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there is no remedy but in arms. Accordingly we find in all the Italian republics, the minority always were driven to arms in despair.1

§ 552. Another learned writer has ventured on the bold declaration, that "a single legislature is calculated to unite in it all the pernicious qualities of the different extremes of bad government. It produces general weakness, inactivity, and confusion; and these are intermixed with sudden and violent fits of despotism, injustice and cruelty." 2

§ 553. Without conceding, that this language exhibits an unexaggerated picture of the results of the legislative power being vested in a single assembly, there is enough in it to satisfy the minds of considerate men, that there is great danger in such an exclusive deposit of it. Some check ought to be provided, to maintain the real balance intended by the constitution; and this check will be most effectually obtained by a co-ordinate branch of equal authority, and different organization, which shall have the same legislative power, and possess an independent negative upon the doings of the other branch. The value of the check will, indeed, in a great measure depend upon this difference of organization. If the term of office, the qualifications, the mode of election, the persons and interests represented by each branch, are exactly the same, the check will be less powerful, and the guard less perfect, than if some, or all of these ingredients differ, so as to bring into play all the various interests and influences, which belong to a free, honest, and enlightened society.

1 3 Adams's Defence of American Constitution, 284 to 286. 21 Wilson's Law Lect. 393 to 405; The Federalist, No. 22. 3 See Sidney on Government, ch. 3, § 45.

§ 554. The value, then, of a distribution of the legislative power, between two branches, each possessing a negative upon the other, may be summed up under the following heads. First: It operates directly as a security against hasty, rash, and dangerous legislation; and allows errors and mistakes to be corrected, before they have produced any public mischiefs. It interposes delay between the introduction, and final adoption of a measure; and thus furnishes time for reflection; and for the successive deliberations of different bodies, actuated by different motives, and organized upon different principles.

§ 555. In the next place, it operates indirectly as a preventive to attempts to carry private, personal, or party objects, not connected with the common good. The very circumstance, that there exists another body clothed with equal power, and jealous of its own rights, and independent of the influence of the leaders, who favour a particular measure, by whom it must be scanned, and to whom it must be recommended upon its own merits, will have a silent tendency to discourage the efforts to carry it by surprise, or by intrigue, or by corrupt party combinations. It is far less easy to deceive, or corrupt, or persuade two bodies into a course, subversive of the general good, than it is one; especially if the elements, of which they are composed, are essentially different.

§ 556. In the next place, as legislation necessarily acts, or may act, upon the whole community, and involves interests of vast difficulty and complexity, and requires nice adjustments, and comprehensive enactments, it is of the greatest consequence to secure an independent review of it by different minds, acting under different, and sometimes opposite opinions and feelings; so, that it may be as perfect, as human wisdom can devise. An appellate jurisdiction, therefore, that acts, and is acted upon alternatively, in the exercise of an independent revisory authority, must have the means, and can scarely fail to possess the will, to give it a full and satisfactory review. Every one knows, notwithstanding all the guards interposed to secure due deliberation, how imperfect all human legislation is; how much it embraces of doubtful principle, and of still more doubtful utility; how various, and yet how defective, are its provisions to protect rights, and to redress wrongs. Whatever, therefore, naturally and necessarily awakens doubt, solicits caution, attracts inquiry, or stimulates vigilance and industry, is of value to aid us against precipitancy in framing, or altering laws, as well as against yielding to the suggestions of indolence, the selfish projects of ambition, or the cunning devices of corrupt and hollow demagogues.1 For this purpose, no better expedient has, as yet, been found, than the creation of an independent branch of censors to revise the legislative enactments of others, and to alter, amend, or reject them at its pleasure, which, in return, its own are to pass through a like ordeal.

§ 557. In the next place, there can scarcely be any other adequate security against encroachments upon the constitutional rights and liberties of the people. Algernon Sidney has said with great force, that the legislative power is always arbitrary, and not to be trusted in the hands of any, who are not bound to obey the

1 "Look," says an intelligent writer, "into every society, analyze public measures, and get at the real conducters of them, and it will be found, that few, very few, men in any government, and in the most democratical perhaps the fewest, are, in fact, the persons, who give the lead and direction to all, which is brought to pass." Thoughts upon the Political Situation of the United States of America, printed at Worcester, 1788.

2

laws they make.1 But it is not less true, that it has a constant tendency to overleap its proper boundaries, from passion, from ambition, from inadvertence, from the prevalence of faction, or from the overwhelming influence of private interests. Under such circumstances, the only effectual barrier against oppression, accidental or intentional, is to separate its operations, to balance interest against interest, ambition against ambition, the combinations and spirit of dominion of one body against the like combinations and spirit of another. And it is obvious, that the more various the elements, which enter into the actual composition of each body, the greater the security will be. Mr. Justice Wilson has truly remarked, that, "when a single legislature is determined to depart from the principles of the constitution, and its uncontrollable power may prompt the determination, there is no constitutional authority to check its progress. It may proceed by long and hasty strides in violating the constitution, till nothing but a revolution can check its career. Far different will the case be, when the legislature consists of two branches. If one of them should depart, or attempt to depart, from the principles of the constitution, it will be drawn back by the other. The very apprehension of the event will prevent the departure, or the attempt.*

1 Sidney's Disc on Government, ch. 3, § 45. 2 The Federalist, No. 15.

3 Id. No. 62, 15.

41 Wilson's Law Lect. 396; The Federalist, No. 62, 63. - Mr. Jefferson was decidedly in favour of a division of the legislative power into two branches, as will be evident from an examination of his Notes on Virginia, (p. 194,) and his Correspondence at the period, when this subject was much discussed.* De Lolme, in his work on the constitution of England, has (ch. 3, p. 214, &c.) some very striking remarks on the same subject, in the passage already cited. He has added: "The result of a division of the executive power is either a more or less speedy

2 Pitk. Hist. 283.

§ 558. Such is an outline of the general reasoning, by which the system of a separation of the legislative power into two branches has been maintained. Experience has shown, that if in all cases it has not been found a complete check to inconsiderate or unconstitutional legislation; yet, that it has, upon many occasions, been found sufficient for the purpose. There is not probably at this moment a single state in the Union, which would consent to unite the two branches into one assembly; though there have not been wanting at all times minds of a high order, which have been led by enthusiasm, or a love of simplicity, or a devotion to theory, to vindicate such a union with arguments, striking and plausible, if not convincing.

But,

§ 559. In the convention, which formed the constitution, upon the resolution moved, "that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches," all the states present, except Pennsylvania, voted in the affirmative.1 At a subsequent period, however, seven only, of eleven states present, voted in the affirmative; three in the negative, and one was divided. although in the convention this diversity of opinion appears, it seems probable, that ultimately, when a national government was decided on, which should exert great controlling authority over the states, all opposition was withdrawn, as the existence of two branches furnished a greater security to the lesser states. It does not appear, that this division of the legislative

establishment of the right of the strongest, or a continued state of war; that of a division of the legislative power is either truth, or general tranquillity." See also Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 6, 7.

1 Journal of the Convention, 85; 2 Pitk. Hist. 233.

2 Journal of the Convention, 140.

3 Yates's Minutes, 4 Elliot's Debates, 59, 75, 76; Id. 87, 88, 89; Id. 124, 125.

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