صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

Public Attitudes Toward
Nuclear Power

INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC OPINION AND
ITS IMPACT ON NUCLEAR POWER

Public attitudes toward nuclear power have become increasingly negative over the past two decades, with the most recent polls indicating that a slight majority of Americans opposes further construction of reactors. During the 1950's, nuclear power was still in the early states of development, and pollsters did not even bother to survey the public on the issue. In the early 1960's, a few scattered protests against local plants gained national attention, but opinion polls indicated that less than a quarter of the public opposed nuclear power (41). From Earth Day in 1970 through the mid-1970's, opposition levels averaged 25 to 30 percent, indicating that substantial majorities of the public favored further nuclear development. However, by 1976, anti-nuclear referenda appeared on ballots in eight States.

Polls taken between 1976 and 1979 indicated that slightly over half of the American public favored continued construction of nuclear plants in the United States in general, while about 28 percent were opposed and 18 percent unsure. The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) in April 1979 had a sudden and dramatic impact on these attitudes. As shown in figure 39, the percentage of people who had been in favor of or uncertain about continued construction of reactors decreased immediately following the accident while the number opposed increased (57). In subsequent months, there was some return to previously held opinions, but opposition levels remained much higher than they had been. National polls taken since mid-1982 indicate a continued slow erosion in support for nuclear power. About a

[merged small][merged small][graphic][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed][ocr errors][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][ocr errors][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small]

third of the public now supports construction of new plants in general, while over 50 percent are opposed (6,10,18). The accident at TMI appears to have accelerated a trend of even greater opposition to construction of new plants near to where those polled live. By the end of 1981, a large majority of those polled opposed construction of new plants in or near their communities. When compared with other energy options, including offshore oil drilling and coal plants, nuclear is now the least favored alternative.

Despite the trend of declining support, the public's overall current attitude toward nuclear power can best be described as ambivalent. For example, a 1983 poll indicates that about 40 percent of the public thinks currently operating reactors are "mainly safe" while slightly over half think they are dangerous and 5 percent are ''not sure." There is some evidence that the public

looks to nuclear power as one solution to the Nation's long-term energy problems. In a recent survey, the majority of respondents believed that most U.S. energy needs would be supplied primarily by nuclear and solar over the next two decades, and over a third of those polled expected nuclear power to provide most of the Nation's energy after the year 2000 (14). The majority of Americans favor neither a halt to all new construction nor a permanent shutdown of all operating reactors. Opinion polls on this question have been verified by State ballot initiatives. As shown in table 31, most of the nuclear moratorium initiatives, and all referenda that would have shut down operating plants were defeated in 1976, 1980, and 1982. However, more of these initiatives have been approved in recent years, and many restrictions on nuclear waste disposal have been passed, reflecting public doubts about the technology.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

Proposal

Would halt new construction

and reduce operations until
safety systems were found
effective, liability ceilings
lifted, and waste disposal was
demonstrated

Same as '76 referenda

Would shut down Maine Yankee
Would prevent Callaway plants
from operating until safety
systems were found effective,
liability ceilings were lifted,
and waste disposal was available
Prohibits new construction until
waste disposal is available and
voters approve in a statewide
referendum

Prohibits issuance of new bonds
needed to complete WPPSS
Unit 3

Prohibits legislation limiting
nuclear power unless approved
by voters in a referendum
Would phase out Maine Yankee
over 5 years

Prohibits new construction and
waste disposal unless certain
conditions, including voter
approval in a referendum, are met

Total restrictive referenda placed on ballots: 14
Total approved: 4

SOURCES: Atomic Industrial Forum, State Codes.

Outcome
Defeated

Vote split

30-70%

Defeated

33-66%

Defeated 29-71%

Defeated 42-58%
Defeated 42-58%
Defeated 32-68%
Defeated 33-67%

[blocks in formation]

The public's ambivalent attitude toward nuclear power is due to a variety of factors including the ongoing debate among experts over reactor safety, individual perceptions of the likelihood of a catastrophic reactor accident, changing personal values, and media coverage of the technology. Underlying all of these factors is increasing doubt about the technical capabilities and the credibility of both the nuclear industry and its governmental regulators. As discussed in chapter 5, weak utility management has led to poor operating performance at some reactors as well as skyrocketing costs and quality-assurance problems at other plants under construction. These problems have led to accidents at operating reactors, causing great public concern.

