which the valour and the wisdom of your patriots has raised, will, in a sudden and tremendous fall, overwhelm you with destruction and dismay. Remember, then, I pray you, that the existence of the government depends, essentially, upon the existence of all its departments; and that treason, in arms against the executive and legislative departments, cannot be more certainly fatal to the vital principle of the government, than habitual opposition, or popular contempt, manifested towards the judicial authority. This is, in some degree, the case under every form of government; but in monarchical governments, the read assistance of military force may always be obtained, to execute the judgments of the law. It is under a free government, constituted by the people, and for ever dependent upon their good will; under which the civil authority is declared to be supreme, w while military force is designated, as an object for jealousy and controul; that the dominion of the laws must, in a peculiar manner, be held sacred; for otherwise (as it has been already said), the government itself must cease to exist. When the decrees of justice can be no longer enforced by the marshal and the writ, you must resort to the soldier and the bayonet ; and whatever you may chuse to call your government, de. pend upon it, you will no longer continue to be a free people. A resort to arms, in obstructing the operation of the laws, must inevitably lead to a resort to arms in maintaining them. Nor can it make any difference in principle, whether the execution of an act of congress, or the judgment of a court, is thus resisted; whether the resistance is attempted by an individual, or by a multitude; in the rage of wanton violence, or under the colour of a spurious authority. The disturbances of 1794 and 1798, were not more lawless and injurious, in their nature, than the resistance of the Lowreys to the process of the court; and the resistance of the Lowreys, in the alledged protection of private property, was less dangerous to the government, than the resistance of the defendants, with the plausible pretext of the performance of a public duty.

But opinions have been scattered abroad, in pamphlets, in newspapers, and in declamatory harangues, which are, I confess, well calculated to pervert the public mind, and to excite the public feelings, on the peculiar subject of the present prosecution It is weakly, if not wickedly, said, that an opposition to the judicial process of our Courts, is not an opposition to the laws; and that persons, who act under the authority of the State, in making such opposition, are guilty of no offence. Against a doctrine so radically vicious, it is

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a duty most solemnly to protest; nor can I safely approach the immediate ground of the prosecution, without first endeavouring to rescue your judgment from its baneful in fluence. I claim, therefore, the attention of the jury, for a short, but, I hope, a satisfactory, developement of the princi ples of our social compact, in its federal, as well as in its State, characteristics.

There is no truth more certain, none to which I more sincerely subscribe, than that the sovereignty of the nation, resides essentially, and everlastingly, in the people. From this sovereignty emanates the powers of government, whether they are vested in the federal, or in the state, system; and whether, in either system, they are assigned to the legislative, the executive, or the judicial, department. The institution of the government, is thus an exercise of the sovereignty of the people, in their own way, and for their own good. The people, acting as the creator, assign to the subject of their creation, the form, attributes, and operation, necessary to its use. In dividing the powers of government into federal, and state, the sovereignty of the people is displayed, not surrendered; and in dividing the government into depart ments, the separation is made for the preservation of each, in its legitimate sphere, and not with a view to render any one department, superior to the others Hence, while the sovereignty resides, inherently and inalienably, in the people, it is a perversion of language, to denominate the state, as a body politic, or government, sovereign and independent. If, indeed, the word "State," is used as a collective, for the people of the State (in which sense, and in a sense descriptive of territorial jurisdiction, it is sometimes used) there is no objection to the phrase: but a state, meaning the govern ment of the state, is never itself sovereign, though it may discharge those functions of the sovereignty, which the people have assigned to it; nor can it ever be independent, while the people possess the right and the power to change, modify, or abolish it. The federal and state governments, in this point of view, are alike possessed of sovereign powers; but the state government can no more be denominated sovereign and independent, in relation to the powers vested in the Federal government, than the latter can be so denominated, in relation to the powers vested in the former, or reserved to the people. The truth is (a political truth, that ought never to be over-looked, in the collisions that may arise between state and federal authorities) that the constitutions of the Union, and of the state, must be regarded and construed as instruments, formed and executed by the same party, the

sovereign people, delegating powers to different agents, but upon the same trusts, and for the same uses. The instruments manifest the powers of the constituent, and prescribe the duties of the representative. And thus, you hear, the mighty voice of the people announcing, in a solemn and formal preface to the work, that they (not that the sovereign and independent states,) ordain and establish, the federal, as well as the state, constitution, for their government. The people of Pennsylvania, acting as a portion, and in concert with all the rest, of the people of the United States, ordained and established the federal constitution, in the year 1787, for their national government; and, subject to the plighted faith of that compact, the people of Pennsylvania, acting for themselves alone, ordained and established the state constitution, in the year 1790, for their territorial government. To the national government, they gave all the national attri butes of judicial, as well as of executive, and legistative power; and on the state government, they devolved the exercise of every other power, necessary for the public welfare, with the exceptions and qualifications contained in the declaration of rights.

