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Mr. HOYT. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I want to take the latitude of bringing up my colleague here who is the next witness, Mr. Shea.

Senator CANNON. That is all right.

Mr. HOYT. Thank you.

I appreciate this opportunity to present our views. For the record, I am Russell Hoyt, executive vice president of the American Association of Airport Executives, a professional group of men who manage the Nation's airports.

You have heard testimony from representatives of several airport sponsors. My statement, although it will essentially agree with foregoing remarks, will present it in a little different light. My brief testimony is in essence a distillation of communications with literally hundreds of professional airport managers throughout the country. Before getting into specifics, let me say that airport management was greatly disturbed by, if I may call it, the high-handed, unilateral manner in which the Federal Government acting through the DOT handled this matter. No consultation with industry, resorting to emergency powers to cut off debate or comment, a command performance at which a pronouncement or edict was handed down with appropriate fanfare, followed by a full scale, big deal TV conference. We have our doubts that this is the way to increase security for the air traveling public.

Three main facts of the airport security program deserve careful consideration of this committee.

The first is the basic premise that armed guards are needed at all passenger screening points. It seems almost alien to this country's history and principles to require its citizens to be individually screened, to be subject to a search of his person and a mandatory search of his belongings.

Hijacking is a serious threat and strong measures must be taken. But, is this medicine to prove worse than the disease?

The rationale for the armed guards, according to Secretary Volpe, is that we are now dealing with a new breed of criminal-desperate air pirates, fugitives from justice, and extortionists. Some spur-of-themoment hijackings may be foiled by the presence of a uniformed law officer. Hijackings planned by those who have already demonstrated a contempt of the law through murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping will hardly consider a police officer on duty at a gate a deterrent.

An airport commissioner, writing to the FAA, managed to put the whole matter in rather clear focus. He wrote:

Do you really believe one person with a gun on his hip, standing at a gate in X airport with nothing happening day after day is suddenly going to stop people who, like in Houston, were four alleged murderers, and bank robbers who shot two airline employees, or three wanted and desperate criminals who took over a jet in Birmingham.

Yet, this is precisely the type of hijacker that moved the DOT, on a crash program basis, into requiring armed guards.

The solution lies in giving these desperados no place to go.

The second item I wish to mention is the considerable expense to be incurred by airports. You have already heard several estimates.

The administration spokesman lightly dismissed this matter of costs with the statement "the costs should be recovered from the traveling public."

The airlines may be successful in getting the CAB to permit a fare increase. The airports do not, however, assess charges directly on the public. They set fees which the airlines pay and, in turn, pass on to their customers. The airport fees are usually contractually established for stipulated periods. They cannot be increased unilaterally.

Furthermore, few airports have the negotiating strength to recover their full costs from the airlines. We have detailed figures from airports throughout the country. These figures indicate conclusively that the great majority of airports serving the air carrier do not now meet their operating expenses; and that this deficit will be greatly aggravated by the costly requirements of both Federal airport certification and now federally imposed security measures.

If a fare increase is authorized, then there must be a formula which will require the airlines to pass on a certain percentage or fixed sum directly to the airports.

We emphasize this point: There must be a predetermined automatic disbursement of any fare increase. The airports must not have to depend on a voluntary effort by the airlines.

The alternative to this is, of course, a complete assumption of the responsibility for the armed guard program by the Federal Govern


I might say in passing that unless the airports soon see a way out of this increased cost burden, then there will be a significant increase in the number of airports resorting to a service charge placed directly on the passengers.

The third factor that must be considered is the quality of law enforcement that will be in effect come February 6. Contrary to what the administration may have thought or hoped, there is no reservoir of competent peace officers just waiting to be hired for airport service. Nor is a competent officer created merely by issuing him a badge, uniform and gun. Giving a man the authority to apprehend, arrest, and even shoot a fellow citizen is a very serious matter.

Many of the States have a higher respect for the safety of its citizens than does the Federal Government. The States, to protect their citizens, have established minimum training and performance standards that a candidate for a law enforcement position must meet before he can carry a gun; 250 to 300 hours of instruction and training is not unusual. Most law enforcement agencies already are understaffed. This is so not only due to a lack of funds, but also a lack of candidates for the sometimes unpopular job of cop.

