...tion, thinks he has a different notion of " himfelf, I muft confefs I can reafon *' with him no longer. All I can allow " him is, that he may be in the right as *' well as I, and that we are effentially * Treatifc of Human Nature, vol. I. p. 434. 435. f Ibid. p. 361. 362. " different in...

...with him no longer. All I • * Treatifc of Human Nature, vol. I. P-4J4- 435. t Ibid. p. 361. 362. " can allow him is, that he may be in the " right as well as I,- and that we are efien" tially different in this particular. He may " perhaps perceive fomething fimple and " continued,...

...thinks he has a " different notion of himfelf, I muft con" fels I can reafon with him no longer. " All I can allow him is, that he may be in " the right as well as I, and that we are " effentially different in this particular. He *' may perhaps perceive fomething fimple " and continued,...

...supposed, " though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simpli"»city and identity t-—If any one, upon serious and. " unprejudiced reflection, thinks...different " notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with '' him no longer. All 1 can allow him is, that he may " be in the right as well as I, and that...

...relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer: he may perhaps perceive something; simple) and continued, which he calls himself....

...annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as 1$ and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple...

...annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...

...by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of mygetf, and may truly be said not to exi«t If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himstlf, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is that he may be in the...

...And were all my perceptions removed by death, ... I should be entirely annihilated. ... If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he...that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,...

...though falsely, to be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity. If any one upon serious and candid reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason with him no longer.' Certainly I would rather believe all the ghost stories upon record, than believe...