Upon this basis, I trust, it will be perceived, that, without derogating from the dignity of organized governments, or impairing their legitimate authority, the sovereignty of the people, the federal jurisdiction, and the state rights, may harmoniously, and securely, rest. But to assert an absolute sovereignty and independence in a state, is either to deny any sovereignty and independence in the Union; or to contend for the existence of a solecism in the science of politics; the existence of two absolute, sovereign, and independent governments, in the same nation! Nor is it possible, that the subject should have been misunderstood by the people, when they adopted the federal constitution; for, General Washington, in the letter of the convention, which accompanied the proposed constitution, proclaimed the effect of its adoption upon state jurisdiction, in these memorable words: "It is, obviously, impracticable in the federal government, "of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereign"ty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. "Individuals entering into society give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must "depend as well on situation and circumstance as on the ob"ject to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with "precision the line between those rights, which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and, on

"the present occasion, this difficulty was encreased by a dif ،، ference among the several states, as to their situation, ex"tent, habits, and particular interests.”

That the constitution, adopted with this knowledge of its design and operation, was indispensable to the duration of the Union, to the harmony of the states, to the prosperity of the people, and to the character of the nation, every man will admit, who saw, or felt; who has read, or heard; what was the situation of the country, at the crisis of the adoption. That the practical blessings of the constitution have surpas sed, all that its most zealous advocates predicted, even its once jealous opponents, gratefully see, and candidly avow. For, all know, that the infirmities of the old confederation were so extreme, that the Union had scarcely consummated its independence, when it seemed to touch the period of its dissolution. The necessity of resorting to some principle of resuscitation, agitated every heart, and exercised every head. Let the Union be dissolved, and what was then to dissipate the gloom, that hung over the internal and external prospects of America! In a foreign view, where was the resource of population, or of revenue, to enable a single state, to command the respect of the world, to reciprocate the benefits of commerce, or to repel the violence of other nauons. In a domestic view, where was the common umpire, to reconcile the jarring interests of the rival states, to regulate the terms of social intercourse, to avert the calamities of civil war, to destroy the hydra of anarchy, or to subdue the efforts of despotism! But, turning from those lamentable views of the subject, let us ask, what under the auspices of the federal constitution, is now wanting to our honour abroad, or to our prosperity at home? The rights, the interests, the treasure, and the power of all the states, constitute an inheritance and a name; a shield and a sword, for each state, in all the pursuits of its enterprize and industry abroad; while an uniform system of national legislation, and an impartial administration of national justice; serve to produce and perpetuate equality, confidence, and concord, at home.

Having thus shewn that the federal, as well as the state, government; and that the judicial, as well as the legislative and executive organs, of each government, are the work of the people themselves; I hesitate not to repeat, that it is indispensable to the duration of a free government, that the judicial department should, above all, be preserved from the encroachments of the co-ordinate departments; from the assaults of the violent, and from the arts of the insidious.

Is it asked, on what foundation this claim for peculiar vene ration is sustained? I answer, on the peculiar character of the judicial department, which gives life and sanction to the other departments of government. Take for example, two prominent features of that character:-1st. After the legisiature has performed its office, by ordaining laws of a general nature, for general purposes, it is the exclusive province of the judicial authority, to apply the general law to particular cases, as they occur, under every possible diversity of fact. It would be hideous in theory; it would be iniqui. tous in practice; if the same department that made the law, should be empowered to expound and to enforce it.-2d. Before the executive magistrate can interfere, either to punish an infraction of the general law, or to afford relief in a partrcular case, the cause of punishment, of the right to relief, must have been investigated and ascertained by a court of justice. It would be hideous in theory; it would be iniqui tous in practice; if the same department that executed the ław, should previously have been employed to make, and to expound it. These features of judicial authority, do not, then, arrogate the right to make, nor to execute, the laws; but they demonstrate the policy and the nature of judicial independence. Say, that the jury were this moment converted into a convention, to devise a form of government, for the union, or for the state, could they, would they, hesitate to pursue the same division, the same demarcation of pawers by which alone the liberties of the people can be secured, on the one hand, from legislative partiality, and, on the other, from executive violence. But destroy the ju dicial power, and you destroy the administration of justice: Destroy the administration of justice;—and what remains of your boasted government, worthy of a freeman's care, or keeping!

At all times, and under all circumstances, from the dawn of American independence, to the splendor of its meridian, the sovereignty of the people has been displayed, in the for mation of our political compacts; and the solicitude of the people has been evinced, for the separation of the powers of government, and, particularly, for the maintenance of the judicial authority. The history of the national carreer in these Respects, is not long; it is not irrelevant to the business of the day; and it cannot fail to be instructive.

The latent sovereignty of the American people was kindled into action, so early as the year 1774. Under a sense of wrong, (not, perhaps, of actual oppression, but of meditated

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