Despite the obvious shortage of peace officers and the long leadtime required to train them, airports are suddenly faced with an ultimatum to have within 60 days ready and on the job anywhere from 2 to 200-depending on the size of the airport-police officers.

Airport management is making a sincere and dedicated effort to have the armed guards in place by February 6. Compliance will, how

ever, range all the way from excellent to poor or nothing. Excellent will be a full complement of well-trained officers. Poor-and this will be the rule rather than the exception-will be an inadequate, illtrained force.

This poses a distinct threat to the very people these armed guards are there to protect. Interestingly enough, the two incidents of hijacking attempts reported since the regulation was announced involved individuals who originally were not armed, but obtained their guns thanks to the antihijacking procedures.

If it is the carefully considered consensus that armed guards are necessary at every passenger control point, then the job must be done correctly and without the present sense of panic and over reaction.

A hastily, ill-conceived program such as the DOT is requiring of all airports can only lead, at best, to an ineffective program and at worse, to a serious threat to the thousands of law abiding citizens who daily use or visit our airport terminals.

This concludes my prepared text, but I thought I might just pass on the FAA report yesterday, that there were three airports in the country, Prescott, Ariz.; Tyler, Tex.; and Aspen, Colo., that refused to submit the plan as required by law.

I talked just about an hour ago with the airport manager in Prescott, Ariz. He said that the mayor and city council wrote to the FAA to say that they respectfully regreted that they were not complying because they felt, first, the thing was completely unjustified as far as they were concerned. They had four flights a day, one air carrier, and they did not think the risk was commensurate with the resources and so on that they would have to allocate to this program.

Second, they were already woefully short law enforcementwise in the community itself. So for this and other reasons, they just stated that lacking justification and more information from the FAA, they had opted not to submit a program.

This will, in my opinion and the opinion of many others, sound the death knell for scheduled air transportation in many of the smaller communities of this Nation.

I am sure that you gentlemen know that there are 500 and some airports that receive airline service, but 70 percent or 370, of these are nonhubs which together generate only 8 percent of the total traffic in the United States. These airports are being priced right out of the market.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoyt.

The next witness is Mr. William Shea, Commissioner of Aviation, Broome County, N.Y.


Mr. SHEA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is William F. Shea, Commissioner of Aviation for Broome County, N.Y.

Broome County owns and operates the Broome County Airport, serving the cities of Binghamton, Endicott, Johnson City, and Vestal, N.Y.

We applaud the great concern being expressed from responsible sectors over the concern of safety measures being established at air carrier airports.

Safety is a paramount concern of any transportation system.

The purpose of Federal Aviation regulation 107 is commendable, however, implementation of this directive will cause hardships on many small-hub air carrier airports due to the following reasons:

No. 1. FAR 107 will require in the case of some airports additional security personnel and 1973 budgets do not include the necessary moneys to finance this requirement. An Associated Press release in the Evening Press, Binghamton, N.Y., December 13, 1972, noted the following airport administrators' remarks:

(a) "The money to meet the Federal standards is just not in our budget." (Portland, Maine International Jet Port)

(b) Another airport director, Mr. Shea, from Takoma, indicated that "We think it is a Federal responsibility and will continue to look for some Federal funding." No. 2. The implementation of FAR 107 places the financial burden on local governments, which in many cases are not prepared to assume the responsibility of such a program.

No. 3. Broome County Airport has made every effort to comply with FAR 107, however, in our opinion, any additional security programs, or if additional airport safety officers are required by the Federal Government, should be financed by the Federal Government.

No. 4. "Arrest power" capability of some airports has not been defined.

No. 5. The selection and training of professional personnel to implement this program would require a minimum of at least 6


It would seem that Federal Aviation Regulation part 107 and part 121.538 should be financed by the Federal Government.

It should also be noted that small, medium-hub airports, and general aviation airports be considered by the committee for an increase of ADAP funds from 50 percent to 75 percent, as well as 82 percent Federal participation for FAA required security measures (not including FAR 107 100 percent) be established.

Senator Cannon, and honorable members of this committee, may I humbly thank you for permission to present this testimony. Senator CANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Shea.

That will conclude our hearing today.

The subcommittee will stand in recess, until 11 tomorrow morning, due to a resumption of the full committee on the hearing of the Secretary of Transportation tomorrow morning.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 11 a.m., on Wednesday, January 10, 1973, in the same place.)

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