has, in a few pages of pregnant sense and brevity, condensed a decisive argument.1 There is danger, however, that it may hereafter be revived; and indeed it is occasionally hinted by gifted minds, as a problem yet worthy of a fuller trial.

2

§ 549. It may not, therefore, be uninstructive to review some of the principal arguments, by which this division is vindicated. The first and most important ground is, that it forms a great check upon undue, hasty, and oppressive legislation. Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous. The habit of acting together produces a strong tendency to what, for want of a better word, may be called the corporation spirit, or what is so happily expressed in a foreign phrase, l'esprit du corps. Certain popular leaders often acquire an extraordinary ascendency over the body, by their talents, their eloquence, their intrigues, or their cunning. Measures are often introduced in a hurry, and debated with little care, and examined with less caution. The very restlessness of many minds produces an utter impossibility of debating with much deliberation, when a measure has a plausible aspect, and enjoys a momentary favour. Nor is it infrequent, especially in cases of this sort, to overlook well-founded objections to a measure, not only because the advocates of it have little desire to bring them in review, but because the opponents are often seduced into a credulous silence. A legislative body is not ordinarily apt to mistrust its own powers, and far less the temperate exercise of those powers. As it prescribes its own rules for its own deliberations, it easily relaxes them, whenever any pressure is made for an immediate decision. If it feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and relations on society.1

§ 550. But it is not merely inconsiderate and rash legislation, which is to be guarded against, in the ordinary course of things. There is a strong propensity in public bodies to accumulate power in their own hands, to widen the extent of their own influence, and to absorb within their own circle the means, and the motives of patronage. If the whole legislative power is vested in a single body, there can be, practically, no restraint upon the fullest exercise of that power; and of any usurpation, which it may seek to excuse or justify, either from necessity or a superior regard to the public good. It has been often said, that necessity is the plea of tyrants; but it is equally true, that it is the plea of all public bodies invested with power, where no check exists upon its exercise.” Mr. Hume has remarked with great sagacity, that men are generally more honest in their private, than in their public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind. But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure removed, since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries.1 This is by no means an opinion peculiar to Mr. Hume. It will be found lying at the foundation of the political reasonings of many of the greatest men in all ages, as the result of a close survey of the passions, and infirmaties, of the history, and experience of mankind. With a view, therefore, to preserve the rights and liberties of the people against unjust encroachments, and to secure the equal benefits of a free constitution, it is of vital importance to interpose some check against the undue exercise of the legislative power, which in every government is the predominating, and almost irresistible power.3

3

§ 551. This subject is put in a very strong light by an eminent writer, whose mode of reasoning can be

2

best conveyed in his own words. " If," says he, “ we should extend our candour so far, as to own, that the majority of mankind are generally under the dominion of benevolence and good intentions; yet it must be confessed, that a vast majority frequently transgress ; and what is more decidedly in point, not only a majority, but almost all, confine their benevolence to their families, relations, personal friends, parish, village, city, county, province; and that very few indeed extend it impartially to the whole community. Now, grant but this truth, and the question is decided. If a majority are capable of preferring their own private interests, or that of their families, counties, and party, to that of the nation collectively, some provision must be made in the constitution in favour of justice, to compel all to respect the common right, the public good, the universal law in preference to all private and partial considerations."1 Again : "Of all possible forms of government, a sovereignty in one assembly, successively chosen by the people, is, perhaps, the best calculated to facilitate the gratification of self-love, and the pursuit of the private interests of a few individuals. A few eminent, conspicuous characters will be continued in their seats in the sovereign assembly from one election to another, whatever changes are made in the seats around them. By superior art, address, and opulence, by more splendid birth, reputations, and connexions, they will be able to intrigue with the people, and their leaders out of doors, until they worm out most of their opposers, and introduce their friends. To this end they will bestow all offices, contracts, privileges in commerce, and other emoluments on the latter, and their connexions, and throw every vexation and disappointment in the way of the former, until they establish such a system of hopes and fears throughout the whole state, as shall enable them to carry a majority in every fresh election of the house. The judges will be appointed by them and their party, and of consequence will be obsequious enough to their inclinations. The whole judicial authority, as well as the executive, will be employed, perverted, and prostituted, to the purposes of electioneering. No justice will be attainable; nor will innocence or virtue be safe in the judicial courts, but for the friends of the prevailing leaders. Legal prosecutions will be instituted, and carried on against opposers to their vexation and ruin. And as they have the public purse at command, as well as the executive and judicial power, the public money will be expended in the same way. No favours will be attainable, but by those, who will court the ruling demagogues of the house, by voting for their friends, and instruments; and pensions, and pecuniary rewards and gratifications, as well as honours, and offices of every kind, voted to friends and partisans, &c. &c. The press, that great barrier and bulwark of the rights of mankind, when it is protected by law, can no longer be free. If the authors, writers, and printers, will not accept of the hire, that will be offered them, they must submit to the ruin, that will be denounced against them. The presses, with much secrecy and concealment, will be made the vehicles of calumny against the minority, and of panegyric, and empirical applauses of the leaders of the majority, and no remedy can possibly be obtained. In one word, the whole system of affairs, and every conceivable motive of hope or fear, will be employed to promote the private interests of a few, and their obsequious majority; and