Nuclear power is one of the most intensively regulated industries in the United States, and the scope and practice of regulation is a volatile issue. Strong—and usually conflicting-opinions abound among the actors in the nuclear debate on the adequacy and efficiency of the current regulatory system.

The utilities and the nuclear industry have been outspoken critics of the current system of nuclear plant regulation, claiming that neither the criteria nor the schedules for siting, designing, building, and operating nuclear plants are predictable under the current licensing scheme. They argue that public participation has been misused to prolong licensing hearings unnecessarily. They believe that these factors have been the primary cause of higher costs and longer construction leadtimes and may have been detrimental to safety.

Nuclear critics, on the other hand, have been less critical of Federal regulation of nuclear powerplants than of the industry that designs, constructs, and operates them. They argue that the lack of predictability and the increase in leadtimes were due to the immaturity of the technology and growing pains due to rapid escalation. They attribute many safety concerns to utility and constructor inattention to quality assurance, and inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of regulations within the NRC. While some critics feel that nuclear plants will never be safe enough, others believe that the current regulatory process could ensure safety if it were interpreted consistently and enforced adequately, but that limiting the opportunities for interested members of the public to participate in licensing will detract from safety.

As a result of these concerns, a number of modifications in reactor regulation have been proposed, either through legislation, rulemaking, or better management of the regulatory process. The primary targets of the various packages are backfitting, the hearing process, siting, and the licensing of designs and plants. The evaluation of proposals for regulatory revision must depend first on whether they will ensure adequate protec

tion of public health and safety and national security, and only secondarily on additional benefits, such as reducing the cost of nuclear plants. It is also important to recognize that licensing changes alone cannot resolve the problems of the nuclear industry. All parties to nuclear regulation must commit themselves to excellence in the management of licensing, construction, and operation, as well as to resolving outstanding safety and reliabililty issues.

Many nuclear utilities are adamant that they will not order another reactor until licensing is more predictable and consistent. These characteristics should also be welcomed by the critics since they are prerequisites for uniformly high safety standards. The primary source of current uncertainty is the potential for imposition of backfits. Backfits serve an important safety function, since unanticipated safety problems do arise after construction permits are granted. But careful revision of the backfit rule could make the process more rational and ensure that plant safety is not inadvertently decreased by installation or maintenance problems or by unexpected interactions with other systems. Proposed changes to the backfit rule focus on making the criteria for ordering backfits more explicit, such as the use of cost-benefit analysis. While a cost-benefit approach would "improve"' consistency, it should not be used as the sole criterion since the available methodologies are inadequate to fully quantify safety improvements. A process to review proposed backfits could also involve a centralized group either within the NRC or as an independent panel drawn from utilities, the public, and the nuclear industry to ensure that criteria and standards are consistently applied.

Legislative amendment of the Atomic Energy Act is not necessary to reform the backfit regulations, since the changes discussed above can be accomplished through rulemaking. Moreover, legislative definitions and standards may actually reduce flexibility needed to adjust to changing construction and operating experience. Legislative action would be more likely, however, to ensure predictability.

The ability of the nuclear industry to respond to an influx of new orders depends on the length of time before those orders arrive. If utilities request new powerplants within 5 years, the industry could supply them, although perhaps with delays of a year or so to restart design teams and manufacturing processes. If the hiatus in plant orders lasts 10 years, the recovery would be slow and not at all certain—especially if U.S. vendors have not been selling reactors abroad in that period. In that case, U.S. utilities may have to buy components, if not entire powerplants, from foreign suppliers.

Many of the problems that have beset the U.S. nuclear industry have hampered the nuclear industries abroad, but with less severe impact in general. Worldwide forecasts of the future role of nuclear power have experienced the same boom and bust that they have in the United States. West Germany, France, Japan, and Canada all are intending to compete with the United States in what is expected to be a very competitive international market for nuclear plants.

In most nations with nuclear power programs, the public has expressed some opposition. In several cases (e.g., Sweden), this has been strong enough to stop new plants from being ordered. All nuclear industries have experienced delays in building plants, but the costs have typically been lower. The licensing process in West Germany is as complex as that in the United States, but licensing in nations such as France is streamlined by strong government control and support and the use of standardized designs.

The efforts by the major reactor vendor in West Germany to standardize its plants might prove to be a useful model for the U.S. nuclear industry. The German vendor plans to produce a series of powerplants in groups of five or six whose standardized features will reduce delays, engineering workhours, and paperwork. Each series of standardized designs would build on the experience of the previous group of plants.

