Senator CANNON. Our first witness this morning is Mr. G. M. Gross, vice president of Southern Airways. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF G. M. GROSS, VICE PRESIDENT, SOUTHERN AIRWAYS, INC., ATLANTA, GA.

Mr. BEASLEY. Mr. Chairman, my name is Cecil A. Beasley. Mr. Gross is on my left and he has no written statement. He does have, however, a statement which he would like to make and we estimate that it will take approximately 10 minutes.

Senator CANNON. You may proceed, Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am the officer of Southern Airways who was on board the aircraft and directed its activities during the hijacking.

Senator CANNON. Will you pull the microphone a little closer, thank

you.

Mr. GROSS. If I may I would like to recount briefly the sequence of events that occurred and tell you a little bit about it. When the hijacking first occurred out of Birmingham, I was between my office and my home. I was called within a few minutes and was back at the airport. At that time the airplane was enroute to Jackson, Miss. The security communication's network was set up with FAA in Washington and other nationwide bases throughout the security system.

We talked to Jackson, Miss., station manager our own station manager-in an effort to determine what could be done and what was happening on the airplane.

At this point in time, we had no real idea of how many hijackers were on board or what their intentions were. It was evident that they wanted fuel and wanted it quickly and we made arrangements to do that. And at that point there the operation ran very smoothly.

They were in Jackson, were serviced and were out. We began to get a feel for how the operation would go at that point because we were told by the hijackers from the aircraft that they wanted no one to approach the airplane except a fuel servicing person in minimum clothes, and they put the airplane near the end of the runway lined up with both engines running, takeoff flaps set up for departure.

After departure from Jackson, we attempted through an ARINC hookup to talk to the airplane and determine what the hijackers wanted.

Some time enroute, some 10 or 15 minutes out of Jackson, Miss., and we knew their destination was Detroit, we found that there were 10— that there were three on board-the original report indicated 10.

We determined there were three on board. And that agreed with our evaluation of the boardings in Birmingham. We found that they had a grievance with the city of Detroit and that they wanted $10 million and parachutes delivered to the Detroit airport.

Earlier in our security program we had tried to develop general guidelines that we might use in a circumstance such as this. And we had agreed that if a hijacking occurred, and was immediately directed to Cuba, we would not necessarily try to follow the aircraft, but that if it appeared that it would go in some other direction that we would try to get as close to it as we could in our own aircraft.

At this point when it turned to Detroit we immediately began to try to develop another airplane, a DC-9. None were available in the Atlanta area at that time and were not for a couple of hours.

As the hijackers made their desires known, we began to make plans to find the $10 million that they asked for. As you can imagine that's a substantial amount of money for an airline with our balance sheet. We were successful very quickly in locating some money in Chicago. So we started from Atlanta to meet the airplane in Detroit.

Then the aircraft ran into some bad weather, minimums, below minimums in Detroit and diverted to Cleveland. It was fueled again. fairly quickly there although there was some delay.

Now on each landing it became more and more evident that the intensity of the panic began to mount and as the airplane approached the ground the hijackers got to be more intense and more of a panic in their own situation.

They were in and out of the cockpit constantly. One of them was always in the cockpit and they were giving conflicting instructions to the crew.

So our objective was to move the airplane as quickly as we could and to satisfy their requirements as quickly as we could. The airplane then departed to Cleveland and went to Toronto and we followed it to Toronto.

We had another aircraft in Chicago that picked up the money and also went to Toronto. It was here that we began to have the real problem as contrasted with Jackson, Miss., where the airplane servicing went smoothly.

In Toronto when we arrived, and we had on board that that time some FBI agents from Atlanta. We were first informed the FBI had no jurisdiction in Canada and could not leave the aircraft.

At least they did not leave the aircraft armed as I understood it. We landed in front of the hijacked aircraft. He was holding in the Toronto area.

As quickly as we could get down into the terminal building we were taken to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police headquarters there and there was something of a state of confusion.

