Another consequence of strict quality control is that a large amount of paperwork is generated. According to one recent estimate, approximately 8 million pages of documents have been produced to support the quality assurance program for a nuclear unit that began operation in 1983 (32). In the midst of such massive requirements for paperwork, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a positive attitude toward quality for its intrinsic value. This becomes even more difficult in an environment where rework is required frequently, since this adds to the paperwork burden and decreases the morale of the workforce.

The exacting nature of nuclear technology manifests itself somewhat differently during operation. It often is necessary to maintain extremely tight control of sensitive systems to keep the plant running smoothly. For example, the water chemistry system in LWRS must be carefully monitored and adjusted to prevent corrosion and remove radioactive materials from the cooling water. Failure to maintain these systems within narrow limits can lead to severe damage in such major components as steam generators or condensers and this can ultimately curtail plant operations (36). As discussed in chapter 4, corrosion has been a serious problem in many operating PWRs and has led to replacement of steam generators in four nuclear units.

External Factors That Influence
Operation and Construction

Certain other factors appear to be less related to the technology than to the environment in which commercial nuclear plants must operate. For example, the nuclear industry has experienced problems with shortages of trained personnel. The commercial nuclear power industry requires engineers, construction crews, and operating teams to be qualified in very specialized and highly technical areas. As shown in figure 30, the demand for technical personnel with nuclear training grew rapidly during the 1970's (2). At the beginning of the 1970's, the nuclear work force was very small, but many reactors had been ordered and were entering the construction phase. Labor requirements grew steadily and peaked in the 4-year period 1973 to 1977, when the number of people employed in the nuclear industry increased at the rate of 13 percent a year. In the early years of the commercial nuclear industry, the greatest shortages were found among reactor designers. This contributed to the practice of initiating construction with incomplete designs. While it was recognized that 60 percent or more of the design should be completed before construction was initiated, some utilities began with half that or less. As plants have progressed from the design phase, through construction, and into operations, the emphasis on personnel has also shifted. Reactor designers are no longer in short supply, but there is a need for more people qualified in plant operations, training, and certain engineering disciplines (12).

A second external problem is inadequate communication among utilities. Only a few utilities had any experience with nuclear power before the 1970's. A structured method for transferring learning might have accelerated the overall progress by providing warnings about common errors and transmitting effective problem-solving approaches. Such communication networks did not exist in any formal manner until the accident at Three Mile Island stimulated an industrywide effort to improve the transfer of nuclear operations information. Even today there is little structure in sharing information regarding reactor construction, with the primary mechanism being the transfer of trained personnel from one utility to another.

An additional consideration is that nuclear reactor owners have had to deal with a rapidly changing regulatory environment throughout the past decade. Frequent revision of quality and safety regulations and backfit requirements have greatly affected construction and operation patterns. As shown in figure 31, NRC issued and revised regulatory guidelines at an average rate of three per month in the mid-1970's (33).

Plants that were under active construction during this time had to continually adjust to the changing regulatory environment. While no single NRC requirement overtaxed the utilities with plants under construction, the scope and number of new regulations were difficult to han

dle. As a consequence, the utilities had to divert scarce engineering forces from design and review activities to deal with NRC (37).

The utilities had to deal with more than a steady increase in regulatory requirements: a series of regulatory "shocks" was superimposed on the cumulative effect of "normal" regulation. A study by EPRI identifies three major events that were followed by a flurry of NRC activity: the Calvert Cliffs decision in 1971 to require Environmental Impact Statements for nuclear plants, the fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in 1975, and the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 (3). The aftermath of these incidents has created an atmosphere of regulatory unpredictability that has

Nuclear facility engineering, design, operation, and maintenance

Miscellaneous (including consulting, lab testing, radiography, etc.)

Fuel cycle

Manufacturing and production

1976 Year

particularly affected plants in the construction phase. In some cases, major portions of nuclear construction projects have had to be reworked to comply with changing requirements. For example, after the fire at the Browns Ferry plant, NRC issued new requirements to fireproof all trays carrying electrical cables. While this was not an unreasonable request, it did disrupt many construction schedules.

In many cases, changes in NRC regulations obviously enhance plant safety. In other cases, it is not clear that safety is increased by adding or modifying systems and components. As discussed in chapter 6, the adverse impacts of certain regulations include equipment wearout due to excessive surveillance testing and restrictions on accessibility to vital equipment as a result of fire or security barriers (37).

