Ctesiphon and the battles of January, 1916; there was amelioration in March and April, 1916; but since then the improvement has been continual, until it is reasonable to hope that now the medical provision is satisfactory. The defects of medical provision caused unavoidable suffering to the sick and wounded, and during the breakdown in the winter of 1915-16 this suffering was most lamentably severe. The main deficiencies were in river hospital steamers, medical personnel, river transport, and ambulance land transport.

As to personal responsibility, the Vincent-Bingley Commission. found :

That a grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway, and with General Sir John Nixon, the General Officer Commanding the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916. General Hathaway did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was responsible, and in particular failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion, appreciate the conditions which would necessarily arise if provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not made on a more liberal scale. We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway, who, in our judgment, showed himself unfit for the high administrative office which he held.

We may add, however, as regards river and land transport, that while it was the duty of Surgeon-General Hathaway to urge its necessity, it was actually the duty of the Quartermaster-General's Department and of Sir John Nixon's staff to see that it was provided.

The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in Mesopotamia is, however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appointment was held by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie up to June, 1915, and afterwards by Surgeon-General J. G. MacNeece.

The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting the general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of retrenchment, and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as that to Mesopotamia. The limitation of medical preparation and the low standard of medical treatment in the Indian Army at the outbreak of war were the natural outcome of this policy.

The Secretary of State showed an earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only comment that can be made upon his procedure is that he did not fully utilise the official powers at his disposal for the purpose of disposing at an earlier period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.

To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsibility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government. In regard to the actual medical administration he showed throughout the utmost good will, but considering the paramount authority of his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.

A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, who failed closely to superintend the adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia. He declined for a considerable time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy, to give

credence to rumours which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures, which a subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering.

There has been misuse of official reticence as to medical defects and the sufferings of the sick and wounded.

Indian Frontier and Internal Troubles.—The Commissioners say that preoccupation caused by anxiety concerned with the ever-present risk of invasion in the North-West Frontier and the danger of simultaneous internal disturbances "must not be forgotten in blaming the Indian Government for the inefficiency of the management of the Mesopotamian campaign.'

General Results of the Expedition.-Except for a few months during which there were serious setbacks, the success of the campaign, as a whole, has been remarkable.

Up to the date of the advance on Baghdad continuous victory has been achieved. During the last few months the Force has resumed its career of victory. We are of opinion-reviewing the operations as a whole that it may now be truly asserted that, in the many parts of the world in which the Allied forces have been engaged, no more substantial results or more solid victories have been achieved than those won by the gallantry of the British and Indian Armies on the stricken plains of Mesopotamia.

66

Moral" of Troops. Our investigations show that what is the default is not the fighting capacity and efficiency of the combatant forces of the Indian Army, but the system of military administration in control of that Army. No praise can be too high for the gallantry and spirit evinced by the officers and men of all ranks of the British and Indian Armies under this accumulation of difficulties.

*

Criticisms of the Indian Government.-The Commission differentiate between the error of judgment shown by the Indian Government in their advocacy of the advance to Baghdad, in October, 1915, which might have happened in any campaign, and their failure adequately to minister to the wants of the forces employed in Mesopotamia.

With the

This failure (they say) was persistent and continuous, and practically covered the whole of the period during which the Indian Government were entrusted with the management of the expedition. knowledge of the facts which we now possess and of the extent and scope of the preparations of the War Office since they undertook the management of the campaign, it is impossible to refrain from serious censure of the Indian Government for the lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the inadequacy of their preparations and for the lack of readiness to recognise and supply deficiencies. They ought to have known, and with proper touch with the expedition they could have known, what were its wants and requirements. It is true that their military system was cumbrous and inept. It was, however, within the power of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief to have established a more effective procedure and a closer touch with the expedition itself.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Commissioners, having in the course of their enquiry received much information as regards the inner working of the

highest branches of administration of the Indian Government both in England and India, make a series of Recommendations "with a view to preventing a recurrence of the want of foresight and of efficiency which our investigations have revealed." These Recommendations deal with relations between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy and their respective Councils; military administration; the necessity for enquiring into certain military questions; the reorganisation of the Royal Indian Marine; and the necessity for certain immediate changes in the existing system of medical organisation in India.

Commander Wedgwood's Report.

Commander Wedgwood's Report is in effect to confine the blame to Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, both of whom he blames severely. The Commissioners say:-"We do not think that evidence before us justifies attaching to Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff alone the blame for the mistakes and shortcomings connected with the Mesopotamia Expedition. We have given reasons for a wider and, in our judgment, a more equitable apportionment of responsibility.”

The Northcliffe Press and the Report.

