dealings with the local law enforcement people on the ground in Knoxville and in Orlando and in Chattanooga.

In each case we had to go through a series of instructions, work out a plan locally on the spur of the moment with the people who were there to do whatever had to be done. I don't think that a local law enforcement situation could have been standardized to the extent during our travels that would have helped us a whole lot from airport to airport.

Senator CANNON. Now, the FBI was apparently the Federal Government agency acting to deal with the hijack situation. What role did the FAA play?

Mr. GROSS. Well, the FAA did a fine job. They monitor or they set up and operate the communications net, that is from Jim Murphy's office here in Washington to various Federal agencies and directly to the carriers operations control center in Atlanta. They stay in contact with the air traffic control center and/or tower that is in contact with the airplane as well as the other agencies that we may need to call on for services or help of one kind or another. And they were able where we were not able to follow the airplane or got behind the airplane, they were able to handle it to a great extent through the tower operators and the instructions and conversations that went back and forth between tower or center operators and the aircraft. I would say they did a fine job in that respect.

Senator CANNON. Did it appear to you that they would be the logical operating agency to coordinate this type of activity?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, sir, are you speaking of the FAA?

Senator CANNON. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. I would think so, yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. What coordination and direction if any, existed between the FBI and the local law enforcement people where you had the local people involved?

Mr. GROSS. I was not in a position to see any direct interchange between FBI and local law enforcement people.

Now, I know that they were working with them in Knoxville to provide some security for our airplane on arrival because of the money on board. I am not sure what occurred in the other cities because we were pretty active trying to stay in contact with the other aircraft. Senator CANNON. In your judgment, in a situation such as you had occur, do you think it would be advisable to have one law enforcement agency completely in charge, or to have a local agency in charge at every particular airport where the aircraft touch down?

Mr. GROSS. I think it would be advisable to have one central law enforcement agency in charge. I think because of the nature of the thing which is almost unique, that moves quickly from one location to another geographically, it almost has to be a single agency to maintain any continuity or consistency from one airport to another.

Senator CANNON. Do you have an opinion as to which agency of the Government should provide this coordination and direction? Mr. GROSS. Yes, sir, I do; I believe it should be the FAA. Senator CANNON. Why do you believe that?

Mr. GROSS. Well, our first objective is for the safety of operation. That was paramount in our whole operation from the beginning to

the end. This is again the prime objective of FAA, and we, the carriers, and FAA work together daily in this respect. I think that it is necessary for whomever heads the security plan for those people, to also be thoroughly familiar with the airplane operation and the airplane

limitations.

And third, I think that because of the nature of the communications required while the airplane is in route, air route traffic control communications are the only way that you can really stay in contact closely without too much language.

Senator CANNON. When the decision was ultimately made to bring the hijacking to a forceful end, exactly who made that decision: Was it the FBI, FAA, company officials, or the flightcrew?

Mr. GROSS. Well, the decision was made, as the media has indicated, by Mr. Gray. We concurred in that with Mr. Gray both in Miami where I was, and in Atlanta, and it was made without the knowledge of the captain. At no time were we able to communicate with the captain without having the hijackers hear that conversation, nor could he communicate with us completely.

Now, there are certain signals that he can give us that indicates to a limited degree what he wants to do. He was unable to even do that. In fact, he nearly got the copilot shot once just operating the trim. But he was unaware of the decision. There was no way to tell him. Senator CANNON. As far as you were concerned, what were the actual considerations that weighed in making that final decision?

Mr. GROSS. Well, the first consideration and the paramount one all along, was the safety of the passengers. We had a spare crew on board; our objective immediately was to get the people off the airplane, that is why we were so concerned about getting the money on. We felt if we could ever do that, we could get the passengers off, and we had a supervisory crew on board to take them to Cuba if that is where they wanted to go.

So, the consideration was how long they could operate the crew over an extended period of time under a very high stress situation. We went for several hours without hearing one of the crewmembers on the radio. We didn't know whether he was alive or not.

