1. Aircraft hijackings in any significant number are a comparatively recent phenomenon. During the 37-year period from 1930-1967, there were only 12 hijacking attempts in the United States, seven of which were carried out successfully.

2. Beginning in 1968, the number of attempts increased reaching an annual high of 40 in 1969, 82 percent of which were carried out successfully by the hijacker.

3. The preponderant number of hijackings in the 1968-1971 period were of the Cuban type, and while the success rate, from the hijacker's standpoint, declined from 82 percent in 1968 to 44 percent in 1971, it was still high.

This reflected the view of the airlines and I believe also of the Federal Aviation Administration that although hijackings were to be avoided, those of the Cuban type were best handled with passivity.

4. In 1972, the nature of the problem changed fundamentally; only 18% of the attempts were of the Cuban variety, and the number of extortion demands increased considerably. Although safety of passengers continues to be the primary consideration of the airlines and the government, the tactics of passivity that were appropriate for the Cuban type of hijacking have begun to change to a more assertive role by airlines and the government.

5. Finally, the data show that while the number of hijackings increased in 1972, with more in the first 7 months of the year than in all of 1971, the success rate from the hijacker's standpoint reached the lowest point ever-29%-compared to 44% in 1971, 67% in 1970, and 82% both in 1969 and 1968.

6. Although not included in the charts appended to my statement, it is important to note that of the $8,712,000 demanded by the extortionist hijacker in U.S. hijackings to date, $5,355,200 has been paid. Of this amount, $3,852,200 has been recovered, $1,000,000 has been impounded by Algeria and hopefully will be returned, leaving only $503,000 associated with two hijackings. One of these involved "D. B. Cooper" who parachuted from an airplane and neither he nor the noney has been found; the other involved a hijacking to Honduras where the hijacker himself was apprehended.

In summary, hijackings are a recent occurrence in air transportation, they are no longer predominantly of the Cuban type, they have occurred at a greater rate in 1972 than in prior years but with less success from the hijacker's standpoint, and almost all of the money the hijackers have demanded has ultimately been recovered.

STATUS OF THE ANTIHIJACKING PROGRAM

A number of important steps to deal with the problem have been taken by the airlines and the government in prior years, and particularly in 1972. I would like to list some of them quickly.

1. If the hijacker succeeds in getting aboard the aircraft, he has been able to get out successfully in one of two ways: by parachuting out the rear staircase door or by seeking asylum in a foreign country. Both avenues of escape must be denied him. The rear staircase door has been rendered inoperative by most of the major carriers, and other airlines intend to do so in the near future. Under United States' leadership, an effort is underway in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop a multi-lateral convention that would effectively deny safe havens to the hijacker. In this connection, the airlines endorse the provision in S. 3871 that would strengthen the President's hand in dealing with the safe haven problem, but believe that the language in the Magnuson bill, S. 2280, dealing with primary boycotts may be more appropriate for the purpose.

2. While it is important to seal off the hijacker's two escape routes, it is even more important to prevent him from getting aboard the aircraft in the first place. In this connection, the airlines and the FAA have tightened screening procedures substantially in 1972, but more needs to be done. I will comment in greater detail on this at a later point in my statement.

3. In a recent Senate-House Conference action, $3.5 million was approved for the purchase of magnetometers and other metal-detecting devices. It would appear that these funds, together with the reprogramming authority they already have, will be sufficient to make a magnetometer available to every gate of the 531 airports that serve the scheduled airlines.

The airlines have already procured 679 magnetometers, have an additional 676 on order, and appreciate the interest of the Congress in taking this additional action.

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With this background in mind, I would like now to turn to the two bills before you.

COMMENTS ON 8. 3815 AND S. 3871

Summary of the Bills. Senator Schweiker's bill-S. 3815-would require 100% screening of passengers and carry-on baggage as soon as practicable, and would authorize the funds that the FAA Administrator would need to acquire the necessary detection devices.

