On Evil

الغلاف الأمامي
Oxford University Press, 20‏/03‏/2003 - 560 من الصفحات
The De Malo represents some of Aquinas' most mature thinking on goodness, badness, and human agency. In it he examines the full range of questions associated with evil: its origin, its nature, its relation to good, and its compatibility with the existence of an omnipotent, benevolent God. This edition offers Richard Regan's new, clear readable English translation, based on the Leonine Commission's authoritative edition of the Latin text. Brian Davies has provided an extensive introduction and notes. (Please note: this edition does not include the Latin text).
 

المحتوى

Can a Good or Bad Angel Sin Venially?
302
Is Venial Sin by One without Charity Punished by Eternal Punishment?
303
Are Any Venial Sins Remitted in Purgatory after This Life Ends?
308
Does Sprinkling Holy Water Anointing the Body and the Like Remit Venial Sins in This Life?
314
On the Capital Sins
317
Is Pride a Special Kind of Sin?
325
Does Pride Belong to Irascible Power?
332
Does Gregory Appropriately Assign Four Species of Pride?
338

Is Every Act Morally indifferent?
103
Are Some Acts Morally Indifferent?
109
Do Circumstances Specify Sins or Alter the Species of Sin By Transferring Them into Different Kinds of Sin?
114
Do Circumstances Make Sins More Serious without Imputing Species to Sins?
120
Do Circumstances Make Sins Infinitely More Serious Namely so as to Make Venial Sins Mortal?
123
Are All Sins Equal?
124
Are Sins More Serious Because They Are Contrary to a Greater Good?
130
Does Sin Diminish Natural Good?
132
Can Sin Destroy the Whole Natural Good?
137
On the Causes of Sin
141
Do Acts of Sin Come from God?
146
Does the Devil Cause Sin?
149
Can the Devil by Interior Persuasion Induce Human Beings to Sin?
154
Does the Devil Suggest Every Sin?
157
Regarding Human Sinners Can Ignorance Cause Sin?
158
Is Ignorance a Sin?
161
Does Ignorance Excuse or Diminish Sin?
165
Can a Person Having Knowledge Sin out of Weakness?
168
Do We Impute Sins Committed out of Weakness to Human Beings as Mortal Sins?
173
Does Weakness Make Sin Less or More Serious?
175
Can a Person Sin out of Malice That Is Deliberate Malice?
177
Does the Sinner out of Malice Sin More Seriously Than the Sinner out of Weakness?
181
Is Every Sin Done out of Malice a Sin against the Holy Spirit?
184
Can Sins against the Holy Spirit Be Forgiven?
189
On Original Sin
193
What Is Original Sin?
200
Is Flesh or the Soul the Subject in Which Original Sin Inheres?
209
Does Original Sin Inhere in the Powers of the Soul Prior to Being in the Souls Essence?
211
Does Original Sin Inhere in the Will Prior to Being in Other Powers?
214
Is Original Sin Transmitted by Adam to All Descendants from His Seed?
216
Do Those Begotten Only from Adams Matter Contract Original Sin?
223
Are the Sins of Immediate Parents Transmitted by Physical Descent to Their Posterity?
225
On the Punishment of Original Sin
231
Does Original Sin Deserve Punishment of the Senses?
237
Do Those Who Die with Only Original Sin Suffer the Torment of Internal Anguish?
239
Are Death and Other Ills of This Life Punishment of Original Sin?
242
Are Death and Like Ills Natural to Human Beings?
245
On Human Choice
253
On Venial Sin
265
Does Venial Sin Diminish Charity?
273
Can Venial Sin Become Mortal?
279
Do Circumstances Make Venial Sins Mortal?
285
Can Venial Sin Belong to Higher Reason?
287
Can Venial Sin Belong to Sense Appetites?
292
Could Adam in the Condition of Innocence Have Sinned Venially?
295
Are the First Movements of the Sense Appetites of Unbelievers Venial Sins?
300
On Vainglory
341
Is Vainglory a Mortal Sin?
344
Do We Appropriately Assign Disobedience Boasting Hypocrisy Contention Obstinacy Discord and Audacity for Novelties as the Daughters of Vaingl...
348
On Envy
351
Is Envy a Mortal Sin?
354
Is Envy a Capital Sin?
359
On Spiritual Apathy
361
Is Spiritual Apathy a Special Kind of Sin?
364
Is Spiritual Apathy a Mortal Sin?
366
Is Spiritual Apathy a Capital Sin?
369
On Anger
371
Can Anger Be a Sin?
377
Is Anger a Mortal Sin?
380
Is Anger a Less Serious Sin Than Hate and Envy and the Like?
384
Is Anger a Capital Sin?
386
On Avarice
389
Is Avarice a Mortal Sin?
392
Is Avarice a Capital Sin?
395
Is Lending at Interest a Mortal Sin?
397
On Gluttony
405
Is Gluttony a Mortal Sin?
408
Does Gregory Appropriately List the Species of Gluttony?
412
Is Gluttony a Capital Sin?
415
On Sexual Lust
419
Is Every Act of Sexual Lust a Mortal Sin?
423
Are Fornication Adultery Incest Seduction of a Virgin Rape and Sins Contrary to Nature the Species of Sexual Lust?
430
Is Sexual Lust a Capital Sin?
431
On Devils
435
Are Devils Evil by Their Nature or Their Will?
444
Did the Devil in Sinning Desire Equality with God?
452
Did the Devil Sin or Could He Have Sinned at the First Moment of His Creation?
458
Sun Devils Free Choice Return to Good after Their Sin?
467
Is a Devils Intellect So Darkened after Sin That It Can Error Be Deceived?
474
Do Devils Know Future Things?
482
Do Devils Know Our Interior Thoughts?
490
Can Devils Alter Material Substances by Changing the Substances Forms?
495
Can Devils Cause the Locomotion of Material Substances?
500
Can Devils Affect the Souls Cognitive Powers Regarding the Internal or External Senses?
503
Can Devils Affect Human Beings Intellect?
509
Glossary of Terms
515
Glossary of Authors and Works Cited
521
Comparable Passages in Other Works of Aquinas
525
NonBiblical Texts Cited
527
Select Bibliography
531
Index
537
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مقاطع مشهورة

