call it absurd or foolish; but it is the established usage of nations, and while it remains so, we must conform to it. Suppose, therefore, that any injury should be done to the commerce of our citizens, by French privateers for instance, or French municipalities, in contravention of our treaty, or against the law of nations, but under color of certain acts of the French government. Could redress be obtained by means of consuls? So far from it, that it could not even be applied for; since the consuls could have no access to the government. And yet the gentleman from Pennsylvania tells us, that the interests of our commerce in foreign countries can be managed by consuls!

In the next place, our consuls in foreign countries are, for the most part, natives of the countries where they reside; with very few exceptions, they are mere private merchants; and except, in the single case of the consuls to the Barbary powers, who, according to established usage, are a species of ministers, they receive no salaries. Are men of this description adequate to the protection of our commercial interests? Can they be expected to possess the requisite knowledge, for conducting affairs of this kind, or the requisite influence or weight of character? Will they abandon their own private affairs, to attend at a remote capital, and solicit the restitution of vessels, the revocation of injurious orders, or indemnification for improper seizures? If they were qualified for this business, and willing to undertake it, they certainly would not do so at their own expense. When our consul at Bourdeaux, Nantes or Marseilles, for instance, should be applied to on any business which would require an application to the French government, would he go to Paris, and remain there to finish the business, at his own expense? Certainly not. We must pay him, not only his expenses, but a compensation for his time and trouble. As these applications would frequently occur, he could not go specially for each one; but must remain always there; and we must give him

He would

a salary sufficient to induce him to do so. then be a minister in fact, and in expense. He would want nothing of the character but the name, and the capacity of usefulness. This is the establishment which the gentleman from Pennsylvania wishes to substitute, in the place of our present diplomatic appointments. The consuls, in order to perform the duties which he says ought to be assigned to them, must be turned into ministers; equally expensive with the present corps, but far less efficacious.

In the third place, we should have a multitude of these new fashioned consul-ministers; for we have a variety of consuls, in each of the great maritime nations of Europe. There is one in every considerable trading town. In France, for instance, we have six or seven; perhaps a much greater number. Each of these, upon the plan of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, must reside at Paris; for it would be impossible for them to be perpetually running backward and forward, between their respective sea-ports and Paris, as often as any affair might occur requiring an application to the government. If any gentleman should doubt of this, let him look at the list now on the table, of between four and five hundred American vessels, carried into the different ports of France, or detained there contrary to the treaty, and redress for the capture and detention of which, must be obtained, if obtained at all, from the French government, by means either of a minister or of consuls. The consuls, therefore, if they are to do the business, must all reside at Paris; and instead of one minister, we should have nine or ten; perhaps a greater number. These observations will apply, with a greater or less degree of force, to every other country with which we have a considerable commerce. And yet the gentleman from Pennsylvania tells us, that our commercial relations ought to be left to consuls!

Having seen, Mr. Chairman, what the duty of consuls is not, let us now inquire, for a moment, what it is. We shall find them very necessary agents, though

wholly inadequate to the business usually committed to ministers.

In the first place, it is their duty to settle disputes, which may arise between seafaring people of their own nation, arriving in the foreign ports where they respectively reside. These disputes, we know, are apt to arise between the masters of the ships and their crews, between the crews themselves, and between the masters or crews of different ships; and these consuls are usually empowered to terminate them, in a manner less tedious and expensive than could be done, by the local laws of the country.

In the next place, they are to assist seafaring people of their own country, who may happen to have any disputes with the people of the place; are to make advances to them when in distress; and procure redress for them in all cases, where it can be afforded by the local authorities of their respective ports.

And lastly, they are to act as agents, between the people of their country and the minister; to inform him of cases which require his interference with the government, and to facilitate to the sufferers the means of applying to him. They are to be his agents in all the sea-ports; while he is the general and immediate agent of his country, with the government. They are to keep him informed of all the cases which occur in their respective ports, of violations of treaties, or of neutral rights; so that he may be enabled to take the proper steps for obtaining redress.

The duties of these agents whom we call consuls, are therefore so distinct from those of a minister, so necessary in themselves, and so incapable of being performed, except by persons residing in the sea-ports, that were all the present consuls, according to the plan of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, to be immediately sent to the capitals, and converted into ministers under a new name, their place must instantly be supplied by other agents, whom perhaps the gentleman would not choose to call consuls, but who must be in

vested with the same powers, and perform the same duties. Such is the wise and notable scheme of the gentleman from Pennsylvania; and thus it is, he is to rid us of the expense of ministers!

Let me be permitted, Mr. Chairman, to propose another question to the gentleman from Pennsylvania. If ministers have nothing to do with commercial relations, except making treaties of commerce, how comes it to pass that the gentleman is willing for us to have ministers of the highest grade, with those two nations with whom we have treaties of commerce, and where, according to him, ministers can have nothing to do? I mean France and England; with both of which nations we have commercial treaties, and where the gentleman consents to our retaining ministers plenipotentiary. To be consistent with himself, he ought to attempt the recal of these two ministers, by refusing an appropriation for their salaries, and to leave untouched those of Lisbon and Berlin, who may possibly have something to do. But this is not the gentleman's object. He has another, which is to establish the principle of controlling the executive, in the exercise of this part of his constitutional functions, and thus effect a breach in the intrenchments of the constitution; and he will pardon me for considering this doctrine, about which he has discoursed so much, and with such ingenuity, as a mere covered way to conceal his attack.

So much, Mr. Chairman, for the utility of ministers in general; who appear to me essentially necessary, not merely for making commercial treaties, but for protecting the rights of our citizens in foreign countries, according to treaties where there are any, and under the law of nations, where there are none.

But gentlemen point particularly to the mission to Berlin. What have we to do, say gentlemen, with the minister to Berlin? What have we to do, say gentlemen, with the king of Prussia, or the politics of Germany? To me, Mr. Chairman, let me repeat it, it is

enough that the President has judged it proper to send a minister to Berlin; for to him and the senate, in my belief, and not to this House, has the constitution confided the right to decide on this subject. But to gentlemen, who are not satisfied with this answer, I will give another, and one which I promise myself they will find satisfactory. Have gentlemen, who object to this mission, adverted to the peculiar situation of Europe at this moment? Have they adverted to our own peculiar situation? We have a most disagreeable dispute with the French republic. France has made peace with the emperor; and a Congress is now sitting, if not already terminated, to settle the affairs of Germany, and adjust the balance of Europe. In this Congress, interests of the utmost magnitude in themselves, and in the highest degree important to France, are to be discussed; no less than to determine whether France shall extend her borders to the Rhine, or be restricted to the Meuse; whether more than two millions of souls, formerly subjects of the German empire, shall become citizens of the French republic. In this Congress, the king of Prussia is mediator; a youthful monarch; enterprising, warlike and ambitious, at the head of three hundred thousand of the finest troops in Europe, and with a treasury replenished by four years of peace, while the coffers of his neighbors are in a most exhausted condition. With these advantages, joined to his local position, he holds in his hands the balance of France and Germany. Prepared to strike in every direction, he is dreaded and courted by all parties, and especially by France; who feels that after Austria, now exhausted and desirous of repose, he is the power most capable of checking her ambitious designs. Hence she has the greatest possible interest to soothe and conciliate him. This monarch possesses all the finest ports in the Baltic, and a great extent of maritime territory. His predecessor, the great Frederick, sensible that commerce alone can supply money, the sinews of military strength, always felt the greatest