Second, we knew that the airplane engines, neither engine had ever been shut down. And the oil consumption was fairly normal in the prior operation of the engine, but it was getting pretty close, both of them were pretty close to the limit, and we expected that he would lose power and perhaps lose both engines fairly closely if we couldn't get him on the ground.

So that was the situation. If we had an opportunity once the airplane came back from Cuba to get him stopped, we felt like we had to take it. We didn't think that he had any chance to get to Bermuda, and that was his first en route stop from their last report. Senator CANNON. Did the coverage by the press or the media in any way influence developments or alter the response to the hijacking by company officials or law enforcement officers?

Mr. GROSS. They did not influence the developments except that they prepared every airport ahead of us for the public and for the problem that they gave us. There we were concerned in our conversation with the airplane, and we knew that they were being recorded

by media, we were told later. We suspected it, and were told later that it was true, that some of our conversations, not only with the hijacked airplane but also with Atlanta that set up specific instructions, might be rebroadcast on the broadcast networks, and the airplane could pick it up on ADF receivers. They tied up our telephones in Atlanta and in Miami, and everywhere we stopped they plugged up our telephones with incoming calls.

Senator CANNON. Do you have any recommendations as to additional steps that could be taken by the Federal Government which haven't been taken that would further guard against the risk of hijacking; and, if so, what are they?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, sir; I do. I think it should be under the control of a centralized Federal agency-that is, the airport security, itself, and the control of the airplane-once a hijacking occurs. There is not today a requirement under the security plan for the action or activity after a hijacking occurs.

I think that has to be under a central Federal agency. I think that it would be extremely helpful for a news blackout during the period of a hijacking. I don't think there ought to be anything on the networks anywhere, about where the airplane is or where it is going, while the hijacking is in progress.

I think that the FAA should be the agency to provide that overall security and that control.

Senator Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gross your testimony has been very, very helpful, and I must say I not only agree with you, but I agree wholeheartedly with the chairman. What in essence you are saying is that the release of December 5, 1972, from the then Secretary of the Department of Transportation, does absolutely nothing but take care of a situation prior to a happening, and that there is no effort or no coordination at any level, at this stage of the game, either by the DOT or by any of its advisers, to coordinate any local efforts to see what must and obviously has to be done in the event of a hijacking.

Mr. GROSS. I don't know that I would characterize it exactly that way or perhaps not that strongly, but I think that the security of the transportation system is somewhat like the safety of the transportation system, it is an evolutionary process.

I don't think you all of a sudden from a theoretical position accomplish everything that has to be done. There have been improvements as time has progressed. I think this is a step in the right direction. I think the program that was initiated last spring and as modified in August was an improvement.

Following a hijacking, we, in effect, initiated or maintained, because of the procedures that were in effect at that time, essentially what is being done today plus what will be done in February. But I don't believe that at the present time, it goes far enough to provide the kind of consistency throughout the 500-and-some-odd airports, air carrier airports, nor does it provide a program to stop a hijacking once it is in progress.

I think, furthermore, it might be worthwhile to find out what kind of people these are that we are dealing with and let that in some way help design the security measures that will be placed into effect.

Senator Cook. Mr. Gross, isn't this simply going to get down to a matter of dollar bills?

Mr. GROSS. That is right.

Senator Cook. I am wondering whether your financial officer or auditing department could provide for this record the increased taxes to the Federal Government as a result of the enactment of the Airport and Airways Trust Fund Act of 1970. Could you do that for us? i

I don't think that would be considered inappropriate for those figures to go into the record. Let me tell you why. I disagree wholeheartedly with Secretary Volpe, and I plan to spend a great deal of time with him tomorrow and also plan to spend a great deal of time with the secretary-designate tomorrow morning. Under the 1970 act, we preempted just about the entire field of taxation for the purpose of Airway and Airport Safety Act of 1970. The only thing the airports in the United States had left was that abominable seat tax where the passenger was charged a dollar or two. As a matter of fact, I went through an airport not long ago where the marshal was there with a gun on his hip, but the only reason that he had the gun there was to see to it that you had that little black ticket attached to your folder so he could tear it off when you went on the aircraft.

