2. The most effective solution to the problem is the elimination of safe havens or sanctuaries for the hijacker or political terrorist, so that no airport or nation can serve as an avenue of escape for the criminal.

Unfortunately, this is not a solution which can be implemented immediately or unilaterally. Airport operators are, however, firmly convinced that the deterrence effect of an antihijacking agreement with Cuba will be substantially greater than the transforming of U.S. airports into armed camps, as the administration has proposed.

The elimination of safe havens removes the chance of hijacking success, while armed guards at airports merely increase the risk to the hijacker, escalate the level of violent action required and may involve tragic consequences to innocent people in terminal buildings.

3. Airport operators, being part of local government and part of the aviation industry, are doing their utmost to protect passengers and aircraft from threats and violence on airports.

Federal regulations issued last year formalized the already recognized need for airport operators to provide a secure environment in the landing areas of the airport (runways, taxiways, and ramps). These programs are now being implemented, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars for ramp lighting, perimeter fencing, personnel badging systems, closed circuit TV systems, et cetera, and for additional security personnel.

4. All passengers and their baggage should be effectively screened by airline personnel, consistent with constitutional requirements, to keep weapons and sabotage devices from being boarded.

New Federal regulations, like the pending legislation, require virtually all passengers on U.S. airlines and their carry-on baggage to be screened by the use of metal detectors prior to boarding. Airport operators continue to support this concept. Further, the airlines must deny boarding to any passenger who does not consent to such screening procedures or personal searches as required.

While we and the courts continue to have serious reservations about the legality of the routine search of those passengers who are not "selectees" under the hijacker profile, we would defer to the airlines and the Justice Department on the matter.

5. A Federal security force under the control of one agency (FAA) must be available to airports to back up the airline screening efforts, to provide uniformity in procedure, and to make arrests for violations of Federal antihijacking statutes. Local governments cannot and should not be responsible for enforcing Federal criminal statutes.

These, again, are the main points AOCI raised during this subcommittee's hearings last August on essentially the same legislation. Has anything happened since that time which would eliminate the need for the prompt enactment of S. 39, the successor bill? Our answer is a decisive "No."

The intervening months have only served to make it completely clear that the administration wants to get out of the antihijacking security problem with no costs, with no responsibility if future hijackings occur and with no public and press criticism of its lack of responsible leadership.

Let us review the record. First, the administration worked hard and successfully to avoid hearings on this legislation in the House of

Representatives last fall. Because of White House efforts the House membership never had the opportunity to decide whether hijacking was sufficiently important to the Nation to devote some minimum level of Federal resources to its elimination. The bill died.

Further, last October, the Congress, by overwhelming margins, passed and sent to the President the "Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1972." A major provision of this legislation would have allowed the administration to take surplus revenues already being contributed by aviation system users and make them available to hardpressed local governments to help pay for necessary airport security facilities and equipment. The President vetoed the legislation although it would not have cost those who don't fly a single cent. These user taxes are still in the Aviation Trust Fund, unappropriated, but, because of the White House veto, cannot be used for the purchase of more security for the flying public.

Finally, the administration announced with considerable fanfare that it had, on December 5, adopted "emergency" regulations to require the Nation's municipal airport operators to recruit, train, arm, and uniform some 4,500 additional policemen to enforce Federal antihijacking statutes not later than 60 days hence, or February 6, at every airport passenger checkpoint.

Bear in mind, and I deviate a little, as required in part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, these armed security officers will be provided by 531 different jurisdiction. There will be 531 sets of employment qualifications, 531 different methods of selection, training, and supervision. Part 107 requires only that the law enforcement officer be an armed person authorized to carry and use firearms, vested with proper police power and identifiable by uniform.

Initial public reaction was favorable in that "something was being done to combat hijacking." This is understandable because the public is primarily interested in stopping hijacking with greater deterrence efforts and is not concerned with the source of the law enforcement presence.

While AOCI does not support the regulation because of its conviction that the criminal acts of political terrorists and hijackers are Federal and not local crimes, we have urged our members at every opportunity to attempt to fully comply with the regulation. However unwise, unless invalidated by the courts or preempted by Congress, the new regulation has the force of law and must be obeyed.

I would like to emphasize that, Mr. Chairman, airport operators are doing their best to comply, not because of their conviction that it is a good regulation, nor are we doing it because we have been threatened with fines if we don't comply.

Senator CANNON. Have any of the operators attempted to make a test of this by taking to court to determine whether there is a legal requirement as far as they're concerned?

Mr. BEAN. Not that I know of, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe it has been done as yet.

For the reasons detailed on the attachment, probably a majority of the larger and many small airports will be unable to fully comply with the new requirements by February 6, even with the extraordinary efforts that are now underway.

Extensions of time for full compliance will be required at many locations. While we have voiced our objection to the administration on the timing and financing requirements of the regulation, our paramount objection is to its philosophy. This New Federalism approach of requiring State and local governments to take over Federal responsibilities can have adverse effects on our aviation system which the Congress might well consider.

Following the precedent set in the new regulations, the administration could next withdraw its narcotics and public health officials from U.S. international airports of entry and declare that protection. of the public from the illegal entry of heroin or disease is a local responsibility.

Extended to its limit, the new administration philosophy could decide that our Nation's air traffic control system should be decentralized with State and local governments recruiting, training, and paying air traffic controllers.

In all these examples, local governments are unable to effectively assume responsibilities which are systemic and which, for safety and operational reasons, must be centralized. Five hundred and thirty-one different police forces, with wide variations in training and legal authority and with no central intelligence network cannot as effectively enforce Federal antihijacking statutes passed by Congress as could a well-coordinated Federal force.

