however, is that the highest levels of the utility management must be involved with the plants and committed to their good operation. Again, the NRC probably has the authority to command attention at the utility headquarters, and is attempting to do so. Still greater resolve seems to be in order at some utilities, however, and congressional encouragement of NRC to make this a high priority item would help.

Both the NRC and INPO know which utilities are most in need of upgrading their management. All utilities are strongly influenced by the experiences of these few. Strong measures may be required to get the operation of these plants up to minimally acceptable levels. Congressional expresson of the importance of a strong management commitment would be a significant incentive for the NRC and the utilities.

B3. Resolve the Financial Liability for Occupational Exposure

The weapons testing program has focused attention on compensation for injuries arising from exposure to radiation. New approaches are being developed for compensating test participants and downwind residents, and the industry is concerned that these plans will be applied arbitrarily to commercial nuclear plants (and possibly the medical industry). The proposals under consideration for the weapons tests plaintiffs link radiation exposure to the probability of contracting' cancer, and then award compensation based on that probability. With this approach, claimants who receive the most exposure also receive the greatest rewards. Recent legislation in Congress proposes awarding $500,000 to a claimant if there is at least a 50-percent chance that the cancer developed from the radiation exposure. At lower levels of exposure that may only result in a 10to 20-percent chance of cancer, the claimant could receive $50,000. This proposal is controversial for two reasons. First, the nuclear industry contests the relationship between low radiation doses and cancer since there is insufficient scientific or technical basis to support it. In addition, many claimants who were exposed to low doses would receive compensation for cancers that were not produced by radiation but by other

causes. Critics would argue that excluding such cases would deprive a large number of potential victims of just compensation.

Exposure levels during the weapons tests were considerably higher than expected occupational exposures at nuclear reactors. Some workers will, over their lifetimes, nevertheless accumulate a high enough dosage to qualify for awards if the floor is at the 10- to 20-percent level. Hospitals also may find themselves liable for the exposure from X-ray machines and nuclear medicine. Compensation for test victims is an important social issue. It also is important to recognize that it has implications for the nuclear industry that could be serious if the awards are large.

Goal C: Reduce the Risk of Accidents That Have Public Safety or

Utility Financial Impacts

Nuclear reactor safety is a function of the design of the plant, the standards by which it is built, and the care with which it is maintained and operated. If any of these are deficient, safety will be compromised, perhaps seriously, and costs may well escalate unexpectedly. Option A2 has discussed how to improve the designs of the next generation of LWRS, but this alone may not be adequate. It would not affect existing plants, and it may not go far enough in assuring safety in future plants. Without a consensus that nuclear reactors now are safe enough, there are unlikely to be any more. Therefore, ways to improve the safety of both present and future reactors are explored under this goal.

The quality of the people involved appears to be at least as important as the design of the plant. Option B2 discusses how to improve utility operation, but again this may be inadequate by itself. Some utilities simply may be unable to improve their performance sufficiently. Others may think they have done so but experience the same difficulties in construction when they order another plant. Two options discussed under this goal can be considered if utility improvement is inadequate. Construction permits and operating licenses could be reserved for utilities and contrac

tors that can demonstrate the commitment to build and operate the plants to the exacting standards required. Second, different institutional arrangements might be considered to replace utility management of reactors. This option also could be effective in stimulating further growth of nuclear power if utilities are reluctant to order

more.

C1. Improve Confidence in the Safety of Existing and Future Reactors

As discussed in the options above, there has been a continual evolution in designs because of frequent discoveries of inadequacies with respect to safety or operation. As our understanding of the technology has improved, formerly unforeseen accident sequences or conditions are recognized. Unquestionably, the technology is maturing, but there is considerable dispute over how much farther it has to or can go.

Part of the problem has been the partitioned nature of the safety analysis both in the industry and the NRC. Each system may be thoroughly scrutinized, but the entire plant is not viewed as a system, and responsibility for analyzing its overall safety appears to be lacking.

No amount of analysis will uncover all potential problems, but an intense analysis of each plant could identify design or operating flaws before they caused problems. These studies are expensive, but a few utilities already are undertaking them in their own interests. The intent is to discover weak points in the design and develop measures to address them, whether by changing plant equipment or modifying operations.

Other efforts to improve safety could focus on improving the analytical techniques. As has been stated above, probabilistic risk assessment is a useful tool that is still imprecise. Development of this technique would be beneficial for both safety and economics. This will involve mainly improving the data base for failure rates and analyzing the human element, as is done in the aircraft industry.