Apparently, you could take anything past that marshal if you had that ticket with the community collecting the head tax. We are probably going to preempt any agency from doing that in this session of Congress.

I voted for it last time, and Senator Cannon obviously is very much in favor of it, so, therefore, we have preempted the entire field, and we have passed that cost just as you did on to the flying public. Mr. Volpe says we should pass the next cost on to them. As a matter of fact, you recall in that release of his of December 5, he said the local airports will have to pay for it and you are going to have to pay for it, and he is in favor of passing it on.

Well, I think he has passed enough on to them, and there is enough in that fund that this could be handled there.

I think the questions you have raised as to a uniform continuity of plans would have been eliminated if the FAA or one overall agency had been handling it. Do you agree with this?

Mr. GROSS. I agree with the operating part of it, sir. I do not presume to make an opinion on the others. Perhaps it would have to be left to others.

Senator Cook. I would not argue with that.

Mr. GROSS. I would like to say this. Because it is usually passed onfirst, to the airline, and then to the traveling public-we are not in a position to fund it. In effect, the $2 million wipes out our entire profit for the year.

Senator Cook. I was about to ask you that. What was the net effect on your corporation as a financial entity that you had to raise this amount of money?

Mr. GROSS. Well, I am not sure that I can tell you the full effect of it yet, because it has not been finalized yet, but we do have $2 million that we have on loan that we are paying interest on, that we have not yet gotten a definite date for return.

The information was not supplied by the time this hearing was printed.

And that $2 million, if not returned, will exceed our profit for 1972, and this is the first time in 4 or 5 years that we have been in a profitable position.

Senator Cook. What is the duration of your airport contracts?

Mr. GROSS. For terminal facilities, they have-some are 3 to 5 years, some are longer, but most are generally in that range.

Senator Cook. For those 3 to 5 years, or even longer, aren't you straddled with the costs that have been long established between you and those airport facilities, unless they are renegotiated or unless we tried to obviate the contracts; which I think, under the Constitution, we do not have the right to do?

Your set costs are established, and, if this program is enforced on the local facilities, then it is the cost of the local airport authorities: is that not correct?

Mr. GROSS. That is right. There are some contracts in which there are clauses which prohibit this, as there are regarding head taxes. However, those are subject to a great deal of pressure to open for renegotiation.

Senator Cook. Do you, as a matter of fact, fly into any cities in Kentucky?

Mr. GROSS. No, sir.

Senator Cook. The problem that I wanted to raise, is that in this particular situation, aircraft did land in Lexington, which by way of example is having a very difficult time meeting their budget. For as small an airport as the Bluegrass Airport, this program which has been imposed on them increases costs somewhere in the vicinity of $40,000 to $50,000 a year.

We will have some people here who will talk in figures of a half a million and up. I must confess, I know of very few airports in the United States, Mr. Chairman, and we have argued this before, that have any capability of increasing their debt provisions. Their bond provisions under State and local laws are already at their limit; and yet Mr. Volpe, who was very much in favor of the Airport Airway Safety Act of 1970, when we preempted the field, feels that this is new cost that can be absorbed.

I just do not think he has really looked into it. Thank you.
Senator CANNON. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gross.
Senator CANNON. Senator Baker?

Senator BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take long. I will just say something of personal interest to underscore the severity of this trauma in the case of the families and friends of those who were on that Southern Airways' plane when it was hijacked. How many hours were they in the air?

Mr. GROSS. Twenty-nine hours, I believe.

Senator BAKER. The most remarkable thing is that the crew held together under those circumstances. On the same day, my daughter was flying to Knoxville from Atlanta, and her flight was diverted because of the hijacking.

My son was at the airport to meet her and could not get out because the airport was closed off by the police and the National Guard.

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