Figure 35.-Estimates of Additional Manpower Requirements for the Nuclear Power Industry, 1982-91 6 SOURCE: Ruth C. Johnson, Manpower Requirements in the Nuclear Power Industry, 1982-91, September 1982, ORAU-205. current turnover and recruiting trends continue, or worsen. The Impact on Future New There are several ironies in the current situation of much of the nuclear industry. Many companies are sustaining themselves on backfits and rework, which over time increases the cost of nuclear power to utilities and consumers alike and makes it less likely that utilities will place orders soon for more nuclear powerplants. Some companies are maintaining their nuclear business because the rest of their business has not yet been affected by the improvement in the economy. As business investment picks up, the rate of companies leaving the nuclear business may accelerate. The recovery is likely to create work and jobs in most other industries before utilities see their reserve margins shrinking and begin ordering again (see ch. 3). As one supplier said, "If the economy revives, I'm not sure I can wait around for the nuclear contracts to roll in. I may be doing something else in the meantime" (21). Some effects of a hiatus in new plant orders are inevitable even if the optimistic projection of nuclear orders after 3 to 5 years occurs. There are likely to be fewer reactor manufacturers (two or three rather than four) and some initial delays for vendors in securing all the necessary suppliers and encouraging their renewal of N-stamps. Even under this optimistic projection, foreign sources would probably be used for some specific areas of supply. Component suppliers estimate a delay of 1 or 2 years in obtaining N-stamp qualifications and additional delays once they are operating because of unfamiliarity with support services. "Right now," one said, "my people know just who to call for an interpretation of the regulations. They know which seismic stress labs are the best. If we had to start over [several years hence], a question that takes an afternoon on the phone to answer today would take three to four months to answer'' (21). 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 Figure 36.-Nuclear Engineer Degrees: Foreign Nationals and U.S. Citizens 100 SOURCE: A Study of the Adequacy of Personnel for the U.S. Nuclear Industry (Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, November 1981). Despite these difficulties, it is probable that even after a hiatus, a realistic 8-year project schedule (under conditions assuming no hiatus) would be delayed only about a year, and perhaps less, if utilities were to freely allow overseas purchasing. If utilities insisted on U.S. sources for all or most components, the delay could be longer (37). With a hiatus of 10 years or longer, there will be a much bigger problem in new plant construction. Unless there have been at least some overseas orders, the reactor vendors are likely to pro vide designs for initial plants that were developed overseas in joint ventures with foreign countries, perhaps even as licensees of foreign companies (37). With a longer passage of time, there will be more critical areas with no qualified U.S. supplier and more dependence on overseas component suppliers. Since licensing and quality-control requirements for foreign nuclear programs are quite different it could prove time-consuming and difficult to obtain nuclear qualification and licensing for the design and components of the initial plant (37). Under these circumstances it is unlikely that there would be more than two U.S. ven dors. It is also conceivable that foreign companies might bid directly for the design and supply of the initial units (37). After a period of 10 years or more without nuclear plant construction some skills would still be available from other industries. Control and instrumentation designers and workers would probably be available from the electronics and aerospace industries. Construction contractors expect that semiskilled construction and maintenance workers would also be available. Of the construction skills, a shortage of welders with nuclear certification might pose the greatest staffing problem. But one AE executive said that the biggest difficulty "would be administrative;" learning again to control "the thousands of decisions and tasks' needed to construct and test a nuclear plant (21). Still another possibility, a very low volume of orders beginning in the late 1980's, is the situation most likely to encourage evolution in the nuclear industry structure to permit the necessary economies of scale in design and construction management experience (37). In this situation, it is likely that utilities or others will form regional or national nuclear generating companies to obtain the economics of scale from multi-unit sites and standardized construction. This is also the situation that is likely to encourage "turnkey" construction, a practice used for the earliest plants constructed in the late 1960's and still used for some exports of nuclear plants (e.g., a plant being constructed by Westinghouse in the Philippines). In turnkey construction, a company or consortium, often headed by an NSSS vendor, offers to construct and warranty an entire nuclear island, or even a complete nuclear plant, for a fixed price, ready for the operating utility to "turn the key" and operate the plant. Such fixed-price agreements may be the only way for vendors to convince utilities that their costs for nuclear *Nuclear island refers to all the equipment that directly or indirectly affects the safety of nuclear operations. In addition to the reactor vessel itself and the primary cooling system it usually includes the secondary cooling system and the steam generators (in a pressurized water reactor). power are predictable. It is quite possible that foreign vendors might offer turnkey plants in the United States. It is perhaps more likely that U.S. vendors may attempt to form consortia with foreign designers and component suppliers to offer turnkey plants. Conclusion.