[136 b] unto another, before his own deed be enrolled, as was judged in Bellingham's case. (1) (1) In Massachusetts it is held that the estate passes on the execution of the deed, and does not remain in the grantor until the deed is registered. 6 Mass. 31, Marshall v. Fisk. 3 Pick. 153, M'Mechan v. Griffing. A subsequent registered deed will have preference to a prior unregistered deed, where the grantee in the subsequent deed has no notice of the prior one; but if the subsequent purchaser, at the time of his purchase, has notice of the prior unregistered one, it is the same to him as if such prior deed had been registered, because the only object of registry is to give notice. 8 Johns. 137, Jackson v. Given. 4 Mass. 637, Farnsworth v. Childs. 9 Johns. 163, Jackson v. Sharp. 10 Johns. 457, Jackson v. Burgott. 10 Johns. 466, Jackson v. West. 5 Mass. 450, Dudley v. Sumner. 6 Mass. 30, Marshall v. Fisk. 6 Mass. 489, Davis v. Blunt. 3 Mass. 573, Trowbridge's Reading. 3 Pick. 153, M'Mechan v. Griffing. And an unregistered deed is always good against the grantor and his heirs. 10 Johns. 457, Jackson v. Burgott; -466, Jackson v. West. 3 Mass. 573. The notice necessary to supply the place of a prior registry may be either express or implied. It is express when actual knowledge of the prior conveyance has in fact been communicated to the second purchaser, by an inspection of the deed or otherwise. It may be implied from circumstances; as when the first purchaser is in possession, claiming the land. 4 Mass. 639, Farnsworth v. Childs. But the proof of it must be clear and unequivocal. It must be proved by indubitable evidence; either by direct evidence of the fact, or by proving other facts from which it may be clearly inferred. It is not sufficient, in such case, that the inference of notice is probable; it must be necessary and unquestionable. 8 Johns. 137, Jackson v. Given. 12 Johns. 452, Jackson v. Elston. 2 Mass. 509, Norcross v. Widgery. Thus where it appeared in evidence that the second purchaser, in a conversation with a third person, about the time of his purchase, had said that he had understood that the grantor had fooled away the lot, and had sold it several times, and did not consider it worth his trouble to look about it, it was held that this conversation, unaccompanied by other circumstances, was too loose to justify the inference of such a notice as would supply the absence of the registry of the prior conveyance. Jackson v. Given, ub. sup. So after express notice of a conveyance, if the grantor remain in possession for a long time, during which the grantee might have registered his deed but had not done it, the second conveyance would be held good against the first purchaser; because the second purchaser might well presume, from the length of time the deed had remained unregistered, either that it was not bona fide, or that it had been cancelled, or that the estate had been reconveyed. 4 Mass. 637, Farnsworth v. Childs. 1 Pick. 164, Priest v. Rice. Where there has been a bona fide conveyance of land, and the grantee has entered under the deed, and continued in the open and peaceable occupation of the land granted, a second purchaser cannot, in general, avail himself of the first purchaser's neglect to procure the registry of his deed. 6 Mass. 487, Davis v. Blunt ;-30, Marshall v. Fisk. 5 Mass. 450, Dudley v. Sumner. 3 Mass. 573, Trowbridge's Reading. But the open and notorious possession of the first purchaser under his deed, does not, in all cases, furnish conclusive presumption of implied notice. Thus if a lessor should grant the fee of the land to the lessee in possession under the lease, and the next day should make a second grant to a third person who well knew that the lessee, the day before, was in possession under the lease, his continued possession would furnish no evidence of notice of his purchase. So where a person owning and in possession of a part of a lot of land not divided from the residue by any partition fence, purchased the residue, consisting principally of woodland, and which had not been actually occupied by the grantor, repaired the fence round the lot, depastured cattle in it, sold trees from the part purchased and removed an old hovel standing on the same part, it was held that these facts did not raise a legal presumption of notice. 3 Pick. 149, M'Mechan v. Griffing. If a second purchaser, who is affected with notice, conveys the estate to another who has no notice, the latter will be protected equally as if no notice had ever existed. 8 Johns. 141, Jackson v. Given. 1 Johns. 573, Beebe v. Bank of N. York. 16 Mass. 406, Trull v. Bigelow. 14 Mass. 296, Connecticut v. Bradish. Notice to the agent employed to affect the purchase is equivalent to notice to the principal. 9 Johns. 163, Jackson v. Sharp. The same law, on this subject, which is applicable to purchasers, is also applicable, in Massachusetts, to attaching creditors, and several of the cases above cited were of that description. See 1 Pick. 164, Priest v. Rice. [136 c] BURCHER'S CASE. A lunatic is not prejudiced by laches in suing livery. [137] Lunatic. Lunatic sueth mean rates run against him. SIR RALPH BURCHER, being seised of divers manors in Jenk.Cent. 299. the county of York, holden in chief, died seised, anno 40 not livery; no Eliz. and the same descended to William Burcher. Presently after his death it was found by his office, before commissioners of the county of Middlesex, that the said William Burcher was a lunatic, and so had been long before the death of his father, and that he was seised of the same manors; and the queen granted the custody of him and his lands to Sir Francis Barrington. After which, 42 Eliz. there was an office found in the county of York, of the seisin of Sir Ralph; his death, and heir ut supra, and that he was of full age; and we resolved, the king was not to And livery was have any mean rates in this case for default of livery sued due to him, and or tendered; because no laches could be imputed unto sumes that he the law pre would have the heir; being lunatic before and ever since the death of sued it, being for his benefit, his ancestors, and the laches of his friends shall not hurt if he had been him. Otherwise it were, if at any time he had been sana memoria, since the death of his ancestor. And there was showed unto us the like decree made Mich. 10 Jac. in the case of one Vaughan, which master attorney of the wards