power became with the people any subject of ardent discussion, or of real controversy. If it had been so, deep traces of it would have been found in the public debates, instead of a general silence. The Federalist touches the subject in but few places, and then principally with reference to the articles of confederation, and the structure of the senate.1 In fact, the opponents of the constitution felt, that there was additional security given to the states, as such, by their representation in the senate; and as the large states must have a commanding influence upon the actual basis in the house, the lesser states could not but unite in a desire to maintain their own equality in a co-ordinate branch.

§ 560. Having considered the general reasoning, by which the division of the legislative power has been justified, it may be proper, in conclusion, to give a summary of those grounds, which were deemed most important, and which had most influence in settling the actual structure of the constitution of the United States. The question of course had reference altogether to the establishment of the senate; for no one doubted the propriety of establishing a house of representatives, as a depositary of the legislative power, however much any might differ, as to the nature of its composition.

§561. In order to justify the existence of a senate with co-ordinate powers, it was said, first, that it was a misfortune incident to republican governments, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those, who administer it, may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies, in schemes of usurpation or perfidy; whereas the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This precaution, it was added, was founded on such clear principles, and so well understood in the United States, that it was superfluous to enlarge on it. As the improbability of sinister combinations would be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance, which would consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.1

§ 562. Secondly. The necessity of a senate was not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples of this sort might be cited without number, and from proceedings in the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. A body, which is to correct this infirmity, ought to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous, and to possess a due degree of firmness, and a proper tenure of office.2

§ 563. Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lay in the want of a due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. A good government implies two things; fidelity to the objects of the government; secondly, a knowledge of the means, by which those objects can be best attained. It was suggested, that in the American governments too little attention had been paid to the last; and that the establishment of a senate upon a proper basis would greatly increase the chances of fidelity, and of wise and safe legislation. What (it was asked) are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aids, which may be expected from a well-constituted senate? 1

§ 564. Fourthly. Such a body would prevent too great a mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members; for from a change of men there must proceed a change of opinions, and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. Such instability in legislation has a tendency to diminish respect and confidence abroad, as well as safety and prosperity at home. It has a tendency to damp the ardour of industry and enterprise; to diminish the security of property; and to impair the reverence and attachment, which are indispensable to the permanence of every political institution."

§ 565. Fifthly. Another ground, illustrating the utility of a senate, was suggested to be the keeping alive of a due sense of national character. In respect to foreign nations, this was of vital importance; for in our intercourse with them, if a scrupulous and uniform adherence to just principles was not observed, it must sub

1 The Federalist, No. 62.

2 Id. No. 62.

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ject us to many embarrassments and collisions. It is difficult to impress upon a single body, which is numerous and changeable, a deep sense of the value of national character. A small portion of the praise, or blame of any particular measure can fall to the lot of any particular person; and the period of office is so short, that little responsibility is felt, and little pride is indulged, as to the course of the government.1

§566. Sixthly. It was urged, that paradoxical as it might seem, the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in the government arises from that very frequency of elections, which in other cases produces such responsibility. In order to be reasonable, responsibility must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be. effectual, it must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. Some measures have singly an immediate and sensible operation; others again depend on a succession of well connected schemes, and have a gradual, and perhaps unobserved operation. If, therefore, there be but one assembly, chosen for a short period, it will be difficult to keep up the train of proper measures, or to preserve the proper connexion between the past and the future. And the more numerous the body, and the more changeable its component parts, the more difficult it will be to preserve the personal responsibility, as well as the uniform action, of the successive members to the great objects of the public welfare.2

§ 567. Lastly. A senate duly constituted would not only operate, as a salutary check upon the representa

tives, but occasionally upon the people themselves, against their own temporary delusions and errors. The cool, deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of their rulers. But there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures, which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of a body of respectable citizens, chosen without reference to the exciting cause, to check the misguided career of public opinion, and to suspend the blow, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind.1 It was thought to add great weight to all these

considerations, that history has informed us of no longlived republic, which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, Carthage were, in fact, the only states, to whom that character can be applied.*

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