-As of 1983 the nuclear industry is still intact although somewhat reduced from 3 to 4 years ago. The industry probably would survive a short hiatus of 3 to 5 years in new orders with only some increase in costs and delays in obtaining some components from U.S. sources and perhaps little or no increase in costs and delays if foreign component sources are used. Predicting the consequences of a hiatus of 10 years or more is more difficult but it is unlikely to mean the end of the nuclear option in the United States. If vigorous, economical, and safe nuclear programs survive in several foreign countries, they are likely to provide designs and some components for the initial plants of a new round of nuclear construction if one occurs. (The survival of foreign nuclear programs is the subject of the next section of this chapter.) Many U.S. businesses would still supply nuclear components because they supply very similar nonnuclear components. Many others probably would get recertified to supply nuclear components. U.S. vendors of NSSS will still have large nuclear service and fuel-loading businesses and probably some foreign nuclear work as well. They are likely to be active in any consortia or joint ventures involving foreign sales of nuclear powerplants in the United States. Under some circumstances, AE firms could end up with less nuclear business after a long hiatus, depending on what restructuring might occur in the industry. A shift to turnkey construction of entire plants or the formation of a few generating companies with their own design and construction management staffs would sharply reduce the role of the architect-engineer. The number of utilities directly involved in nuclear construction would also be drastically reduced under such circumstances. THE PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER OUTSIDE Many of the problems that have threatened the nuclear power industry in the United States have also weakened nuclear power prospects abroad. However, a few countries-with somewhat different institutional structures for producing electricity and stronger motivation to avoid dependence on energy imports-may be able to nurture their nuclear industries to survive the 1980's in stronger condition than the U.S. industry. This section surveys the highlights of the foreign nuclear experience-economic, technical, and politicaland points out a few aspects of foreign experience that provide a perspective on U.S. experience. The section also assesses the likely competitive situation of the U.S. industry vis a vis its competitors abroad. The Economic Context for Nuclear Power Worldwide forecasts of the future role of nuclear power have experienced the same boom and bust cycles as have U.S. forecasts. In 1975, OECD countries forecast a total of 2,079 GW of nuclear power by the year 2000. As of 1982 *OECD means Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a Paris-based organization of industrialized countries. the OECD countries forecast for the same year had fallen by 75 percent, to only 455 GW of nuclear power (table 24). The reasons for this drastic reduction in expected nuclear capacity are familiar to anyone acquainted with the U.S. nuclear industry: slower-than-expected electricity demand growth, high interest rates that increased the cost of capital for nuclear powerplants and stronger-than-expected public opposition in many countries. Just as in the United States, the rate of growth of electricity demand slowed from the 1960's to the 1970's in France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom (except for demand from French households) (10) (see fig. 37). Given the slower-than-expected growth rates in electricity demand, many countries are now lowering their forecast growth rates for 1990 and 2000 and finding themselves with adequate generating capacity. West Germany expects to need new powerplants only if oil and gas capacity is to be replaced (24). A Government commission in France estimated that completion of the present construction program should provide most of the electricity forecast to be needed before 2000. As of mid-1983, the Government had not Table 24.-Forecasts of Installed Nuclear Capacity in OECD Countries (GW) Capacity installed or due to be commissioned by Jan. 1, 1990. Source: SPRU turbine generator data bank. SOURCE: Mans Lonnroth, "Nuclear Energy in Western Europe," a paper for the East-West Center, Honolulu Conference on Nuclear Electric Power in the Asia Pacific broader philosophical concerns about the future direction of a society based on high technology which requires extensive central control (24,30). In a few countries, public opposition to nuclear power has become directly involved in political and administrative decisions that affect the growth of nuclear power. The most dramatic of these is Sweden. In a referendum held in March 1980, 57 percent of the public voted that 3 plants under construction should be completed but the total of 12 reactors then in existence should be operated only until economical means are found to replace them and should not be replaced with more nuclear powerplants if there is any feasible alternative. Parliament subsequently adopted this position as official Government policy. A similar referendum, which halted nuclear power yet accepted the report because of the drastic implications for the future of the nuclear power industry. Other conditions, familiar to observers of the U.S. nuclear industry, were described by Måns Lönnroth, and William Walker in a 1979 paper, The Viability of the Civil Nuclear Industry (26). Although the rapid increases in oil prices after 1973 made nuclear power appear relatively less expensive over the long run, it made it harder to finance in the short run because the resulting high rates of inflation increased interest rates. In those countries where the government approves electricity rates it became harder to get political support for rate increases to compensate for inflation. Inflation and the several recessions of the decade also put pressure on governments providing financing to electric utilities to restrict the extent of their support (26). Public Acceptance NUCLEAR TERRORISME In most European countries and some other countries, there has been considerable public opposition to nuclear power. This sometimes arises from specific concerns about plant siting, design and management, and sometimes from much UCLEAIRE atomindustrie Photo credit: OTA Staff In West Germany, construction of nuclear plants has been stopped in the courts while in France the more centralized decision-making system has kept nuclear construction going without delays, despite public opposition. |