The Report is to form the subject of Parliamentary discussion, and this month we only note that (as might be expected) the Report is being used by the Northcliffe Press as a stick with which to beat Mr. Asquith. For instance, the Daily Mail (June 28th) said :

"It will be idle to punish those who are directly responsible for one of the most disgraceful episodes of our history if the chief culprits escape the consequences of their folly and wickedness. The heaviest weight of blame falls, and should fall, upon the politicians. They were the real contrivers of the mischief. Had not the officials in India, had not the generals commanding in the field, desired to conciliate Mr. Asquith's Cabinet, the truth would have been told at once, and thousands of gallant lives would have been spared. Therefore, all the steps taken along the path of retribution will be taken in vain if the ex-Prime Minister, upon whom depended the final decision, is not punished. Never can we hope for a firm or courageous Government at home until we have impeached a Minister, and made it clear to all politicians that another and a sterner duty is laid upon them than the collection of votes."

The senseless unfairness of this can be seen from the following considerations::

(a) The only politician individually censured in the Report is Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

(b) The War Committee censured is that of the First Coalition Government. Of this Committee, two-thirds (six members out of nine) are members of the present Second Coalition Government. Of the present War Cabinet, two-thirds (four members out of six) were members of the First Coalition War Committee.

NOTES AND FIGURES.

THE REFORM
BILL.

We give below an account of the progress made in the House of Commons in June of the Reform Bill (the "Representation of the People Bill"). The Bill has its opponents in Parliament, who are not exactly silent, but we have great hope that the Bill will safely make its way to the Statute Book as an agreed settlement of many vexed controversies, long over-ripe for settlement. The more important divisions will be found analysed in "Divisions of the Month." (See page 282).

COMMITTEE STAGE.

Franchise Questions.

1. SIR F. BANBURY (U) moved (June 6th) an amendment to give the owner of any land or premises of the annual value of £5 or upwards a vote in addition to the vote in respect of his residence. Lost by 228 to 35 (majority 193). Sir F. Banbury said that if his amendment were accepted, the oldest franchise qualification in the country-the ownership vote-would be restored. That was precisely why the amendment was rejected by so sweeping a majority.

2. MR. R. MCNEILL (U) moved (June 6th and 7th) an amendment providing that a man, in order to have the requisite residence qualification, must for the last thirty days have been residing in premises in the constituency. Discussed and negatived. A long discussion took place on the question of how to prevent the vote being obtained by the "swallow voter." Mr. Aneurin Williams (L) suggested a form of words (to replace Mr. McNeill's), which the Government accepted. This led to protests from Mr. McNeill and his friends, and eventually the Government amendment was inserted, on the understanding that the whole subject is reconsidered on Report.

3. Clause 1 (replacing outside universities all existing Parliamentary franchise for men by the qualifications of [a] residence, and [b] business premises) added as amended (June 7th) to the Bill by 184 to 14 (majority, 170).

INSTRUCTIONS TO BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS.

The Committee proceedings were interrupted after June 7th in order to permit of SIR G. CAVE moving (June 11th) the following resolution:

"That this House approves of the instructions appended to the warrants appointing Commissioners to determine, for the purposes of the Representation of the People Bill, the number of members to be assigned to the several counties and boroughs in England and Wales and in Scotland respectively, and the boundaries of such counties and boroughs and divisions thereof."

1. MR. MASON moved (June 11th) a proviso enabling the Commissioners to depart from the strict application of their instructions in any case where it would result in the formation of constituencies inconvenient in size or character, or where the narrowness of margin between the figure representing the estimated population of any area and the figure required for any of the purposes of the instructions seemed to them to justify such a departure. Agreed to with an addition proposed by MR. SALTER (U) instructing the Commissioners to have regard to electors and population in cases where it appears that the ordinary ratio of electors to population is abnormal. This was a concession by the Government to the entreaties of some agricultural members, who looked with dismay upon the increase of the urban representation at the expense of the country districts. This is inevitable, and the Government declined to do more than was conceded in the above amendment.

2. COL. SIR H. JESSEL (U) moved (June 11th and 12th) a proviso directing the Commission to act on the assumption that Proportional Representation is not adopted. Agreed to by 149 to 141 (majority, 8).* Political parties were very divided in their views on the question of Proportional Representation, but many London members, of either party, strongly protested against the re-carving of London into constituencies returning more than one member. It must be confessed that Unionists in favour of Proportional Representation were not at any pains so to state their case as to attract Liberal support. Lord Hugh Cecil, for instance, supported P.R. because "as a Conservative" he found the prospect of enfranchising eight million electors "very alarming "; Sir F. Banbury voted for P.R. because he sees in it " some check upon the wayward passions of the millions of new voters. The whole question comes up again in Committee on July 4th, when Clause 15 of the Bill is reached.

3. SIR G. YOUNGER (U) moved (June 12th) that the Commissioners have power, when re-grouping boroughs, to extend such grouping to contiguous counties. Agreed to.

Resolution carried (June 18th) in the following amended

“That this House approves of the instructions appended to the warrants appointing Commissioners to determine, for the purposes of the Representation of the People Bill, the number of members to be assigned to the several counties and boroughs in England and Wales and in Scotland respectively, and the boundaries of such counties and boroughs and divisions thereof.

"Provided that the Commissioners may depart from the strict application of these instructions in any case where it would result in the formation of constituencies inconvenient in size or character, or where the narrowness of margin between the figure representing the

As was discovered later, the tellers made an error, and the actual majority was only 7-148 to 141.