Nuclear Powerplant Standardization-Light Water 11. Oregon Department of Energy and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum of Understanding, Jan. 4, 1980. 12. Patterson, D. R., "Revitalizing Nuclear Power Plant Design and Construction: Lessons Learned by TVA," October 1981. 13. Phung, D. L., "Light Water Reactor Safety Since the Three Mile Island Accident," Institute for Energy Analysis, July 1983. 14. Rogovin, M., et al., "Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-1250, February 1980. 15. SC&A, Inc., "Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Reactor Safety," Sept. 6, 1983. 16. Title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.109(a). 17. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regaulations, Part 50, Appendix E. 18. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., "Nuclear Regulatory Reform," UE&C 810923, September 1981. 19. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., "Regulatory Reform Case Studies," UE&C 820830, August 1982. 20. U.S. Department of Energy, "The Need for Power and the Choice of Technologies: State Decisions on Electric Power Facilities," DOE/EP/10004-1, June 1981. 21. U.S. Department of Energy, "Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Reform Act of 1983," draft bill submitted to Congress, March 1983. 22. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: Opportunities for Improvement," NUREG-0292, June 1977. 23. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Reform Act of 1983," draft bill submitted to Congress, February 1983. 24. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October 1975. 25. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants: A Discussion Paper," NUREG-0880, February 1982. 26. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "A Survey by Senior NRC Management to Obtain Viewpoints on the Safety Impact of Regulatory Activities From Representative Utilities Operating and Constructing Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0839, August 1981. 23. NSSS/AE Combination of Light Water Reactors Under Construction or On Order As of 1981 .... 24. Forecasts of Installed Nuclear Capacity in OECD Countries ..203 .207 Page .180 ..189 25. Sample Construction Times for Nuclear Plants in Various Countries. 26. Operating Performance by Country ... .192 ...195 27. Categories of Foreign Nuclear Programs in Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region 194 28. Structure of Electric Utility in Main Supplier Countries and the Distribution of 7A. Onsite and Offsite Nuclear-Related Job Vacancies at INPO Member Utilities, Mar. 1, 1982204 7B. Nuclear-Generating Capacity Outside the United States .. ..205 35. Estimates of Additional Manpower Requirements for the Nuclear Power Industry, 1982-91186 36. Nuclear Engineer Degrees: Foreign Nationals and U.S. Citizens ..187 37. Average Annual Increase in Electricity Demand: France, West Germany, and United Kingdom . . . . ..190 38. Engineering and Construction Man-Hours per Megawatt of Capacity 194 Survival of the Nuclear Industry in the United States and Abroad INTRODUCTION Whether or not utility executives order more powerplants (given all the uncertainties and disincentives described in earlier chapters) has direct implications for the U.S. nuclear industry and its ability to remain viable as a source of nuclear powerplants both within the United States and abroad. This chapter examines the consequences for different parts of the U.S. industry of a long period with no orders for new plants or a period in which orders for new plants follow a long delay. The chapter then surveys the prospects for nuclear power abroad and the likelihood of U.S. exports as well as the possibility that the United States might be able to turn to foreign suppliers as future sources of the technology. Although there are no strict parallels between the U.S. nuclear industry and that of any other country, there nonetheless is much to be learned from foreign experience. Many of the same problems faced by the U.S. industry are being faced elsewhere: public opposition to nuclear power, slow demand growth, and the difficulty of controlling cost and time overruns in nuclear plant construction. Understanding how these and other problems are being coped with in each country, provides some perspective on the U.S. situation and information on approaches that might be successful in the United States. THE EFFECTS IN THE U.S. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY OF NO, The nuclear industry may be portrayed as a monolith by its critics. In fact, however, it has always been a loose-knit group of several hundred businesses and organizations, given what cohesion it has by the demands of a difficult technology and the need to develop a coordinated response to critics. Today, the industry consists of the 59 public and private utilities that are the principal owners of nuclear powerplants in operation or under construction, 4 reactor manufacturers also known as nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) vendors, 12 architect-engineering (AE) firms with a specialty in nuclear design and construction, about 400 firms in the United States and Canada qualified to supply nuclear components, and several hundred nuclear service contractors. Table 23 shows the combinations of reactor manufacturers and AE firms for plants under construction or on order as of the spring of 1981. Of about 90,000 employees of the nuclear industry, about half operate and maintain commercial power reactors (as well as some test and research reactors), a quarter are engaged in reactor and reactor component manufacturing, and a quarter are engaged in design and engineering of nuclear facilities (other than design associated with reactor manufacture) (4). Companies and organizations in each of these sectors must develop strategies for coping with the likelihood of no new orders for nuclear plants for 3 to 5 years and the possibility of no or very few orders for 5 or more years after that. In a comprehensive study for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the S. M. Stoller Corp. (37) assessed the impact on NSSS vendors and component suppliers of three possible futures: ⚫ a slowly increasing projection of: no orders until 1986, an average of two to three a year 179 SOURCE: Nuclear Powerplant Standardization: Light Water Reactors (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-E-134, April 1981). until 1989, and six to eight orders a year after that; • no orders until the early 1990's; and • no orders until 1988 or 1989 and an average of one a year for 5 years after that. The findings of the Stoller study are echoed in the results of 35 interviews conducted by OTA with representatives of reactor vendors, nuclear suppliers, AE firms, utilities with nuclear plants, and industry analysts and regulators. Further insights are available from several assessments of personnel needs for the industry (4,9,16,18). Reactor Vendors No new nuclear reactors are now being built. The nuclear business for the four reactor vendors currently consists of assembling at site, fuel loading and services, and the latter two will continue regardless of what happens to new orders. Figure 34 shows one vendor's prediction of the need for engineering manpower through the 1980's. Engineers will be needed for services to operating plants and fuel loading. Manpower to handle changes in existing plants, and rework in plants under construction, will initially increase but then diminish. The need for engineering manpower to design new NSSS will practically disappear. Refueling, which occurs in each plant approximately every 18 months, is a demanding task re quiring sophisticated skills and a sound knowledge of nuclear physics. Used fuel rods are removed and new fuel rods are inserted among partially used fuel rods, and the array of both fresh and older fuel rods is then reconfigured to provide maximum nuclear energy. Vendors expect also that spent fuel management will also be a continuing source of business. Vendors are now competing for the nuclear service business in an arena once dominated by the nuclear service consultants. The Stoller report estimates further that backfits and rework may require 30 to 50 man-years of contracted engineering work per operating plant with a total demand of 3,000 to 6,000 technical people per year. (37) The vendors are uncertain, however, if the current level of backfits, stimulated largely by requirements following the Three Mile Island accident, will continue beyond the next few years, and, at the same time realize that over the long run the continued cost of backfits will discourage new orders. The only current new plant design activities are joint ventures by both GE and Westinghouse with Japanese companies. The Westinghouse project is being aimed at both the domestic and export markets and is being developed in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). (See ch. 4.) The GE project is being developed for Japan only and not for future U.S. licensing. |