No one advised me of the route via Farn Island, Lindesnaes, and Lister Deep.

I received a uniformed Trinity House pilot at Nab Lightship, February 27th, and we went to the Downs that evening and anchored at 9.30 p. m. We stayed there until the 19th before we received our clearance papers.

We had a very heavy southeast storm there and the English boarding officer was unable to board us earlier. He came on board at 5 a. m. the 19th, and at 8 p. m. he gave us our clearance papers. We proceeded the following morning at 6 a. m. The pilot remained with us as far as Sunk Lightship.

The pilot told me at Downs that I could proceed either by way of Yarmouth (the Farn Island route) or via Galloper Buoy. He said that if we were going to the Hook of Holland the latter route would be the best, as Holland-American steamers were constantly going back and forth in that track. He said he was willing to go either way.

The boarding officer gave me no advice as to which route to take, but after he learned I was going to the Hook of Holland he gave me a true east course via Galloper Buoy to Schouvenbank Lightship and thence to the Maas. He showed me on the chart what he supposed to be the southern limit of the German mines and the northern limit of the English mines.

We anchored at or near North Hinder Lightship at 5 p. m. on the 19th, on account of danger from floating mines.

We proceeded on the morning of the 20th at 7.30. Between 8 and 10 o'clock that morning we passed 14 floating mines en route to Schouvenbank Lightship. I saw these 14 mines myself. They were not in one line or in one group; first I saw some on the starboard side and then some on the port side, and so on.

I thought they were new mines, because they were not rusty.

I was within 25 or 30 yards of some, and could see them well with the naked eye. In fact, we had to change our course for some of them which were dead ahead. I also saw some with marine glasses. The mines were about four feet in diameter and round like a buoy. The mines seemed to be free and not anchored, and bounced up and down with the waves just like buoys. They all seemed to have studs. on top, and I do not remember having seen any smooth ones. A long thin bar seemed to extend across the top of each mine, over the sides, and balanced on a pivot in the middle. Several of the mines were marked on the side with the letter "H." No other letters were to be

seen.

I never stopped running on account of mines after leaving North Hinder. We were running full speed on the 19th, about 9 knots.

We arrived at Maas Lightship at 1.30 p. m. on the 20th, and I saw the Dutch torpedo boats. They came close to me and asked what I wanted, and I told them I wanted a pilot to take me to the Weser.

They replied that I would have to run into the Hook of Holland to get a pilot, as the pilot boat lies there.

We sailed into the Hook of Holland and anchored near the gas buoy and the Dutch pilot boat sent a pilot aboard the ship. We had the pilot flag up and they evidently thought we were bound for Rotterdam.

In talking with the pilot, he said I could get no pilot there to take me to the Weser, but said I might be able to get a pilot if I went ashore and telegraphed to Bremen for one. They took me ashore at the Hook, and there I met the chief officer of S. S. Ocmulgee, who told me that he had come ashore and had telephoned to the Furness Shipping Company of Rotterdam for a pilot, and they had sent one to the Ocmulgee and they were just going aboard the ship to sail. They had told Furness Company that the Carib was there and also wanted a pilot, but I could not get one that day. I called up the Furness Company and he told me to call up the company by telephone at 9 o'clock the next morning. I called him as agreed next morning, and he said the pilot would be at the Hook of Holland at 1 p. m.

The Furness Shipping Company, I think the manager of the company, suggested that I might follow the Ocmulgee without a pilot, but I said I would not do that, but would wait at the Hook until I secured a pilot.

We secured the pilot at 1 p. m. February 21st, and sailed about 4.15 p.m.

I did not question the pilot as to his ability or references, because the Furness Shipping Company had recommended him to me and had engaged him for me, and before I left the United States I had instructions that the Furness Company would attend to affairs for me in Holland.

The pilot told me he was a North Sea pilot and had been sent by the Furness Shipping Company. He was sober when he came on board and remained so the entire time.

I discussed with him the course we should pursue to the Weser, and he mentioned, what I already knew, that the lightships were gone. He claimed to have been master and mate on many vessels and to have sailed German waters often. He never told me that he had never piloted any American vessel to the Weser.

We were going to steer for Haaks Lightship position and had no intentions of going to Lister Deep. Then we intended to go to Terschelling Bank Lightship position: then to Boerkum Reef Lightship position; then east by south, magnetic, to 9 miles north of Norderney Lighthouse. I think we changed to this last course about 2.45 a. m.

We cast the lead frequently. We had 15 fathoms at 9 a. m., 13 fathoms at 10 o'clock, and 121⁄2 fathoms at 10.30. We were about to heave lead again when the explosion came.

The pilot had his own chart with him and advised me when to

heave the lead. We did not want to go too close as it was quite hazy. I depended greatly upon him as he seemed to know the waters thoroughly. He appeared to be a capable pilot, and I found his courses to be correct.

We were going at full speed when the explosion occurred. We had been going at full speed all night; the pilot says it was safe to do so. The weather was somewhat hazy and at times there was a thick fog. Most of the time we were able to see about 2 or 3 miles. We saw no floating mines at all that morning.

I had just left the bridge and was down on deck when the explosion came.

I judged the ship was 10 miles north by west from Norderney Light when the explosion came. But all morning we had had the tide against us and I believe we were much more to the westward than this position. The wind was about SSW.

