Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action, المجلد 743

الغلاف الأمامي
Cambridge University Press, 23‏/06‏/1977 - 198 من الصفحات
All social theorists and philosophers who seek to explain human action have a 'model of man', a metaphysical view of human nature. Some make man a plastic creature of nature and nurture, some present him as the autonomous creator of his social world, some offer a compromise. Each view needs its own theory of scientific knowledge calling for philosophic appraisal and the compromise sets harder puzzles than either. Passive accounts of man, for example, have a robust notion of causal explanation but cannot either find or dispense with a self to apply them to. Active accounts rightly stress an autonomous self, but lack a proper concept of explanation. Martin Hollis takes these tensions and contrasts from the thought of sociologists, economists, and psychologists. He then develops a model of his own - one which seeks to connect personal and social identity through an ambitious theory of rational action and a priori knowledge, proposing a sense in which men can act freely and still be a subject for scientific explanation.
 

المحتوى

Two models
1
Nature and nurture
23
The regularity of the moral world
41
Lifes short comedy
69
Personal identity and social identity
87
Elements of action
107
Reasons and motives
123
The rational and the real
143
Ideal understanding
165
Envoi actor and context
185
Bibliography
191
Index of names
197
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