compos mentis. [137 a] said was made as a decree of equity. But we resolved also, it was a good decree in law, upon the reason aforesaid; not because the king had seised and committed by force of the lunacy; for that would have changed with the king's better estate; for it is better for the king to hold for default of liberty, than for lunacy. Devon. Quare impedit cannot be brought, hang ing another against the same defendant, and for the same avoidance. Winch. BEDFORD VS. BISHOP OF EXETER & al. A quare impedit purchased against two, pending a former quar. imp. against one of them, will be abated, though the plaintiff declare upon a new disturbance. But he may have as many as he will against several persons. EDWARD, EARL OF BEDFORD, brought a quare impedit against William, bishop of Exeter, and Henry Wilson, clerk for the church of Buckand, and conveyed unto himself the advowson in tail, and then shows, that he granted the next avoidance unto one Walton, and others; and that Ent. 892. Hutt, the church voided by the death of Wheeler; and that the 4. Noy. 10. Post. 184. grantee presented John Hopkins, who was admitted, &c. and died, and so it pertains to him to present, and the defendants disturbed him. To this the defendants pleaded, that before this purchase, that is to say, in May, 10 Jac. the plaintiff did purchase a quare impedit against this bishop defendant of the same church; whereunto the bishop appeared, and the plaintiff declared against him, and conveyed unto himself the advowson in tail, and that the church became void by the death of Wheeler, and that he presented John Hopkins, who was admitted, &c. and died, and so it pertains to him to present; whereunto the bishop, defendant, imparled, and avers that it is the same earl, the same Hopkins, the same avoidance, and the same disturbance, whereupon both actions are brought; and that the first action depends, yet not discontinued, discussed, nor determined; and demands judgment of this later writ purchased (a little) whereupon the plaintiff now declares, hanging his first writ. The plaintiff replies, that after the purchasing of the first original writ, that is to say, the sixth day of December, anno 12 Jac. the same church being still void, and he still seised of the advow- [1376] son in tail, (as aforesaid,) presented one Henry Curtis, his clerk, to the bishop, praying him, &c. who refused him; which is the disturbance, whereupon he now declares; and traverses without that, that it was the same disturbance whereupon both actions were brought, and upon this the defendants demurred in law. And in the end of Easter term, 15 Jac. after some argument at bar before had, we all agreed, and I pronounced the judgment, that this writ ought to abate; for though there must be a disturbance naturally to maintain the action, yet the principal effect of the suit is to gain and recover the presentation. And Hutt.4. accord. therefore for the same thing you shall not have two suits at once. And here was a disturbance laid in the former suit, and the avoidance of the same ; so that the new disturbance betters not the case for the plaintiff. Besides, Co. L. 139. a. the nature of a quare impedit is to be final upon nonsuit 7 Co. 27. b. or discontinuance; but this way were to defeat that; for the plaintiff, not leaving his former suit, may bring a new one; and by the same reason; twenty, which were an intolerable vexation, against rule of law; and the adding of a new defendant to the former amends not the case; for still there are two depending against one man. Otherwise, if his first quare impedit were against ten, by adding another to them he might have a new quare impedit, and so in infinitum; but he may have as many as he will against several persons. [138] PROCTER US. DARNBROOK & al. Star chamber has no jurisdiction of felony. MORTON US. ORDE. How issues joined at Westminster may be tried in the county palatine of Durham, &c. [139] Leicester. 5 Co. 1. b. 1 Leo. 184. [140] 11 Eliz. Dyer 286. Ejectione firme. 5 Co. 1. B. Асcord. Co. L. 46. b. Dyer, 218. b. NORRIS VS. THE HUNDRED OF GAWTRY. When time is to be computed from an act done, the day of the act is to be included. NORRIS brought a writ upon the statute of hue and cry against the hundred of Gawtry, and the robbery was laid, as it was indeed, 9 Octob. 13 Jac. And the teste of the writ was 9 Octob. 14 Jac. And after a verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved by Harvey that the writ was not brought within the year after the robbery committed, which are the very words of the statute 27 Eliz. And it was agreed that in the case of protection the year should be counted from the day of the date; and so in deeds enrolled, the day of the date shall not be counted any part of the six months. And justice Warberton held it so also in this case. But justice Winch and I were of a contrary opinion, in cases that depended not upon writings dated, but upon time to be reckoned from acts done, as in this case from the robbery committed, which must be confessed was done upon the ninth of October 13 Jac. and there cannot be two ninth days of October in one year, and he might have brought this action the same first day without doubt. And though it is true, that a deed may be enrolled the very day of the date, yet that is by reason of the intent of the law, and not by the letter. If a lease be made from the making of the lease, it takes effect presently, the same day, whether it be dated or no. So if the bargain and sale be not dated, the six months must be reckoned from the delivery. And though the party robbed deserve relief and pity, yet against the hundreds, which are innocent, it is a very penal law; and so the plaintiff could not have his judgment. (1) (1) The rule adopted in the text is not universal in its application. There are, upon the subject of the computation of time, many conflicting cases which it is impossible to reconcile; but the general rule now adopted is, that words are to be construed according to their legal sense or ordinary import; and if this be doubtful, the intention of the parties is to govern in cases of contract, and that of the legislature when the question relates to the construction of a statute. If this intention is doubtful, such a construction is to be adopted, if the words will admit of it, as will save an estate, rather than create a forfeiture. 1 Pick. 494, Bigelow v. Wilson. Upon this principle it is now settled, |