Senator Boggs' bill-S. 3871-would also require 100% screening of passengers and carry-on baggage. Responsibility for screening would be assigned to the Department of Justice, which would issue the necessary regulations within 60 days after enactment of the bill. The Attorney General would furnish airports with the necessary screening devices and with United States marshals and deputy marshals to operate the devices. Funds in the amount of $20 million for FY 1973, $17 million for each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975, and such amounts as necessary thereafter would be provided by the bill. In addition. the bill would expand and strengthen some of the penalties associated with hijacking threats or attempts and, as noted earlier, would grant new powers to the President for dealing with the problem of a country which refused to extradite a hijacker.

Funding. Because the Congress has agreed in conference action to provide sufficient funds ($3.5 million) to meet the magnetometer needs for carrying out FAA's screening plan, it does not appear that any additional funds for metal-detecting devices need be authorized at this time under either S. 3815 or S. 3871. If, at some later point, after further experience has been gained with the devices on hand or to be ordered, it appears that additional funds are needed, they could then be requested.

Thus, the funds provided in S. 3871 could be limited to paying the manpower costs of the U.S. marshals and deputy marshals provided by the bill. Based upon some preliminary calculations we have made, we do not believe that annual amounts of $20 million or $17 million are sufficient to provide the needed manpower at the 531 airports involved. A figure of $30 million per year would be more realistic.

Requirement for 100% Screening. Both bills require 100% screening of passengers and carry-on baggage with magnetometers or other metal-detecting devices. The airlines believe that this will be feasible when the magnetometers are available to each gate. In this connection, "100% screening" is interpreted at the present time to mean: (1) that all passengers and their carry-on baggage would be required to pass through a magnetometer or other metal-detecting device; (2) that those passengers who are "selectees" under the behavioral profile, together with any other members of their traveling party, be subjected to a physical search or further magnetometer screening in the event that their magnetometer readings are above the threshold level; in addition their carry-on baggage will be inspected. It should be noted that the second of the two procedures described above is already in effect and in instances where a magnetometer is not yet available, the screening process is carried out by inspection rather than by a metal-detecting device.

The airlines are staffed and organized to provide safe, efficient air transportation, and cannot assume the government's responsibility for law enforcement. As a matter of principle, there is no argument that the law enforcement phase of air transport security is a responsibility of government. We believe the overall responsibility is that of the Federal government since Federal laws and interstate commerce are involved. Further we are addressing the safety and viability of a transportation system which will carry almost 200 million passengers in the coming year. The problem belongs to everyone, and it is serious. Accordingly, the airlines welcome the emphasis in S. 3871 on the law enforcement aspects of the anti-hijacking program, and are particularly pleased that Federal marshals would be provided on a continuing basis. The airlines have on a number of occasions expressed their concern to various agencies of the government on the absolute necessity for uniformed, law enforcement officers to assist in the screening operation and to deal with suspects and would-be hijackers. Since at any time these officers may be confronted by armed criminals who are desperate, irrational, or both, the airlines have been impressed with the need for high quality, motivation, alertness and uniform standards among these officers.

Under present plans, some 1100 Federal officers now involved in the antihijacking program are scheduled to be phased out over the period of the next two years. We think this is wrong and we are pleased that S. 3871 would continue the availability of Federal officers.

The bill does more than this, however; it would appear to turn over the entire screening operation to Federal marshals. This has an obvious attractiveness to us as a concept but we are not so sure it would work out in actual practice. Use of Federal Personnel. The airlines have consistently taken the position that law enforcement is a government responsibility. First, the behavioral profile is an important aspect of the screening process and this must be handled by airline personnel and coordinated with the metal-detecting operations. Secondly, the screening process must be carried out as part of the boarding of passengers. The airlines must be responsible for timely boarding and would lack the necessary control over it if the screening process were operated by government personnel.

Our concept of the Federal role was expressed in a telegram to Secretary Volpe last May as follows:

The government should provide uniformed armed law enforcement officials for stationing at active gate positions and able to take immediate action to assist in the operation of the magnetometers, to search suspected passengers, and to prevent forced entry into aircraft.