As early as 1966, when large majorities of the public supported nuclear power, a design error caused blockage of coolant, leading to melting of a small part of the core at Detroit Edison's Fermi breeder reactor (3). Although no radioactivity was released, and the event received relatively little publicity at that time, nuclear critics and some members of the public became concerned. They pointed to a University of Michigan study conducted prior to construction of the plant, which indicated that if the plant had been larger and had been operating at full design power for at least a year, a complete breach of containment combined with the worst possible weather conditions might have led to as many as 60,000 deaths (26). Nearly a decade later, public discussion of the accident increased in response to the 1975 publication of the book, We Almost Lost Detroit (25).

In 1975, a fire started by a worker using a candle to test for air leaks spread through the electrical system of the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Browns Ferry plant in Alabama. The fire caused some loss of core coolant in one unit of the plant, and disabled the reactor's safety systems (11). Because of confusion about how to put it out, the fire burned out of control for 7 hours before being extinguished. Again there was no loss of life and no release of radiation, but the incident was reported in the national media, increasing public fears of an accident. Critics felt that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) news release on the event-which emphasized

the safe shutdown of the reactor while downplaying the failure of the Emergency Core Cooling System- misrepresented the nearness of a disaster and ignored the lack of foresight which the accident demonstrated.

While these earlier accidents had an adverse impact on popular support for nuclear technology, it was not until 1979 that a single accident had a direct, measurable impact on public opinion as reflected in national opinion polls. That spring, poor maintenance, faulty equipment, and operator errors led to a loss of coolant and partial destruction of the core at the TMI Unit 2 reactor located in Pennsylvania. Radioactive water spilled onto the floor of an auxiliary building, releasing a small amount of radioactivity to the environment, although the total radiation dose received by the population in the vicinity was far less than their annual exposure to natural and medical radiation (31). On March 30, Governor Thornburgh advised pregnant women and preschool children to leave the area within a 5-mile radius of TMI. This advisory was not lifted until April 9. Conflicting statements from authorities combined with obvious confusion at the reactor site before and during the evacuation shook public confidence in the nuclear industry and State and Federal officials. Following the accident, majority support for nuclear power was lost, a trend that continues today. Local opposition to some reactors around the country also increased after the accident, while local attitudes toward other reactors remained favorable (see Case Studies at the end of this chapter).

Opinion polls taken after the accident at TMI indicated that at least half of those polled thought more such accidents were likely. Since that time, other incidents, such as the rupture of steam generator tubes at Rochester Gas & Electric's Ginna nuclear plant in January 1982, have occurred at operating reactors. There is some evidence that the public views these incidents, along with the TMI accident, as precursors to a catastrophic accident that might kill thousands (67).

The handling of reactor safety issues by the nuclear industry and the NRC has led many people to the conclusion that both have seriously underestimated safety problems. For example,

[blocks in formation]

opinion polls indicate that a majority of the public believed government officials understated the dangers at TMI (57). In addition, since 1973 the nuclear industry has argued that the possibility of failure of reactor emergency shutdown systems is negligible. Because of industry opposition, the NRC delayed regulations requiring extra equipment to avoid an accident in the event of such a failure. However, it was exactly this type of failure that occurred not once, but twice within 4 days at Public Service Gas & Electric's Salem, N.J., plant in February 1983 (38). (See ch. 5.)

The importance of public opinion to further development of nuclear power has been recognized by government and industry but is still little understood (12,75). This chapter attempts to add to the limited understanding of public perceptions and to identify changes in the management of nuclear power that might make it more acceptable to the public. The analysis is limited to public perceptions of operating nuclear reactors and those under construction. An April 1983 OTA study, Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste, deals with public attitudes toward transportation and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste in greater depth.