The existence of unresolved safety issues, and the probable introduction of more as new concerns are developed, undermines confidence in

safety. Resolving them expeditiously would eliminate some safety concerns, demonstrate a commitment to maximum safety on the part of the NRC, and permit more stable cost projections for future plants. Resolution of some of the issues may call for modifications on existing plants. While the utilities would not welcome such expenditures, the overall reduction of uncertainties and the gains in safety would be useful.

C2. Certify Utilities and Contractors

It is readily apparent that some nuclear plants are not being built and operated skillfully enough. As discussed earlier, all plants may be hostage to the weakest because an accident, or even poor performance, reflects on all. If the persuasive approach of option B2 is insufficiently effective in improving nuclear plant management, more drastic steps could be warranted.

For existing reactors, the NRC evidently already has the power to suspend an operating license if a utility is incapable of managing a reactor safely. Few people expect the NRC to do this without the most compelling evidence of incompetence. If higher standards are to be enforced, it probably will only be with congressional legislation. Such improved standards would be in the best interests of the industry even though their implementation could be traumatic. Even if this authority were never invoked, it could be a strong incentive to utilities to improve their performance. The result would be greater confidence in the safety and operability of reactors.

Future reactors present a slightly different picture. Utilities have learned that building reactors is very difficult, and few, if any, would embark on a new construction program unless they were confident they had the ability. Even then, however, other parties of concern may not share that confidence. Certification of utilities as having the necessary ability and commitment to build and operate a reactor to high standards would ensure that many of the expensive mistakes of the past were not repeated. This would reassure many of the critics of nuclear power as well as investors, utility commissions, and the public. It also might be necessary to eliminate from contention con

tractors who had not demonstrated their capability of meeting the exacting standards required for nuclear construction. Presumably utilities would know better than to select these contractors, but some past experiences have been so poor that making it official would increase confidence.

Even though this option is not likely to prevent any plants from being built, it would be viewed by the industry as another set of regulations to meet in what they consider to be an already overregulated enterprise. The utilities also may resent having a Federal agency judge utility management quality. An independent peer body analogous to that being set up for review of medicare inpatient treatment might meet with better acceptance.

There are no clear criteria as to what constitutes good management concerning construction of a nuclear powerplant. Nevertheless, as part of a strategy to rebuild confidence in the technology, this option clearly bears further examination.

C3. Develop Alternative Reactors

DOE has carried on a modest program for R&D on the high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR). Given a higher commitment, the HTGR might develop into a superior reactor. In particular, it has inherent safety features that at least temporarily would shield it from some of the safety concerns of the LWR. Further, if problems develop with the LWR that are too difficult to solve economically, the HTGR probably would be the next available concept in this country. An enlarged R&D program could prove vital in maintaining the nuclear option.

On the negative side, it has to be noted that gas reactors have not been a great success anywhere, and most countries have turned to the U.S. developed LWR technology. Estimates of future costs and reliability are much more conjectural than for the LWR. Many utilities would be reluctant to turn to a less familiar technology that might turn out to be subject to many unforeseen problems. Such uncertainties will only be resolved by a substantial R&D program. To a greater degree than for the standardized LWR discussed above, a thorough demonstration of

the entire HTGR concept, including licensability, costs, operability, and acceptability would be required. This would necessitate an increased development program at DOE.

Even if the HTGR is not seen as a replacement for the LWR, there are still several reasons for supporting an R&D program paced to make it available early in the next century. It would use uranium more efficiently than LWRs, has relatively benign environmental impacts, and could be used for industrial process heat. A small, modular form also has been proposed that could have major safety and financial advantages and be particularly well suited to process heat applications.

It is harder to see a role for heavy water reactors (CANDU) in this country. CANDUS are working extremely well in Canada. At least some of that success, however, is due to the managerial environment in which the nuclear industry operates in Canada. Transplanting it to this country could lose these advantages, and would necessitate industry learning and investing in a quite different technology. While the technology can be mastered, a significant research program would be necessary to adapt CANDUs to our regulatory requirements, or vice versa. It is not clear that this effort is warranted compared to other alternatives such as the HTCR or improved LWRs.

The final alternative reactor discussed in chapter 4 is the PIUS, which was conceived largely to meet safety objections to the LWR. While radically different from the LWR in some ways, it still is an LWR. Therefore it has an element of familiarity that the others do not. The concept, or at least some features of it, appear promising, but only a significant research effort will confirm the feasibility of the design since it is still a paper reactor concept. There is great uncertainty over this concept, but if the research program does prove out the expectations of the developers, the reactor could be deployed rapidly. PIUS could be perceived as much safer by the public and critics.

