The pilot talked as though we were clear of the mines and said we were outside of them. He figured on going out farther. We were on full speed all the time after leaving the Hook of Holland, having no reason to do otherwise. The pilot came on board the 21st of February, at 4 p. m. From the time we left the Downs we kept a lookout night and day, which was according to instructions from America. The explosion occurred about 10.58, February 22, 1915. The ship was going full speed at the time, so far as I know. The weather was somewhat thick, but only for a few minutes at a time. There was a light fog. The wind was SW. It was ebb current. The current ran about from 2 to 4 knots. When we struck the mine we were about 10 miles north by west of Norderney Lighthouse. When the explosion came I was in my cabin. It seemed to be right amidships. At first I thought something had gone wrong in the engine room. There is no doubt in my mind that we struck a mine. I could not say just how the ship was damaged, as the explosion came from the port side and I was on the starboard side. In 20 or 25 minutes we were in the boats which were swinging in the davits. Practically all of us remained several minutes on board and the engineers and others tried to get into the engine and fire rooms to look for the Third Assistant Engineer and fireman and coal passer, but it was impossible to get down to them on account of the rush of sea water and live steam. The three men were probably killed instantly. After we got clear of the ship we hung around for 30 or 40 minutes to see if any trace of the men could be found, but the ship's quarter deck was already under water then. I do not think the ship could have staid afloat very long. I was in charge of boat No. 2. We were in the boats about one or 11⁄2 hours, and were picked up about 12.45 by the German scout boat Annie Busse and kept there 48 hours on account of the fog, when we were taken to Wilhelmshaven. The German officers and crew treated us most courteously and even gave up their beds for us. We reached Wilhelmshaven at noon of the 24th and arrived in Bremerhaven at 10 o'clock that night. AMERICAN CONSULAR AGENCY, G. H. GIFFORD, First Officer S. S. "Carib." City of Bremerhaven, Empire of Germany, ss: Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named First Officer Gifford on the 28th of February, 1915. J. F. BUCK, Consular Agent of the United States of America. [Seal of American Consular Agency.] [Inclosure 3.] Sworn Statement of Third Officer of S. S. "Carib." My name is Charles H. Winnett. I was born in Philadelphia, June 28, 1876. I was third officer on the S. S. Carib and joined that vessel at Charleston, January 26th, 1915. I never made the trip to Germany before. We finished loading on the night of the 26th and sailed for Bremen the 27th of January. We had 4,600 bales of cotton and pig iron as ballast. I understand that the iron was distributed in all four hatches. We cleared from Charleston. I do not know whether the captain had any special sailing instructions before leaving. The captain was Edgar L. Cole. Shortly after leaving Charleston the captain told me that he had orders to go via the English Channel and then to the Hook of Holland, where the agents were to furnish us a pilot for Germany. I know that the captain never had any difficulties with his officers or crew. We broke the steering gear twice, the first time February 1st, about 600 miles south of Halifax and about 900 miles east of New York, and the second time 90 miles west of the Scilly Islands, February 13th. When the gear broke the first time, it carried away the hand gear as well, and we had nothing to go by except the steam gear. After the steam gear had been repaired it was as good as ever. The ship had proper charts to bring her across the Atlantic and through the Channel, but the chart of the North Sea was not a good one as it was too small. We got a new North Sea chart at the Hook of Holland which was a large scale chart and a good one. We had the January and February Hydrographic charts from the United States Government on board. I believe the master and pilot consulted these charts. The master expected to be able to get proper instructions and a qualified pilot at the Hook of Holland. We took our English pilot at Nab Lightship. He took us via the Downs to Sunk Lightship. The British boarding officer came on board at the Downs after we had laid there about 44 hours. We anchored at Downs the night of the 17th and the boarding officer came the morning of the 19th. His visit was delayed on account of a heavy southwest gale and a rough sea. The delay was due to weather conditions. He detained us about 12 hours before giving us permission to proceed. The captain discussed the voyage with the English pilot. The pilot advised the master as to what he considered the best route to the Maas Lightship, and the pilot laid down the course on the chart, via Galloper Lightship. We reached the Hook of Holland February 20th, at 3 p. m. about. The captain went ashore to see about securing a German pilot, or pilot for Germany, and the Dutch sea pilot remained on board until he returned. The captain applied to his agents at Rotterdam for a pilot. I do not know the agents' names. The captain told me in off-hand conversation that the agents furnished the pilot. The pilot for Germany came on board the 21st, between 4-5 p. m. The sea pilot went ashore then and the other pilot took charge, I presume. I do not know the pilot's name. I had no conversation with the pilot until 11 o'clock that night, when I called him and he instructed me to cast the lead, and we found 17 fathoms and altered the course to NE. 4 E. I was on watch from 8 to 12 that night and from 8 to 11 the next morning, and during these periods had some conversation with the pilot. The pilot claimed to be a general pilot; he claimed to be a North Sea pilot. He said he had run into the Weser but said he had not been to Bremen or Bremerhaven since the war started. He