Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils: Analyse des Urteils. Erster Band

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J.A. Barth, 1905 - 222 من الصفحات
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الصفحة 200 - But who does not see that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or conditional proposition, the ideas are combined in the same identical way in which they are in a proposition which is solidly believed? The way in which the ideas are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the thought's object or content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one. But when we have...
الصفحة 208 - Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ' chain ' or ' train ' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed ; it flows. A ' river ' or a ' stream ' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described.
الصفحة 36 - Zwischen den Bedürfnissen des Gemüthes und den Ergebnissen menschlicher Wissenschaft ist ein alter nie geschlichteter Zwist. Jene hohen Träume des Herzens aufzugeben, die den Zusammenhang der Welt anders und schöner gestaltet wissen möchten, als der unbefangene Blick der Beobachtung ihn zu sehen vermag: diese Entsagung ist zu allen Zeiten als der Anfang jeglicher Einsicht gefordert worden.
الصفحة 208 - chain ' or ' train ' do not de scribe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed ; it flows. A ' river ' or a ' stream ' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.
الصفحة 195 - S. 192: ..A judgment is universally a necessary combination of concepts equally necessary, wether it be true or false. That it must be either true or false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever, reality for instance, or the world in space and time. For both of these must be supposed to exist, in some sense. if the truth of our judgment is to depend upon them; and then it turns out that the truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the judgment...
الصفحة 200 - What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation, through the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas.
الصفحة 194 - We may, therefore, articulately define a judgment or proposition to be the product of that act in which we pronounce, that of two notions thought as subject and as predicate, the one does or does not constitute a part of the other, either in the quantity of Extension, or in the quantity of Comprehension.
الصفحة 196 - From our description of a judgment, there must, then, disappear all reference either to our mind or to the world. Neither of these can furnish "ground" for anything, save in so far as they are complex judgments. The nature of the judgment is more ultimate than either, and less ultimate only than the nature of its constituents—the nature of the concept or logical idea.
الصفحة 52 - Schluß zu erlauben, daß es überhaupt keine psychologischen Bedingungen des Urteils gibt, welcher Art auch die Erlebnisse sein mögen, die im einzelnen Fall zum Urteil werden.
الصفحة 194 - The first objection which, I think, must occur to any one, on the contemplation of this definition, is that it omits the main and characteristic element of a judgment and of a proposition. . . . When we judge or assert, there is introduced a new element, that of objective reality, and a neiv mental fact, belief.

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