The Regulation of Nuclear Power Nuclear power is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the United States, and the scope and practice of regulation are among the most volatile issues surrounding the future of nuclear power. Strong-and usually conflictingopinions abound among the participants in the nuclear debate on whether the current regulatory system is adequate to ensure safe and reliable powerplants or is excessive, and whether it is enforced adequately or is interpreted too narrowly. Every aspect of the nuclear industry-from the establishment of standards for exposure to radiation to the siting, design, and operation of nuclear powerplants and the transportation, use, and disposal of nuclear materials-is regulated at the Federal, State, or local level. In general, the Federal Government retains exclusive legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over the radiological health and safety and national security aspects of the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, while State and local governments share the regulation of the siting and environmental impacts of nuclear powerplants and retain their traditional responsibility to determine questions of need for power, reliability, user rates, and other related State concerns. This chapter describes the existing regulatory process at the Federal, State, and local levels; reviews the various criticisms of that process raised by the different parties in the nuclear debate; and discusses proposals for substantive and procedural changes in nuclear power regulation. The chapter focuses on the health and safety and environmental regulation of nuclear powerplants; financial and rate regulation are discussed in chapter 3. It should be emphasized that this chapter primarily reports on the existing regulatory process and on proposals for changes in that process. Arguments for and against the existing system and proposed changes are presented as they appear in the literature or as OTA determined them in the course of this study. Such criticisms of the regulatory system can reflect the biases and vested interests of the commentators. In light of this, it is important to examine the arguments critically from a safety and efficiency perspective. Where OTA found sufficient documentation to support a particular argument, the basis for the conclusions is identified. In instances where OTA could not make such a determination, the arguments are presented without conclusions to illustrate the scope of the controversy and the wide divergence among the parties' perceptions of the current role of regulation and of the need for changes in the regulatory system. FEDERAL The primary forms of regulation under the Atomic Energy Act (see box D) are: 1) the issuance of licenses for the construction and operation of reactors and 2) inspection and enforcement to ensure that nuclear plants are built and operated in conformance with the terms of a license. This section describes the licensing process that was put in place during the 1970's when the last group of plants received construction permits. This is precisely the licensing process that REGULATON has been the target of so much criticism by the nuclear industry, utilities, nuclear critics, and regulators. In addition, this section discusses the way in which this licensing process might operate in the current climate. Although the basic regulations have not changed substantially since the 1970's, the way those regulations are applied to construction permits or operating licenses might be very different if an application were filed today. Box D.-Historical Overview of Nuclear Regulation Federal oversight of the nuclear industry began in the early 1940's with military control of the development of nuclear fission to produce weapons-grade fuel. In 1946, Congress passed the first Atomic Energy Act, which was designed primarily to protect "atomic secrets" so that the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons and technology would be preserved. The act also established an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to provide civilian control over nuclear weapons and investigate the potential for peaceful uses of atomic energy.* The 1946 act expressly forbade private ownership of nuclear materials and established an absolute government monopoly over nuclear energy. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, composed of nine Senators and nine Representatives, also was formed in 1946 as the prime congressional committee responsible for nuclear energy. In 1947, the Reactor Safeguards Committee was established within AEC to review the hazards of proposed nuclear plants. But AEC remained largely preoccupied with weapons development until the early 1950's, when the Naval Reactors Branch successfully demonstrated a pressurized water reactor, thus laying the foundation for a workable technology to generate power through nuclear fission. Spurred by this demonstration and developments abroad, by the burgeoning demand for electricity, and by reports from the Joint Committee expressing dissatisfaction with AEC's lack of progress in reactor development, the Eisenhower administration urged Congress to amend the 1946 act so that private industry could enter the nuclear energy business. In 1954, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act, directing AEC to promote nuclear energy and to regulate the emerging nuclear industry by issuing licenses to private companies to build and operate commercial nuclear power stations and by adopting whatever rules were deemed necessary to protect the public health and safety. In 1957, a second obstacle to the investment of private capital in nuclear industry was removed when Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act. This law limits the liability of the builders and operators of nuclear plants to the general public in the event of injuries from an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" and established a $560 million fund from which damages would be apportioned among the victims of an accident. In 1955 and 1956, AEC issued the first sets of "basic regulations for civilian