of removal he maintains, by the contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and the uniform practice under it. The President further contends, "that the Treasury Department is on the same footing as the other departments; the Secretary, being constitutionally appointable and removable by him,