The Oxford Handbook of Ethical TheoryDavid Copp Oxford University Press, 22/12/2005 - 680 من الصفحات The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. Ethical theories have always been of central importance to philosophy, and remain so; ethical theory is one of the most active areas of philosophical research and teaching today. Courses in ethics are taught in colleges and universities at all levels, and ethical theory is the organizing principle for all of them. The Handbook is divided into two parts, mirroring the field. The first part treats meta-ethical theory, which deals with theoretical questions about morality and moral judgment, including questions about moral language, the epistemology of moral belief, the truth aptness of moral claims, and so forth. The second part addresses normative theory, which deals with general moral issues, including the plausibility of various ethical theories and abstract principles of behavior. Examples of such theories are consequentialism and virtue theory. As with other Oxford Handbooks, the twenty-five contributors cover the field in a comprehensive and highly accessible way, while achieving three goals: exposition of central ideas, criticism of other approaches, and putting forth a distinct viewpoint. |
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accept agent-neutral agent-relative alternative possibilities argue argument attitudes basic beliefs Cambridge causal determinism claim concepts concern consequentialism consequentialist constraints deny deontology depends desire distinctive divine command theory epistemic epistemology ethical naturalism ethics of care evaluative example explain expressivism expressivist formula God’s hold human Hume Hume’s idea impartiality intrinsic intuitive issue justice Kant Kant’s Kantian kind maxim metaethical metaphysical Moore’s moral facts moral judgments moral principles moral properties moral realism moral responsibility moral rights moral theory morally required motivation natural properties naturalistic normative normative reasons objection obligations one’s Oxford University Press particular person philosophical plausible pleasure practical reasoning problem projectivism psychological question realists reflective equilibrium reject relations relativism relevant right action role rules second-personal seems sense sentimentalism simply someone sort suppose things thought true truth understanding universal law utilitarianism virtue ethics virtue theory virtuous wrong