الصفحة 21 - For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present— namely, the diseases and wounds— go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance,— the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which...
الصفحة 25 - But nevertheless, on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.
الصفحة 39 - Aquinas would reply that my actions are free if nothing in the world is acting on me so as to make me perform them, not if God is not acting in me. According to him, what is incompatible with human free will is 'necessity of coercion...
الصفحة 44 - The knowledge that is natural to us has its source in the senses and extends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, however, our understanding cannot reach to the divine essence.
الصفحة 51 - Goodness should be associated above all with God. For goodness is consequent upon desirability. Now things desire their perfection; and an effect's perfection and form consists in resembling its cause, since what a thing does reflects what it is. So the cause itself is desirable and can be called 'good', what is desired from it being a share in resembling it.
الصفحة 19 - Since it is God's nature to exist, he it must be who properly causes existence in creatures, just as it is fire itself which sets other things on fire. And God is causing this effect in things not just when they begin to exist, but all the time they are maintained in existence. . . . Now existence is more intimately and profoundly interior to things than anything else, for everything as we said is potential when compared to existence.
الصفحة 21 - ... mean that the evils which were present— namely, the diseases and wounds— go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance,— the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils— that is, privations of the good which we call health— are accidents.
الصفحة 39 - Aquinas, however, would reply that my actions are free if nothing in the world is acting on me so as to make me perform them, not if God is not acting in me. According to him, what is incompatible with freedom is "necessity of coercion...
الصفحة 33 - And so, as being the principle through which the universe is created, divine wisdom means art, or exemplar, or idea, and likewise it also means law, as moving all things to their due ends. Accordingly, the Eternal Law is nothing other than the exemplar of divine wisdom as directing the motions and actions of everything

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