The first explosion occurred at 10.58 a. m., February 22nd. It seemed to strike the vessel just about amidships, and directly from below, as the ship seemed to lift. The explosion broke the ship in two and burst one of the boilers, which blew coal and steam up into the air and into the Captain's room, and almost instantly the engine room was full of water up to the cylinders. This rush of water and steam is, in my opinion, what caused the death of Third Assistant Engineer William Bazzell, Fireman Antonio Martinez, and Coal Passer Segunda Blaz, as no trace of these men could be found, although a search for them was made as thoroughly as possible.

The boats were uncovered and already swinging in the davits, as they were constantly since leaving the Channel. They were lowered immediately and the remaining 27 men and the pilot, named Kruize, rowed away from the ship.

I was unable to save any papers on account of the perilous condition of the vessel and the necessity for immediate departure.

After we had rowed about one-quarter of a mile from the ship we stopped and waited, and the last we saw of the ship through the haze and fog the stern of the vessel was just about to sink under water. This was about 20 minutes after the explosion. Then we started to make for the shore, steering a southerly course, and in about 15 minutes we heard a second explosion. We were unable to tell whether this was another mine or the second boiler exploding. We did not actually see the ship sink, on account of the thick fog, but judging from our last sight of her she went down in a very few minutes.

I have no belief that the vessel was torpedoed but feel reasonably sure she struck a mine.

I was in charge of boat No. 1 and Chief Officer Gifford was in charge of boat No. 2.. There were 16 men in my boat, including the pilot, and in the other boat there were 12 men.

After rowing for about 40 minutes we sighted a German patrol

boat, Annie Busse, almost ahead and a little on the port bow. We had no sail set and had put out no distress signals.

As soon as we saw the Annie Busse we shifted our course direct for the boat, and as they had sighted we were enabled to come on board at about 12.30 p. m., after not more than 11⁄2 hours on the water.

The patrol boat was anchored, and on account of the thick fog it was unable to bring us in until February 24th, on which date we landed at Wilhelmshaven at 1 p. m. From there we were sent to Bremerhaven, reaching the latter port at 10 p. m. the same day.

During our stay on the Anne Busse we were most courteously and kindly treated, and received everything necessary in the way of sleeping accommodations and food, etc.

The only men of the crew lost were those previously mentioned, Third Assistant Engineer William Bazzell, of Pensacola, Fla., Fireman Antonio Martinez, and Coal Passer Segunda Blaz, the last two of Corunna, Spain.

EDGAR L. COLE,

CONSULAR AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES,

Master of S. S. Carib.

City of Bremerhaven, Empire of Germany, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named Captain Edgar L. Cole, February 26th, 1915.

J. F. BUCK,

Consular Agent of the United States of America.

[Seal of American Consular Agency.]

[Inclosure 2.]

Sworn Statement of First Officer of S. S. "Carib."

My name is George H. Gifford.

I was born in Salem, Mass., March 24, 1875.

I have been first officer on the Carib since two weeks before we sailed for Germany.

I have never made a trip to Germany before.

The ship was loaded with 4,600 bales of cotton and 250 tons of pig iron as ballast.

We finished loading at Charleston, January 26, 1915, and sailed the following day at 1 p. m.

We had 30 men in our crew, including officers, when we sailed. The captain had special instructions to proceed to the Isle of Wight to get a pilot, and from there, in case he could not get one, to proceed to Hook of Holland for German pilot. He had received these instructions from the Clyde Steamship Company before sailing.

We also had a chart from the United States Hydrographic Office, I think the one for January. We also had Hydrographic bulletins. I did not see in the bulletins any special instructions for the trip, but we were not looking for other instructions, as we were ordered to via Hook of Holland.

We had bad weather twice between Charleston and the Isle of Wight, the first time February 8th, when we had to heave to, and the second time February 13th.

The captain demonstrated himself to be an able and a capable seaman and a very good navigator. He got along well with his officers and crew and never had any trouble with them.

We reached the Isle of Wight February 14. We anchored there at 10 o'clock the same night. We got a Trinity House pilot there the next morning and proceeded to the Downs. We were detained at the Downs about 48 hours on account of bad weather. The boarding officer came on board at 5.20 a. m., February 17th, and we were cleared that night at 8 p. m., but did not leave until the following morning.

We went via Sunk Lightship and the Galloper to Maas Lightship the night of the 18th and did not attempt to go further that night on account of mines. We passed one mine at 3.45 that afternoon a half hour before we anchored. This mine was recorded in the log book as having been within 50 feet of our vessel. I did not see it.

February 19th we left for Maas by way of Schouvenbank Lightship. On that day we saw 14 mines, 13 of them between 8 and 10 a. m., and the other one about 12.45 p. m.

I saw 13 of the mines myself. They were what I took to be floating mines and jutted at least one-third out of the water. They were plainly visible a long ways off, as we had a calm sea. They were painted black and had a white letter "H." There was also a balance rod on top, thin and perhaps four feet long. I saw all mines with the naked eye and did not use the glasses.

We never saw any more mines after the 14 above mentioned. We reached the Maas at 1.35 p. m., Saturday, the 20th. We did not anchor there. We proceeded to the Hook of Holland, reaching there at 4 p. m. the 20th. The captain went ashore immediately.

The English pilot had told us that we could get a pilot at Maas and we signaled for one there, but we had to go inside for him.

The Furness Shipping Company of Rotterdam furnished the pilot; the captain had orders to ask the Furness Company for one and he told me afterward that the pilot was from them.

I talked with the pilot a few times, and he told me he had sailed to the Weser as master, but did not say he had ever come in as a pilot. He told me he was not a Government man, but a private pilot, and claimed that North Sea pilots were not licensed. From what he said I inferred that he had been to the Weser enough times to bring in a ship in safety.