atomic industry" under the amended Atomic Energy Act. According to then-AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, "the AEC's objective in the formulation of the regulations was to minimize government control of competitive enterprise [and] open the way to all who are interested in engaging in research and development (R&D) of commercial activities in the atomic energy field." The basic notion underlying this first regulatory scheme was to allow industry the discretion to choose plant designs and build them using its own judgment on how best to satisfy the requirement for a "reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered." The assumption at that time was that the industry would be able to handle the technology well, and regulation would entail only a brief design review of safety-related components and periodic inspections. As the civilian nuclear power industry grew, it became apparent that both the industry and AEC had underestimated the complexity of ensuring safety and, therefore, the degree of regulation that would be appropriate. Regulatory activity expanded throughout the 1960's and 1970's along with an increasing appreciation for the probability and consequences of reactor accidents; this in turn contributed to increased public participation in the regulatory process. Regulatory guidelines also increased in scope and complexity with the rapid evolution of nuclear technology. *The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the AEC and transferred its regulatory functions to the newly created Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The R&D functions of AEC were transferred first to the Energy Research and Development Administration and evenutally to the Department of Energy. In the 1970's, a utility would undergo an initial planning phase before it would apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a construction permit. It would select a site in accordance with NRC (and State and local) policies and guidelines; choose an architect/engineering (AE) firm; solicit bids for the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and the balance of the plant; award contracts; and assemble data to be submitted to NRC with the construction permit (CP) application. During this planning phase, the utility also would ensure compliance with State and local laws and regulations, which could require a variety of permits for approval of the facility. The utility then would file an application for a CP, as indicated in figures 32 and 33. The application would include: 1) a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) that presents in general terms the plant design and safety features and data relevant to safety considerations at the proposed site; 2) a comprehensive Environmental Report (ER) to provide a basis for the NRC evaluation of the environmental impacts of the proposed facility; and 3) information for use by the Attorney General and the NRC staff in determining whether the proposed license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. NRC regulations require the antitrust information be submitted at least 9 months but not more than 36 months prior to the other portions of the CP application. A hearing might be held at the completion of the antitrust review, but it would not be mandatory unless requested by the Attorney General or an interested party. The NRC also must make a finding on antitrust matters in each case where the issue is raised before the Commission. Upon receipt of a CP application, the NRC staff would review it to determine if it is complete enough to allow a detailed staff review, and request additional information if necessary. The application would be formally "docketed" when it met the minimum acceptance criteria. In the past, the PSAR included very incomplete design information (only 10 to 20 percent in some cases). Most parties in the nuclear debate agree that many of the construction problems evident in today's plants could have been prevented if more complete designs had been available during CP review. In recognition of this argument, NRC officials have indicated that they now would require an essentially complete design with a CP application, a move that has widespread support. In the next step of the process, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation would compare the details of the permit application with the NRC's Standard Review Plan (SRP) and usually would submit two rounds of questions to the applicant. These questions often would result in changes in the plant design. The staff then would prepare a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) documenting the review and listing "open issues," which are changes dictated by NRC but disputed by the applicant. Concurrent with the preparation of the SER, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) would review and comment on the application, and the NRC staff could issue supplements to the SER to respond to issues raised by ACRS or to add any information that may have become available since issuance of the original SER. During the 1970's, this review process culminating in SER might have taken 1 to 2 years. The review period could potentially be shortened if an application were filed now with essentially complete design information or a standardized design. Detailed design information would be likely to meet the minimum criteria for acceptance of the application with little delay. A standardized design could indirectly accelerate the process even more because it is unlikely that many new questions would be raised by the ACRS or about the SRP after approval of the first plant using that design. During this period, the NRC staff also would be reviewing the proposed plant's environmental impacts and preparing a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be issued for review by the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies and by interested members of the public. After comments on the draft EIS were received and any questions resolved, the staff would issue a final EIS. Soon after a CP application was docketed, NRC would issue a notice indicating that it would hold |