Piping system design provides another example of possible adverse effects of regulation. The current trend in NRC guidelines is to require more rigidly supported systems. This is not necessarily because flexible systems are less safe, but anaytical techniques cannot unequivocally prove them safe. Rigid systems are easier to analyze, but can present serious operational difficulties during routine changes in temperature (23).

Finally, rapid technological changes have further complicated nuclear powerplant construction and operation. Nuclear reactors were scaled up from the earliest demonstration plants of several hundred megawatts to full-scale 1,000-MWe plants within a decade. By 1968, most orders were placed for units greater than 1,000 MWe. As shown in table 20, there were only three LWRs with a generating capacity greater than 100 MWe in operation in the United States when the first of these orders was placed. Thus the designs for the larger plants were not built on the construction and operating experience of gradually scaled units. By the time the first 1,000-MWe units began operation in 1974, an additional 70 large plants had been ordered. There was little opportunity for orderly, deliberate design modification and transfer of knowledge in this rapid scale-up.

The factors discussed above have contributed to the complicated task of maintaining rigid standards of excellence in nuclear powerplants. As a result, the construction and operation of nuclear reactors has demanded the full resources, both technical and financial, of the utilities. Many utilities have failed to fully meet these challenges. Others, however, have managed to cope with all of these complications-plants have been constructed with few major setbacks and operated

Year ending

well. This suggests that some of the variability among utilities can be attributed to differences in factors internal to the utility.

Internal Factors That Influence
Construction and Operation

Factors related to utility management are difficult to assess since they are less visible than external factors; moreover, they are not easily quantified. Nonetheless, they can influence the financial success of a nuclear project or plant safety. As discussed above, there are a number of characteristics that distinguish the management of nu

SOURCE: "Update - Nuclear Power Program Information and Data, OctoberDecember 1982," U.S. Department of Energy, February 1983.

clear technology from that of other conventional power technologies. The complexity of the reactor and the demands for precision and documentation provide significant challenges to utility managers.

Even more important are the difficulties in dealing with a changing environment. Successful utility managers have had to maintain a great deal of flexibility to keep up with the rapid growth in the size and design of nuclear plants and changes in regulatory structure. In fact, some utilities have reorganized several times in an attempt to control their nuclear projects better. The most common changes have been away from traditional line management and towards matrix or project management (3). While this has been successful

in some cases, it is not always sufficient to improve the quality of utility management. Other factors are also very important, as discussed below.

Managing nuclear power projects requires a commitment to safety and quality that is less essential in other electric utility operations. This implies far more than a concern for schedules and budgets, which pervades all commercial endeavors. Because there is some possibility that an accident could occur in a nuclear reactor, every effort must be made to protect the investment of the utility and the safety of the public. It is important that nuclear managers adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of safety and quality-assurance regulations.

The Palo Verde plants are good examples of commitment to quality (6). When Arizona Public Service announced its nuclear program in 1972, it thoroughly studied all aspects of designing and constructing nuclear powerplants. Many advanced safety features were incorporated into the Palo Verde design from the beginning of the project. One unexpected consequence of this attention to safety is that Arizona Public Service anticipated many of the Three Mile Island backfit and redesign requirements. As a result, regulatory changes in response to Three Mile Island had less impact on the Palo Verde projects than on many other plants which had not originally planned to incorporate the extra safety features.

Sincerity of commitment can be observed in several ways. Highly committed senior managers can impress their commitment on project managers, who in turn can communicate it to designers, manufacturers, and constructors. The strength of utility commitment is also indicated by the level of quality required in the utility's contractual and procedural arrangements with suppliers of material, equipment, or personnel. For example, if a contract primarily emphasizes the schedule for physical installation, the message from project management is production. On the other hand, if the contract also emphasizes owner-acceptance and adequate documentation, the message is quality as well as production. The latter case provides the proper incentives for highquality work (13).

Corporate commitment also can be indicated by the way in which a utility responds to changes or problems. The more successful utilities have a history of responding rapidly and with adequate financial resources to resolve problems and adapt to new situations. Other utilities with less eagerness to confront their problems directly have experienced construction delays and operational difficulties (3).

An important factor in the management of any powerplant is the distribution of responsibility and authority. This is particularly vital in the construction of nuclear plants because of the complexity of the technology and the need to coordinate the activities of vendors, architects, engineers, construction managers, consultants, quali