I asked who was in charge. A sergeant told me that he was responsible for the activities. I asked what their plan was.

At this point there didn't seem to be one other than trying to fuel him and get him moving and we informed him we had money en route and that we wanted to get it on board the airplane.

There was some delay to find out where the airplane was and as soon as we found it was on the ground we then went to the tower and, in the base of the tower one of the operators had the airplane on the radio.

We talked to him for some 35 or 40 minutes. During that time, we attempted to get the aircraft fueled. There were continuing delays to get a fuel tender from the gate which was a couple miles away out to the airplane on the other runway.

The hijackers threatened continuously to either shoot the pilot or blow up the airplane. In fact, on a couple of occasions we felt they were going to leave Toronto with minimum fuel on board and under those weather conditions they would not have gotten very far.

The airplane from Chicago with the money on board came in behind the hijacked airplane very shortly and we made efforts there to get that money on the fuel truck, because it had again become evident by that point that there would only be one vehicle allowed near the airplane and only one person on the vehicle. We were unsuccessful in that, and, because primarily of no communications between our location and the location of the airplane with the money.

The tower operation, as far as police support was concerned was handled by a local police agency from a small community there. And we were dependent to some extent on their communication on the airport.

At any rate, after successive delays fuel tender came out to the airplane without the money and the aircraft departed, told us it was headed for Oak Ridge, they were going to take the airplane into Oak Ridge.

We attempted to talk them into going into Knoxville and told them we would have the money there in Knoxville. We got off the ground as quickly as we could and followed them.

They were some 25 minutes ahead of us. They held over Knoxville for awhile then went into Lexington, Ky.

We got on the ground in Knoxville. There had been some preparation as far as reception was concerned. The local law enforcement people had cleared the public back from the fences where we were being parked. There were some military helicopters on the ground that had arrived unexpectedly, at least unexpectedly to us and we got them out of sight in a hurry.

For the next 2 hours, after the hijacked airplane was fueled and departed Lexington, they held over Knoxville and we talked to them almost continuously to try to persuade them not to blow up the airplane, that we were waiting for additional money which was coming from Detroit on a chartered jet aircraft.

You can imagine at this time a succession of peaks of pressure by the hijackers, both to the aircraft and to the people on the ground in discussion with them where they consistently threatened to either shoot the pilots or the passengers or blow up the airplane if we didn't get the money to them and get it on the ground by a certain stated time. Fortunately the captain called an error in their timing where they were on Central time and we were on Eastern, that gave us another hour. Otherwise I doubt that we would have made it. They insisted at each stop that before they would land everything in their numerous demands had to be met and verified ahead of time and that everything was ready and that there would be no delay for them on the ground. We had some minor problem in the Knoxville area with airport vehicles with flashing red lights and yellow lights and so forth.

We knew that they were where they could see the airport from time to time. Without any warning and on the final approach at Knoxville they broke off and went to Chattanooga and we followed them to Chattanooga we had a list of items they required including bulletproof vests, helmets, food and ice and coffee and so forth, as well as parachutes, and the money which was-part of which we carried and part of which was on the Lear jet.

In Chattanooga we got on the ground as quickly as we could. The hijacked airplane was low on fuel. We our main objective there was

to get him down. We had some considerable problem in that area by a massive influx of local law enforcement in the form of city, county and highway patrol cars all with emergency lights and so forth.

We got everybody we could under cover and finally insisted pretty harshly that all the law enforcement people get under cover and get out of sight. We finally convinced the hijackers that everything was set and they landed the airplane. They again lined up on the south end of the runway in an open area, lined up ready for take off and we got the tender to them.

We got the airplane serviced and made the transfer of all the items they wanted. Now at no time did they ever shut the engines down nor did they ever open the doors. When they were on the ground they had one man in the cockpit, one man about midway with binoculars and one man in the rear watching for the rear door. We thought that we would be able to get the people off the airplane in Chattanooga in a very liimted conversation that we had with them at that time, because they had gotten at that point where they wouldn't talk to us.

