quent recurrence to questions respecting the fundamental principles of government.1 Whoever has been present in any assembly, convened for such a purpose, must have perceived the great diversities of opinion upon the most vital questions; and the extreme difficulty in bringing a majority to concur in the longsighted wisdom of the soundest provisions. Temporary feelings and excitements, popular prejudices, an ardent love of theory, an enthusiastic temperament, inexperience, and ignorance, as well as preconceived opinions, operate wonderfully to blind the judgment, and seduce the understanding. It will probably be found, in the history of most conventions of this sort, that the best and soundest parts of the constitution, those, which give it permanent value, as well as safe and steady operation, are precisely those, which have enjoyed the least of the public favour at the moment, or were least estimated by the framers. A lucky hit, or a strong figure, has not unfrequently overturned the best reasoned plan. Thus, Dr. Franklin's remark, that a legislature, with two branches, was a wagon, drawn by a horse before, and a horse behind, in opposite directions, is understood to have been decisive in inducing Pennsylvania, in her original constitution, to invest all the legislative power in a single body. In her present constitution, that error has been fortunately corrected. It is not believed, that the clause in the constitution of Vermont providing for a septennial council of censors to inquire into the infractions of her constitution during the last septenary, and to recommend suitable measures to the legislature, and to call, if they see fit, a convention to amend the constitution, has been of any practical advantage in that state in securing it against legislative or other usurpations, beyond the security possessed by other states, having no such provision.1

§ 537. On the other hand, if an appeal to the people, or a convention, is to be called only at great distances of time, it will afford no redress for the most pressing mischiefs. And if the measures, which are supposed to be infractions of the constitution, enjoy popular favour, or combine extensive private interests, or have taken root in the habit of the government, it is obvious, that the chances of any effectual redress will be essentially diminished.

§ 538. But a more conclusive objection is, that the decisions upon all such appeals would not answer the • purpose of maintaining, or restoring the constitutional equilibrium of the government. The remarks of the Federalist, on this subject, are so striking, that they scarcely admit of abridgment without impairing their force: "We have seen, that the tendency of repub"lican governments is to aggrandizement of the legis"lature at the expense of the other departments. The "appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be "made by the executive and judiciary departments. "But whether made by one or the other, would each "side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us "view their different situations. The members of the "executive and judiciary departments are few in num"ber, and can be personally known to a small part "only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their "appointment, as well as by the nature and perma"nency of it, are too far removed from the people to "share much in their professions. The former are "generally objects of jealousy; and their administra"tion is always liable to be discoloured and rendered "unpopular. The members of the legislative depart"ment, on the other hand, are numerous. They are "distributed and dwell among the people at large. "Their connexions of blood, of friendship, and of "acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most "influential part of the society. The nature of their "public trust implies a personal weight with the peo"ple, and that they are more immediately the confi"dential guardians of their rights and liberties. With "these advantages it can hardly be supposed, that the "adverse party would have an equal chance of a favour"able issue. But the legislative party would not only "be able to plead their case most successfully with the "people; they would probably be constituted them"selves the judges. The same influence, which had "gained them an election into the legislature, would "gain them a seat in the convention. If this should "not be the case with all, it would probably be the "case with many, and pretty certainly with those "leading characters, on whom every thing depends in "such bodies. The convention, in short, would be "composed chiefly of men, who had been, or who "actually were, or who expected to be, members of the "department, whose conduct was arraigned. They "would consequently be parties to the very ques"tion to be decided by them."1

§ 539. If, then, occasional or periodical appeals to the people would not afford an effectual barrier against the inroads of the legislature upon the other departments of the government, it is manifest, that resort must be had to some contrivances in the interior structure of the government itself, which shall exert a constant check, and preserve the mutual relations of each with the other. Upon a thorough examination of the subject, it will be found, that this can be best accomplished, if not solely accomplished, by an occasional mixture of the powers of each department with that of the others, while the separate existence, and constitutional independence of each are fully provided for. Each department should have a will of its own, and the members of each should have but a limited agency in the acts and appointments of the members of the others. Each should have its own independence secured beyond the power of being taken away by either, or both of the others. But at the same time the relations of each to the other should be so strong, that there should be a mutual interest to sustain and protect each other. There should not only be constitutional means, but personal motives, to resist encroachments of one, or either of the others. Thus, ambition would be made to counteract ambition; the desire of power to check power; and the pressure of interest to balance an opposing interest.1

§ 540. There seems no adequate method of producing this result but by a partial participation of each

in the powers of the other; and by introducing into every operation of the government in all its branches, a system of checks and balances, on which the safety of free institutions has ever been found essentially to depend. Thus, for instance, a guard against rashness and violence in legislation has often been found, by distributing the power among different branches, each having a negative check upon the other. A guard against the inroads of the legislative power upon the executive has been in like manner applied, by giving the latter a qualified negative upon the former; and a guard against executive influence and patronage, or unlawful exercise of authority, by requiring the concurrence of a select council, or a branch of the legislature in appointments to office, and in the discharge of other high functions, as well as by placing the command of the revenue in other hands.

§ 541. The usual guard, applied for the security of the judicial department, has been in the tenure of office of the judges, who commonly are to hold office during good behaviour. But this is obviously an inadequate provision, while the legislature is entrusted with a complete power over the salaries of the judges, and over the jurisdiction of the courts, so that they can alter, or diminish them at pleasure. Indeed, the judiciary is naturally, and almost necessarily (as has been already said) the weakest department.1 It can have no means of influence by patronage. Its powers can never be wielded for itself. It has no command over the purse or the sword of the nation. It can neither lay taxes, nor appropriate money, nor command armies, or appoint to offices. It is never brought into contact