In recent weeks we have noted an increasing problem with respect to individual airline employees and some of the unions which represent them when the duties assigned to employees in the screening procedure border upon the law enforcement function. The situation needs to be clarified and we believe the best way to do it is by providing Federal law enforcement officers in required number to make the necessary physical searches, to apprehend and take suspects into custody, and to assist generally in the screening process.

Assignment of Responsibility to Justice. S. 3871 establishes an Office of Aviation Security within the Justice Department which would furnish metaldetecting devices and the Federal marshals to operate them.

We believe it would be necessary to establish such an office as the administrative headquarters for the marshals. We believe further that it would be possible to make a clear-cut delegation of responsibility to the office for the law enforcement functions the marshals are to provide.

We have some reservations, however, about other aspects of this proposal. First, under the bill the new office would "furnish" the metal-detecting devices. This would appear to conflict with FAA's assignment for specifying and procuring magnetometers, an effort that has been under way for some time. Moreover, the bill and Senator Boggs' remarks when he introduced the bill seem to suggest that the overall responsibility for the anti-hijacking program is somehow being transferred from FAA to Justice. If so, we think it would lead to a fragmentation of the total effort. While law enforcement is a fundamental aspect of the program, the overall effort involves many other important considerations. For example, it involves engineering matters, such as how best to secure ventral doors; airport design matters, such as separating public from operational areas; communications procedures when a hijacking is in progress, weapons or explosives in stowed baggage as well as in carry-on baggage, etc. These are matters in which the FAA has the needed expertise and for which it must continue to exercise responsibility. FAA has no particular claim to expertise in baggage checking and it is not the government's primary agency for law enforcement. Thus, there is no inherent reason why the stipulated law enforcement responsibilities cannot be assigned to Justice. Indeed, the overall effort may be improved as a result of the change, so long as FAA continues to have primary responsibility for the total anti-hijacking program and adequate liaison is maintained.

No Regulatory Leeway. Both bills provide that the appropriate regulatory authority (FAA in S. 3815 and Justice in S. 3871) shall prescribe regulations requiring that all passengers in regularly scheduled air transportation, and their carry-on luggage be screened by magnetometers or other weapons detecting devices before boarding the aircraft for such transportation.

However, no authority is provided for the modification of these regulations as circumstances may warrant. Since we believe that any security program must be flexible in its operation, we urge that the final bill be modified to include a provision to the effect that these regulations will remain in effect until the

regulatory authority (presumably the Federal Aviation Administrator) concludes that they are no longer required or should be modified.

Additional Penalties. The extension and strengthening of penalties provided for in S. 3871 are strongly endorsed by the airlines. We also support the provision in the bill to strengthen the President's hand in dealing with safe haven countries, but, as noted earlier, believe the language in the Magnuson bill on primary boycotts is more appropriate. Moreover, the language in S. 3871 is inconsistent with the Hague Convention which requires prosecution or extradition of a hijacker whereas S. 3871 is limited to extradition.

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The bills before you raise important questions of public policy with respect to assignment of responsibility between the airlines and the government for preventing hijacking. The travelling public must be assured that all reasonable efforts are being taken by the government, the airlines and the airport operators to prevent hijackings from being carried out. In appraising these questions, certain fundamentals should be kept in mind:

1. The U.S. airline system is the safest and most efficient in the world, and actions to heighten security should be carried out in a manner that enables the airlines to maintain their high standards of operating performance.

2. The security program should be flexible in nature so as to provide varying degrees of alert depending upon existing conditions.

3. The anti-hijacking programs underway should be augmented by further study of comprehensive screening systems designed to automate procedures and to take advantage of available and foreseeable technology. When system studies of this type are completed, it may be possible to visualize a highly effective screening system that could be operated at lower manpower levels and with fewer boarding delays.

Mr. Chairman, the airlines strongly support the need for uniformed Federal law enforcement officers as a fundamental part of the anti-hijacking program. Both S. 3815 and S. 3871 would provide additional security for airline passengers through the use of electronic screening devices. The objective of S. 3815 will largely be met by the appropriations for magnetometers provided in the Department of Transportation appropriation bill. S. 3871 is somewhat more