For these many reasons, airport operators support prompt enactment of the pending legislation, which is sufficiently flexible to permit the Administrator to modify the antihijacking system to changed circumstances and to permit him to enter into contracts with smaller local governments which might prefer to utilize their own police forces but with Federal arrest authority.

Mr. Chairman, attached to our statement are facts which, I am sure, will be of interest to the committee. An example of some of the problems that the local communities have is the inability of the local police force to enforce Federal statutes.

In many instances, peace officers employed by State and local governments have no statutory authority to arrest without warrant for suspected violation of Federal criminal statutes-felony or misdemeanor. This is true, according to Justice Department reports, in the following 19 States, whose air carrier airports enplane a total of some 40 percent of total domestic passenger traffic:

No authority to arrest for Federal felony: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, and Vermont.

And have no authority to arrest for Federal misdemeanor not committed in officer's presence: Georgia, Idaho, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.

In response to AOCI survey, airport operators in 30 States questioned whether their personnel had sufficient authority to arrest for such Federal offenses.

In some instances, States have previously enacted statutes closely resembling the Federal offenses. However, it remains quite possible that in the remaining States, law officers attempting to enforce the new

Federal regulations on February 6 may be powerless to do so and subject to suits for false arrest.

Airport operators, on advice of counsel, do not favor the questionable use of general purpose law enforcement authority-disorderly conduct, assault-to attempt to detain a suspect until the FBI can be summoned to arrest for the Federal offense.

Any arrest or detention by local police officials without probable cause would likely be overturned by the courts as an unconstitutional arrest.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bean.

Mr. Shay?

Mr. SHAY. Mr. Chairman, I am Donald G. Shay, director of aviation for the Port of Seattle Commission, which operates the SeattleTacoma, Wash., International Airport. I also serve as second vice president of the Airport Operators Council International.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to describe the problems faced by the Port of Seattle in our efforts to comply with the recent amendment to part 107 of the Federal Air Regulations.

First, however, I would like to make it clear that the Port of Seattle shares the deep concern of this subcommittee, the Senate and the executive branch over the matter of a solution to the aircraft hijacking problem. I am certain that the owners and operators of the Nation's 530 other air carrier airports are equally concerned.

Of immediate concern to all of us are the very serious problems we all have in coping with the previously mentioned Federal Air Regulations amendment.

Our problems are basically three in number: legal, financial, and time. Mr. Richard D. Ford, deputy general manager and legal officer of the Port of Seattle, and chairman of the legal committee of the Airport Operators Council International, will address his remarks to the legal questions, and I will discuss briefly the other two.

To put our situation in proper context, let me describe the Sea-Tac International Airport. It is a large hub airport and enplaned approximately 2.4 million passengers in 1972.

We presently have 35 passenger loading gates located on four concourses. We average 178 daily flight departures.

In early 1973 we expect to open two satellite terminals with an additional 10 gates each.

In conjunction with the nine U.S. air carriers and two foreign air carriers serving Sea-Tac, we have chosen to utilize the so-called "concourse plan" rather than the gate plan in an effort to economize on manpower.

Even So, it appears that we will need as many as 46 law enforcement officers added to our payroll to be in compliance with Federal Air Regulations, part 107 as amended.

This additional manpower represents an additional payroll cost of approximately $500,000, an amount which is not included in our approved 1973 budget. We do have an agreement with the airlines serving Sea-Tac whereby they reimburse the Port for all operating and maintenance costs at the airport. Even so, the addition of this additional cost, not to mention the additional costs assessed directly to the air

lines for their portion of the program, represents a difficult negotiating situation.

In our case, the $500,000 per year potentially amounts to an increase in landing fees of 5 cents per thousand pounds per landing.

In order for us to actually place law enforcement officers in position to comply with the directives, we have to go through a careful screening and selection process. I understand that we have had in the neighborhood of 600 prospective applicants for the 46 positions.

Following selection, it will be necessary for us to send the selectees to the Seattle Police Department Academy for police training. To accommodate our special needs, the Seattle Police Department has tentatively agreed to set up a special class commencing on or about March 5, 1973. The duration of the class is 12 weeks.

Accordingly, we could not then be able to supply law enforcement officers in place until late June 1973.

We have petitioned the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration for an exemption from the February 6, 1973, compliance date and have requested an extension of time until July 1, 1973.

Gentlemen, that briefly is our example of the type of problems we, as airport operators, have had placed on us with little or no notice. I know that airport operators all around the country are desperately trying to find solutions, but the budgetary problem at the local level simply cannot be resolved overnight, so to speak.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission we would ask that the attachment to our statement be included in the hearing record. Senator CANNON. It will be included.

(The attachment follows:)

AIRPORT OPERATORS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL-SURVEY OF U.S. AIRPORTS ON NEW SECURITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

Introduction. In anticipation of the issuance by the Administration of the December 5 amendment to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 107, with respect to law enforcement support of airline passenger screening, AOCI requested all 531 air carrier airports to complete a survey questionnaire.

The attached sheets indicate the legal, financial and practical problems local governments operating air carrier airports would have in complying with the new Federal regulation.

1 Large, 1 percent or more of total U.S. traffic; medium, 0.25 percent to 0.99 percent; small, 0.50 percent to 0.24 percent; non, 0.40 percent or less.

Caveat. The AOCI survey, completed by most respondents before the new regulation was published, requested the number and cost of additional police officers required to cover each boarding gate. As the final regulation authorizes the use of "sterile concourses" (necessitating fewer police officers than the "gate plan"), individual airport totals may since have been modified and should be verified.