Public attitudes towards nuclear power have become increasingly negative over the past decade, largely because of growing concern over safety and economics. The most recent polls indicate that only a third of the public supports construction of nuclear plants, while over 50 percent are opposed (see fig. 2).

Public support is an essential ingredient in any strategy for recovery of the nuclear power option. Negative public attitudes are most directly manifested through referenda. Although all binding referenda that would have shut existing plants have been rejected to date, some have been close. Referenda and legislation have been approved in 11 States that will prevent construction of any new nuclear plants unless prescribed conditions are met. Indirectly, public worry over nuclear risks has been a principal reason for NRC's imposition of safety backfits to existing reactors. State public utility commissions are unlikely to adopt rate structures favoring nuclear projects unless a majority of the public is in favor.

A central factor in public concern is the fear of a nuclear accident with severe consequences. Surveys indicate that most people view death due to a nuclear accident as no worse than other causes of death, but they fear nuclear plants because the technology is unfamiliar and foreboding. Much of the loss of public confidence is a result of a series of safety-related incidents at several reactors, especially the accident at TMI, and the evident mishandling of these incidents by utilities. The likelihood of a catastrophic accident is perceived as greater than that estimated by safety analysts in industry and government, creating a credibility gap.

Another factor in public concern about nuclear power is the ongoing debate about nuclear plant safety among scientists and other experts. As the public has listened to the experts debate, they have grown increasingly dubious about plant safety. If the experts cannot agree, the public concludes, then there must be a serious question about the safety of nuclear power.

Concerns other than accidents have caused some people to turn away from nuclear power. Perhaps the largest concern after the possibility of an accident is the disposal of high-level wastes generated by nuclear reactors. In addition, the potential esthetic and environmental damage caused by nuclear plant construction also raises objections. Some groups see a link between the military and commercial applications of atomic power. Finally, distrust of large government and institutions has carried over, to some degree, to both the nuclear industry and NRC.

People are prepared to accept some risk if they see a compensating benefit. The high cost of some nuclear plants and current excess generating capacity, however, lead many to question if there is any advantage.

While media coverage of nuclear power has become more extensive in recent years, there is no evidence of overall bias against nuclear power. The spectrum of opinion among reporters is the same as that for the population as a whole. Their coverage is more likely to reflect than to determine society's concerns.

The credibility of both the industry and NRC is low, so words and studies alone will have little impact on the public. Steps to improve public attitudes towards nuclear power must rely on an actual demonstration of the safety, economics, and reliability of nuclear power. If the reactors currently under construction experience continued cost escalation, the next generation will have to be much more economic to gain public support. Alternative reactor concepts that have inherent safety features, and studies of other energy sources, including analysis of the environmental costs and benefits, also might help change public attitudes, though other concerns such as over waste disposal would still remain.

One of the most important steps in reducing public fears of a nuclear accident would be to improve utility management of the technology. Improved management could greatly reduce the likelihood of accidents which the public views as precursors to a catastrophe. While making every effort to minimize both minor incidents and more serious accidents, however, the nuclear industry should be more open about the possibility of accidents.

Improved communications with nuclear critics might also alleviate public concerns about reactor safety. A concerted effort to identify and

respond to the substance of critic's concerns could reduce acrimonious debate which contributes to negative public opinion.

Further orders for nuclear powerplants are unlikely without some government action and support. If Congress chooses to improve the chances of nuclear reactors being ordered in the future, Federal initiatives could be directed to the following goals:

• reduce capital costs and uncertainties, • improve reactor operations and economics, • reduce the risks of accidents that have public safety or utility financial impacts, and

• alleviate public concerns and reduce political risks.

These general goals are neither new nor as controversial as the specific steps designed to achieve the goals. The initiatives discussed in this report that are likely to be the most effective are:

1. Support a design effort to re-optimize reactor designs for safety, reliability, and overall economy. This initiative would extend the efforts of the reactor vendors. Designs would incorporate the backfits that have occurred in existing plants and address the outstanding safety issues, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of costly changes during construction and the concern for safety in current LWRs. It would be expensive, however, especially if a demonstration plant is necessary.

2. Improve the management of reactors under construction or in operation. Inadequate management has been one of the major causes of construction cost overruns and erratic operation. Efforts are underway by the NRC and INPO to upgrade reactor management, and they should show results in improved training programs, better quality control and more reliable performance. The congressional role in improving reactor management would be oversight of the NRC, and support for improvements in analytical techniques and resolution of the remaining safety issues.