Development of new technology will not by itself solve the problems of the industry. However, it will play a vital role in an overall upgrading, whether the end result is an improved LWR or an alternative concept.

C4. Revise the Institutional Management of Nuclear Power if Necessary

If a utility has its license revoked as in option C2, or such action seems likely, it might think of turning the plant over to a different operating agent instead of just shutting it down. Utilities already use a large number of consultants and service companies for specific tasks. Operating service companies, discussed in chapter 5, could be an extension of these, or they could be other utilities that have established good records and are prepared to extend their expertise to other reactors. The NRC would be satisfied that the plant was being given the management attention required, the utility would have its plant operating again, probably at higher availability than before, and the public would have greater assurance about the commitment to safe operation.

There are potentially serious liabilities to the idea, however. No utility would like to admit that it is incapable of operating its plant safely and would be reluctant to turn to another operating company except under extreme conditions. The contract between the two would have to be carefully worked out to determine who would pay for modifications and maintenance. If a serious accident did occur, plant restoration costs and liability for offsite damages would have to be spelled out. Premature plant closure due to unexpected deterioration could be another problem.

There do not appear to be any legal impediments to the idea that would require legislation. However, Congress might want to encourage the NRC, and perhaps the Justice Department, to undertake further analysis.

Alternative institutional arrangements also could be formed to encourage nuclear orders in the future. If individual utilities are unable to undertake the risk, consortia of utilities, possibly including vendors and architect-engineering firms etc., might be able to do so. Alternatively, Government-owned power authorities might be the only way to maintain the nuclear option. These concepts are explored briefly in chapter 5.

Goal D: Alleviate Public Concerns and Reduce Political Risks The issue of public acceptance has permeated this report for good reason. If the long-term trend in public opinion toward increasing opposition (described in ch. 8) is not reversed, there will be few, if any, more orders for nuclear plants.

Many of the options discussed above are relevant to this goal. Nuclear energy will not be acceptable so long as there are spectacular examples of out-of-control cost escalations and a continuing series of alarming operating events. A major accident involving offsite loss of life would almost certainly preclude future plants and quite likely close many operating reactors. Therefore, almost any action to improve operations and safety will pay dividends in public acceptance. The options discussed here are intended to reduce the controversy or to confine a role for nuclear power.

D1. Accelerate Studies of Alternative Energy Sources

One of the major factors affecting public opinion against nuclear power is the feeling that the risks associated with it outweigh the benefits. As long as other energy sources are available that are perceived to be both more economical and acceptable, there is little incentive to favor nuclear energy with its more controversial risks. Therefore, as more information is developed on the resource base, costs and impacts of these alternatives, better decisions can be made on the relative merits of nuclear energy.

The major competitor of nuclear power for new central station plants is coal. Yet coal is arousing concerns (e.g., carbon dioxide and acid rain) that may exceed those of nuclear. Significant research is going on in these areas, and the answers are crucial for nuclear power. The sooner they become available, the easier it will be to make informed decisions.

Some analysts feel that natural gas resources have been greatly underestimated. This cannot be confirmed for many years, but there is an im

portant data-gathering role for the Government. If gas remains plentiful and is permitted as a boiler fuel, it will reduce the competitiveness of nuclear energy. From a different perspective, it also might be useful to expand R&D on the solar energy options that appear promising. Some of the euphoria about solar energy has withered under the hard light of costs, but some technologies such as photovoltaics are still candidates. Accelerating these technologies actually could be beneficial to nuclear power. If they ultimately prove to be not widely competitive with nuclear energy, we would know that sooner. If they are reasonably competitive, then the Nation has another option.

None of these proposals is particularly controversial, though some might be expensive. In general, decisions on these options will be made on

a basis other than one's attitude toward nuclear power. The outcome, however, could be very important to the future of nuclear power.

D2. Address the Concerns of the Critics

Critics of nuclear power have long felt a deep distrust of the industry and the NRC. They feel that their concerns have been ignored or downplayed while the Nation plunged ahead to build more reactors. The mistrust is mutual. The industry feels that nothing would change the mind of the critics.

Bridging this distrust will be difficult at best. For those critics who do not want nuclear power under any conditions and for those in the nuclear industry who refuse any concessions, resolution