They indicated they would. But we had the public gathering around the perimeter of the runway and they began to move in close to the airplane. The hijackers would not let us put any vehicle down the runway to clear the people and finally in desperation they took off. They then went to Havana, we followed them, held over Key West until they landed, went back into Miami.

And shortly thereafter we were informed that they were coming out again. At this point, we were considerably concerned about their lack of all servicing. They went into Key West which gave us an indication quickly that they had not been able to service the airplane in Havana. On departure from Key West they began to ask Miami center for vectors to Switzerland and to Bermuda and told Miami center they were headed for Bermuda. It was determined then and we concurred that the airplane had to be stopped if we could turn the airplane and get it down on the ground anywhere.

We talked to them directly from Atlanta and from Miami through Miami center to ask them to parallel the coast and try to fly it up over the northern route.

We didn't know where they were going when they turned north and very quickly they indicated they were going to Orlando. We loaded everybody we could including some 30 or 35 FBI agents and their equipment and followed again. At Orlando they landed, put the airplane on the south end of runway 36, right, about 2,000 feet from the end and again lined it up for take off.

We had attempted to talk to Atlanta through the ARINC net and were concerned about being monitored and about it possibly being relayed through commercial stations to tell them to block the airplane in Orlando, to block it with a fuel tender. This information never got through. We landed blacked out on the parallel runway to the left of the aircraft, turned around and discharged the FBI agents and then went down to the operations area and parked the aircraft. At the time we landed, we didn't know that our instructions hadn't gotten through, and the fuel tender was right on the nose of the airplane headed directly into it. So we thought we had it stopped. Then when the action started in Orlando and after the copilot was injured, they got him back in the cockpit, he took off, tires were flat

on the left side and either partially or almost all the way down on the right side and the nose and as you know he went on back into Havana.

That in essence is what happened.

Senator CANNON. Now it has been stated in press reports that the suspects were subject to examination by metal detecting devices prior to their boarding in Birmingham. Is that so, and if so was there any indication on the magnetometer to indicate a positive response?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, sir, they were subject to a search by hand-held magnetometer. All three were selectees. Two approached the counter individually in Birmingham, one bought his own ticket, one bought a ticket for himself and the man with him. The two together cleared the gate and the third one cleared last and they were searched at that time.

They were carrying-one was carrying a binocular case which was checked. Another was carrying a camera case which was checked and they were given the usual shakedown with the magnetometer. Now this is a little bit of a sensitive area.

We have found that the hand-held magnetometers, there are two different kinds, are dependent somewhat on the expertise of the user. And, also, on the amount of metal in the area, in the gate area. And it is possible that a check can be made, and if the user is not extremely careful or proficient or if there is a lot of metal in a gate area that it will not register a metal object on a person.

It has been our effort, both with Southern Airways and with the industry to obtain the walk through magnetometers. Now when this advisory circular was issued and the expedited security program put into effect last spring, Southern Airways was operating under an approved security program and the methods used were approved methods however, and there just were not enough magnetometers to go around. The walk through magnetometers are more effective, but there is a shortage of them.

They are fast becoming available. So all of the carriers got as many of the hand held magnetometers as they could, and in fact for a few months we did not have them in every station and we were forced to make a physical search. So it is our hope that we will be able to develop a walk through situation at every gate ultimately.

Senator CANNON. Well, these people apparently had weapons on them at the time they boarded, either on their person or in their carryon luggage?

Mr. GROSS. We are not sure how they got them on board even today. There are possibilities, several possibilities of how they could have been gotten on board. We just don't know at this time. They did not have handbags such as briefcases or so forth. Had to have been on their person if in fact they went on board that way.

Senator CANNON. Well now, can you tell the committee of any problems you encountered as a result of the changes in law enforcement jurisdictions and procedures?

Mr. GROSS. Well, yes, sir. We covered quite a bit of territory during this period of time and I guess the most acute problem we saw was in the Toronto area where our people, except through the FAA air traffic control system had no jurisdiction on the ground. We did have some