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to aid their advancement, or gratify their ambition. But the solid judgment of a senate may stay the evil, if its own duration of power exceeds that of the other branches of the government, or if it combines the joint durability of both. In point of fact, the senate has this desirable limit. It combines the period of office of the executive with that of the members of the house; while at the same time, from its own biennial changes, (as we shall presently see,) it is silently subjected to the deliberate voice of the states.

§ 713. In the next place, mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, is found by experience to work, even in domestic concerns, serious mischiefs. It is a known fact in the history of the states, that every new election changes nearly or quite one half of its representatives; 1 and in the national government changes less frequent, or less numerous can scarcely be expected. From this change of men, there must unavoidably arise a change of opinions; and with this change of opinions a correspondent change of measures. Now experience demonstrates, that a continual change, even of good measures, is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. In all human affairs, time is required to consolidate the elements of the best concerted measures, and to adjust the little interferences, which are incident to all legislation. Perpetual changes in public institutions not only occasion intolerable controversies, and sacrifices of private interests; but check the growth of that steady industry and enterprise, which, by wise forecast, lay up the means of future prosperity. Besides; the instability of public councils gives an unrea

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1 The Federalist, No. 62.

2 The Federalist, No. 62; 1 Kent's Comm. 212, 213.

sonable advantage to the sagacious, the cunning, and the monied capitalists. Every new regulation concerning commerce, or revenue, or manufactures, or agriculture, or in any manner affecting the relative value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those, who watch the change, and can trace the consequences; a harvest, which is torn from the hand of the honest labourer, or the confiding artisan, to enrich those, who coolly look on to reap profit, where they have sown nothing. In short, such a state of things generates the worst passions of selfishness, and the worst spirit of gaming. However paradoxical it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that in affairs of government, the best measures, to be safe, must be slowly introduced; and the wisest councils are those, which proceed by steps, and reach, circuitously, their conclusion. It is, then, important in this general view, that all the public functionaries should not terminate their offices at the same period. The gradual infusion of new elements, which may mingle with the old, secures a gradual renovation, and a permanent union of the whole.

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§ 714. But the ill effects of a mutable government are still more strongly felt in the intercourse with foreign nations. It forfeits the respect and confidence of foreign nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. It not only lays its measures open to the silent operations of foreign intrigue and management; but it subjects its whole policy to be counteracted by the wiser and more stable policy of its foreign rivals and adversaries, One nation is to another, what one individual is to another, with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantages of the indiscretions of each other. If a nation is perpetually fluctuating in its measures, as to the protection of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, it exposes all its infirmities of purpose to foreign nations; and the latter with a systematical sagacity will sap all the foundations of its prosperity. From this cause, under the confederation, America suffered the most serious evils. finds," said the Federalist, with unusual boldness and freedom, "that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation, which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils, and embarrassed affairs."

1 The Federalist, No. 62.

2 The Federalist, No. 62; 1 Elliot's Debates, 268, 269.

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§ 715. Further; foreign governments can never safely enter into any permanent arrangements with one, whose councils and government are perpetually fluctuating. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for them to object to the continental congress, that they could not guaranty the fulfilment of any treaty; and therefore it was useless to negotiate any. To secure the respect of foreign nations, there must be power to fulfil engagements; confidence to sustain them; and durability to ensure their execution on the part of the government. National character in cases of this sort is inestimable. It is not sufficient, that there should be a sense of justice, and disposition to act right; but there must be an enlightened permanency in the policy of the government.1 Caprice is just as mischievous, as folly, and corruption scarcely worse, than perpetual indecision and fluctuation. In this view, independent of its legislative functions, the participation of the senate in the functions of the executive, in appointing ambassadors, and in forming treaties with foreign nations, gives additional weight to the reasoning in favour of its prolonged term of service. A more full survey of its other functions will make that reasoning absolutely irresistible, if the object is, that they should be performed with independence, with judgment, and with scrupulous integrity and dignity.

1 The Federalist, No. 62; 1 Elliot's Debates, 269, 270 to 273; 1 Kent. Comm. 212, 213. 2 The Federalist, No. 62.

§ 716. In answer to all reasoning of this sort, it has been strenuously urged, that a senate, constituted, not immediately by the people, for six years, may gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and eventually transform itself into an aristocracy.2 Certainly, such a case is possible; but it is scarcely within the range of probability, while the people, or the government, are worthy of protection or confidence. Liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power. There are quite as numerous instances of the former, as of the latter. Yet, who would reason, that there should be no liberty, because it had been, or it might be, abused? Tyranny itself would not desire a more cogent argument, than that the danger of abuse was a ground for the denial of a right.

§ 717. But the irresistible reply to all such reasoning is, that before such a revolution can be effected, the senate must, in the first place, corrupt itself; it must next corrupt the state legislatures; it must then corrupt the house of representatives; and, lastly, it must corrupt the people at large. Unless all these things are done, and continued, the usurpation of the senate would be as vain, as it would be transient. The periodical change of its members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. And if such universal corruption should prevail, it is quite idle to talk of usurpation and aristocracy; for the government would then be exactly, what the people would choose it to be. It would represent exactly, what they would deem fit. It would perpetuate power in the very form, which they would advise. No form of government ever proposed to contrive a method, by which the will of the people should be at once represented, and defeated; by which it should choose to be enslaved, and at the same time, by which it should be protected in its freedom. Private and public virtue is the foundation of republics; and it is folly, if it is not madness, to expect, that rulers will not buy, what the people are eager to sell. The people may guard themselves against the oppressions of their governors; but who shall guard them against their own oppression of themselves?

1 See 1 Elliot's Debates, 269, 272, 273, 274. See 2 Amer. Museum, 547.

3 The Federalist, No. 63; 1 Elliot's Debates, 269, 272.

§ 718. But experience is, after all, the best test upon all subjects of this sort. Time, which dissolves the frail fabrics of men's opinions, serves but to confirm the judgments of nature. What are the lessons, which the history of our own and other institutions teach us? In Great-Britain, the house of lords is hereditary; and yet it has never hitherto been able successfully to assail the public liberties; and it has not unfrequently preserved, or enforced them. The house of commons is now chosen for seven years. Is it now less an organ

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