was talking about ships which run from Rotterdam to the River Plate, and I assumed he was either master or mate of a ship on that run. He said he was not a government pilot, but a private pilot. He said nothing about holding a license either as master or pilot. I was informed by another pilot at the Hook that the Dutch government pilots are not allowed to leave Dutch waters, and could not make the trip to Germany. He seemed to know how to handle the ship all right; he knew his courses and he knew his distances. As he had been sent on board by the agents, I supposed he was qualified to take us in safely, but I believe now if he had been a qualified man he would have been better posted. During my watches on the night before and the day of the explosion the vessel was running at full speed. This was, of course, on the pilot's orders. The pilot never seemed anxious about mines. We had double outlook on watch for floating mines. We posted double lookouts after leaving Nab Lightship. We saw our first mines on Saturday morning, the 20th, by the North Hinder Lightship, west of there about 6 to 8 miles. We saw two groups of three mines each and passed between them, three on each side, about a quarter of a mile away from them. I saw the mines myself. We met a Dutch ship shortly after seeing these mines and she signaled that we were standing into danger and to keep a sharp lookout. After meeting this vessel we saw seven more mines within an hour. In all we passed 13 mines within two hours, between 8 and 10 a. m. They were floating mines. They floated about a foot out of water and were easily distinguishable at a mile. They were new and freshly painted, without seagrowth. They were equipped with balance bars or rods on top and were marked with the letter "H" in white. They were marked with three white letters and they may have all been "H," but we could not distinguish the other two. We reported these mines to two Dutch torpedo boats that same afternoon. I never saw any more mines after that, but one was reported on the next watch which I did not see. The first night after leaving Maas, the 21st, we steered NE. 1⁄2 E., I think, but I am not certain. Then at 10.45 we changed the course to NE. 4 E. by compass. While we were on that course I went off watch. When I came on watch the next morning at 8 o'clock we were steering East by South. We took a cast of the lead at 10 o'clock and the bottom was 14 fathoms. Overcast and light fog at the time. After 10 o'clock it shut in thick and we were still steering East by South. At 11 o'clock we struck an obstruction amidships. It was within 2 minutes of 11 o'clock. The approximate position when we struck was north and west of the position of Norderney Lightship, about 3 miles away, 13 fathoms of water by the lead. The vessel did not lose her headway when we struck. I do not know how the tide was. The boiler burst and the steam was shut off automatically. The explosion broke the vessel in two amidships and cracked her up to the hurricane deck. There was a hole in her and when she listed to port this hole came up to the water line and could be plainly seen. The hole must have been at least 6 feet in diameter and, I presume, she was split up right from the bottom. There was only one explosion while we were on board. The boats had been swung out constantly since we left the Downs. In 20 minutes we were clear of the ship. Three men were lost. They were the Third Assistant Engineer William Bazzell, and one Spanish fireman and one Spanish coal passer. These men were presumably in the after fireroom or coal bunker. That is where they would be in any case while on duty. No one in our crew saw these men after the explosion occurred, to my knowledge. The engine and boiler room space was filled with steam and water instantly, and there is no question in my mind that three men were either killed instantly or were drowned after being first rendered unconscious by the shock. The engineers went down into the engine and boiler rooms as far as they could and looked for these men, but it was impossible to find any trace whatever of them. It was also impossible to remain long, on account of the volume of water pouring into hole from the sea. I am satisfied that all possible was done to find the men, and that they were not abandoned until danger made it absolutely imperative. I was in the captain's boat. After we had cleared we heard one more explosion, about 25 minutes after clearing, and we believe it to have been a second mine. As soon as we got a short distance away the ship was closed in by the fog, and we did not see her sink. There is no question in my mind that she sank very soon; she was down by the stern and a heavy port list, her port rail being under when we last saw her. When we cleared the vessel, we steered south by west by boat compasses, trying to make the beach. About 12.45 we were picked up, after a little more than one hour in the boats. The German patrol boat Annie Busse picked us up and kept us on board 48 hours, because the ship could not come in on account of fog. We were treated very courteously on the boat, and the German officials, officers, and crew did all they possibly could to make us comfortable. We were landed in Wilhelmshaven at 11.30 a. m. the 24th of February, and were sent to Bremerhaven, reaching here at 10 p. m. same day. The morning of the explosion we saw no other vessels, no buoys, and no mines. No land or seamarks of any kind were to be seen. CHARLES H. WINNETT, Third Officer S. S. "Carib." AMERICAN CONSULAR AGENCY, City of Bremerhaven, Empire of Germany, ss: Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named Third Officer Winnett on the 28th of February, 1915. J. F. BUCK, Consular Agent of the United States of America. [Seal of American Consular Agency.] [Inclosure 4.] Sworn Statement of Second Officer of S. S. "Carib.” I, Jesse Boyd, born in New York City March 2, 1870, second officer of the steamer Carib, having been duly sworn, do hereby depose and |