Actors in the Nuclear Power Debate

As discussed in chapter 1, there are a number of groups in the United States with sometimes conflicting interests in nuclear power. The apparent contradictions in public attitudes toward the technology are explained at least partially by the fact that there is not a single homogeneous "general public" in this country. Opinion polls which survey the "general public" may fail to reveal the intensity of individual opinions. For example, the phrasing of the question most frequently asked to gage national public opinion"In general, do you favor or oppose the building of more nuclear power plants in the United States?"-leaves little room for people who are uncertain or have no opinion. When the question was rephrased in two surveys taken shortly after the TMI accident, over a third of the respondents were uncertain or neutral (45). A national poll taken in 1978 indicated that about a third of respondents were neutral; however, large

percentages of respondents were also extremely pro- or anti-nuclear. Thus, it appears that different groups among the public vary in the strength of their beliefs about nuclear power.

During the 1970's, critics of nuclear power and their associated public interest groups became increasingly well-organized at the national level. As shown in table 32, today all of the major national environmental groups are critical of at least some aspects of the U.S. nuclear program (33). In addition to these environmental groups with broad agendas, several organizations, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Critical Mass Energy Project of Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, Inc., focus primarily on nuclear power. Overall, about 1 million Americans belong to environmental and energy groups critical of nuclear power. Total annual expenditures for lobbying, public education, and other activities related directly to nuclear energy are estimated to be about $4 million (33). In addition, these groups rely heavily on volunteer labor and donated re

sources.

Partially in response to the publicity attracted by nuclear critics, proponents of nuclear technology have also formed advocacy groups, as shown in table 32. Most of the groups supporting the technology are trade and professional associations, although there are some broad-based public interest groups in this category as well. In total, about 300,000 individuals belong to professional societies and public interest groups that directly or indirectly support nuclear energy development. Some groups in this category, such as the American Nuclear Society and the Atomic Industrial Forum, focus primarily on nuclear power, while others such as the Edison Electric Institute are utility trade associations with broad agendas that include advocacy of nuclear power among many other issues. In response to the accident at TMI, nuclear advocates stepped up their public education efforts through the creation of the Committee for Energy Awareness (CEA). Current plans call for expenditure of about $27 million in 1983 for CEA, a major increase over previous expenditures of about $6.5 million by all groups combined (42).

Nuclear advocates and critics, including the staffs of public interest groups, are knowledgeable

Table 32.-Major National Groups Influencing Public Opinion For and Against Nuclear Power

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

SOURCES: Terry Lash, "Survey of Major National Groups Influencing Public Opinion Against Nuclear Power," Office of Technology Assessment contractor report, April 1983; M. & D. Mills, "Activities of Groups Which Influence Public Opinion in Favor of Nuclear Power," Office of Technology Assessment contractor report, May 1983.

about nuclear power and much more committed to their beliefs than the general public. They act on these beliefs both in seeking to influence nuclear power policies at the State and Federal level and in attempting to convince the public of their point of view.

The nuclear establishment sometimes blames nuclear critics for the growth of public opposition to nuclear power. However, to some extent these individuals simply are reflecting the concern of the wider public which has grown in response to reactor accidents and the increasing financial problems of the utility industry. In addition, the success or failure of both advocates and critics depends in part on public response to their arguments. A 1983 opinion poll indicates that Ralph Nader, a leading environmentalist, is considered very believable on energy matters (9). Electric utility trade associations are considered somewhat less believable, and nuclear industry associations have much lower credibility among poll respondents. Thus, it appears that the public may be more willing to listen to and accept the arguments of nuclear critics than those of advocates.

The Impact of Public Opinion

on Nuclear Power

Public concerns about reactor safety, nuclear waste disposal, and rising construction costs have had a particularly notable impact on State policies affecting nuclear power. As discussed in chapter 6, State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) must grant a license certifying the need for power prior to construction of any type of new powerplant. Because PUCs have veto power over new plants, based on economic and financial criteria, State laws essentially can halt further development of nuclear power. While critics and advocates have been involved in voter-initiated referenda restricting further licensing of nuclear plants, it is ultimately the voters of the State (the "general public') who decide whether or not to approve these restrictions. Table 31 provides a history of State votes on nuclear energy referenda. Overall, the trend appears to reflect accurately the trends shown in public opinion polls, declining from a large margin of support for nuclear power in 1976 to an ambivalent position today. While all seven restrictive proposals were defeated in 1976, voters in Oregon and Massachusetts approved

« السابقةمتابعة »