The Will, Its Structure and Mode of ActionAndrus & Church, 1898 - 86 من الصفحات |
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¹ Wundt action analysis apperception argument assertion attention become brain causal cause cerned character choice conception conservation of energy constitutes crete deliberation demands Descartes desire determine Die Willenshandlung element Ethics Ethik event existence experience explain expression external fact feeling of activity fills consciousness force Freedom given Hegel Höffding idea ideal immediate implies impulses individual influence inner instinctive intel intellectual invariable James James Ward Joule Libertarian manifested matter means ment metaphysical theory mind minor premise moral motives movements Münster Münsterberg nature necessary nervous ness object ourselves outer acts Outlines of Psychology perception perhaps Phil physical physiological possible postulate practical Principles of Psychology psychical punishment question realize reference reflex regarding relation remorse representation result rience sciousness seems sensations sense sphere suppose syllogism take place thing thought tion ultimate vidual volition voluntary Willenshandlung word
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الصفحة 40 - ... not determined by that only which excites, that is, immediately affects the senses ; but we possess the power to overcome the impressions made on the faculty of our sensuous desires, by representing to ourselves what, in a more distant way, may be useful or hurtful. These considerations of what is desirable with regard to our whole state, that is, of what is good and useful, are based entirely on reason.
الصفحة 10 - ... to tell little more than a few names of places through which he passed. Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and has made his experience thereby.
الصفحة 79 - What is really true for the ordinary consciousness; what it clings to, and will not let go; what marks unmistakably, by its absence, a "philosophical" or a "debauched" morality, is the necessary connection between responsibility and liability to punishment, between punishment and desert, or the finding of guiltiness before the law of the moral tribunal. For practical purposes we need make no distinction between responsibility, or accountability, and liability to punishment. Where you have the one,...
الصفحة 67 - Character is simply that of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation ; it is the force of which conduct is the expression, or the substance of which conduct is the attribute.
الصفحة 38 - The essential achievement of the ivill, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should ensue.
الصفحة 69 - And certainly, in the case of Actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past.
الصفحة 48 - The subject, then, of Psychology is the uniformities of succession, the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which one mental state succeeds another — is caused by, or at least is caused to follow, another.
الصفحة 56 - ... a valid and useful working hypothesis under which we may bring certain classes of physical phenomena.
الصفحة 39 - ... integration with the old-established complex of presentation. The new end gets in only as far as it is adjusted and harmonized with old ends : the old ends themselves, a single integrated group, take on a new complexion from the new element of experience thus absorbed. The attention moves throughout the series of elements, grasping, relating, retaining, selecting, and when the integration it effects swells and fills consciousness — that is the fiat.
الصفحة 40 - The first point to start from in understanding voluntary action, and the possible occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve, is the fact that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive* We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its way to instigate a movement.