Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being

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W. Blackwood, 1856 - 543 من الصفحات
 

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The masks of philosophy
9
Its unsatisfactory state further accounted for The globe of speculation
11
Explanation continued First principles always come out last
12
Illustrations of this from language and grammar
13
Illustration continued
14
Illustration from logic
15
Application to philosophy Here too first principles come out last
16
These principles though operative in philosophy are unnoticed and un known
17
Hence philosophy is nowhere a scheme reasoned throughout
18
The repudiation of necessary truths a further retarding cause
19
What necessary truth is
20
Its criterion is the law of contradiction Law explained
21
Its criterion is not ready acceptance
22
Return Philosophy deals with necessary truthstherefore retarded
30
Further explanations as to how philosophy goes to work
48
Restatement of the first or proximate question of philosophy
53
It must be made to revolve away from us in order to bring round
55
Recapitulation of the three sections 1 Epistemology 2 Agnoiology
61
PROPOSITION VI
73
PROPOSITION I
79
PROPOSITION VIII
85
Importance of Prop I as foundation of the whole system
86
PROPOSITION II
97
It expresses the ordinary notion and also generally the psychological
103
Further illustration
118
Short statement of what this proposition contends for
119
No opinion offered as to existence
120
PROPOSITION IV
121
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
122
Oversight of self only apparentnot real and total
123
Psychological materialism as founded on the four counterpropositions
124
Fallacy of materialism Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions
125
A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist
126
Cause of this precipitate judgment Its evil consequences
127
How Prop IV decides this preliminary question How Counterpro position IV decides it
128
The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position
129
Different conclusions from the two positions
130
Difference farther explained
131
Another point of difference between this system and psychology
132
Matter per se reduced to the contradictory
134
This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter per se
136
But to matter per se itself
137
Advantage of this reduction New light on the problem of philosophy
139
Importance of finding the contradictory
140
In what sense the contradictory is conceivable
141
Matter per se is not a nonentity
142
PROPOSITION V
144
Fifth Counterproposition
145
Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter
149
It runs into a contradiction
151
Psychological conception of idealism
152
This refutation if logically conclusive is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted
154
The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be aban doned as useless or worse
155
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN COGNITION
156
DEMONSTRATION
157
Explanation of words
158
Why this proposition is introduced
160
Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing
161
Was made a question of being by the early philosophers Thales
163
Rightly interpreted it is a division into elements
174
It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds
176
Explanation of this charge
177
Sixth Counterproposition
179
This counterproposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers
180
Review of our position
181
Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences
182
Perplexity as to general existences
183
Realism is superseded by Conceptualism
184
Conceptualism is destroyed by Nominalism
185
Evasion by which conceptualism endeavours to recover her ground and to conciliate nominalism Its failure
186
Nominalism
190
Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI
191
The summing up
192
The abstract and the concrete
193
PROPOSITION VII
196
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
197
The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from
213
explained
219
their prescription
223
PROPOSITION IX
241
DEMONSTRATION
257
The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counterpropo
282
The true compromise between Sense and Intellect
288
PROPOSITION XII
300
PROPOSITION XIII
310
PROPOSITION XIV
321
PROPOSITION XVI
327
Psychological opinion as to existing substance
342
Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance
348
A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses
356
PROPOSITION XVIII
363
PROPOSITION XIX
367
PROPOSITION XXI
373
Continuation of these remarks
376
PROPOSITION XXII
384
PROPOSITION I
405
PROPOSITION III
412
No ontology is possible if we can be ignorant of matter per
426
PROPOSITION I
448
Remark obviating any objection to this system on the score of presunip
456
PROPOSITION III
464
PROPOSITION VI
472
his Preestablished Harmony
488
His character as a philosopher
494
it finds that matter is only a half cognition
506
PROPOSITION X
511
This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion
518
The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character
529
The tenth contradiction which it corrects
534
The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects
535
The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects
536
The derivative contradictions which it corrects
537
The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of Being
538
Exposure and refutation of these contradictions
539
The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects
540
By the correction of these contradictions the system has redeemed its pledge
541
As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth
542

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الصفحة 97 - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' — a various wording of the general doctrine.
الصفحة 245 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
الصفحة 95 - Hegel, — but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen, — not any foreigner, — seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.
الصفحة 522 - All absolute existences are contingent except "one; in other words, there is One, but only " one, Absolute Existence which is strictly " necessary ; and that existence is a supreme " and infinite and everlasting Mind in synthesis
الصفحة 13 - Krofprin- stance, that no inquirer has ever yet got to tha « pies always • * ° come out beginning ; and this, again, is to be accounted for by a fact for which no man is answerable, but which is inherent in the very constitution of things — the circumstance, namely, that things which are first in the order of nature are last in the order of knowledge. This consideration, while it frees all human beings from any degree of blame, serves to explain why the rudiments of philosophy should still...
الصفحة 28 - Affirm nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth — that is, as a truth the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction ; and deny nothing, unless its affirmation involves a contradiction — that is, contradicts some necessary truth or law of reason.
الصفحة 384 - the senses are only contingent conditions of knowledge; in other words, it is possible that intelligences different from the human (supposing that there are such) should apprehend things under other laws, or in other ways, than those of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling ; or more shortly, our senses are not laws of cognition or modes of apprehension which are binding on intelligence necessarily and universally.
الصفحة 84 - I' is the object of intel" lect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man "can see and touch his body, but he cannot see and touch "himself. When the cognizance of self is laid down as the " condition of all knowledge, this of course does not mean that " certain objects of sense (external things, to wit) are apprehended " through certain other objects of sense (our own bodies, namely), " for such a statement would be altogether futile.
الصفحة 8 - One man is playing at chess, his adversary is playing against him at billiards ; and whenever a victory is achieved or a defeat sustained, it is always such a victory as a billiard-player might be supposed to gain over a chess-player, or such a defeat as a billiard-player might be supposed to sustain at the hands of a chess-player.
الصفحة 230 - Te who make shattered nerves and depraved sensations the interpreters of truth, the keys which shall unlock the gates of heaven, and open the secrets of futurity — ye who inaugurate disease as the prophet of all wisdom, thus making sin, death, and the devil, the lords paramount of creation — have ye bethought • yourselves of the backward and downward course which ye are running into the pit of the bestial and the abhorred? Oh, ye miserable mystics! when...

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