We see no rationale for distinguishing the airport from the bus depot, the train station, or the sports arena in the provision of police protection. That the protection at airports is provided principally for the protection of those traveling in interstate commerce should not be considered an adequate justification for the creation of a Federal force.

For example, State law-enforcement personnel police our Interstate Highway System, and the railroads provide their own security force to protect their property and passengers.

In addition, there are many practical reasons why a Federal security force should not be established. To require the creation of a new Federal police force for the sole purpose of satisfying the security needs at all airports, regardless of their size and level of operations is unnecessarily costly and wasteful.

This cost and waste must be measured not only in terms of the financial costs of such a program, but also in terms of the nonproductive time of the Federal employees whose duties would be called for only for a short period of each working day.

To put this in a proper perspective, it would be helpful to provide you with some figures on the estimated numbers of passenger enplanements for 1973. There are, as you know, 531 airports which serve the scheduled air carriers, and during this year, approximately 185 million passengers will board scheduled air carrier flights at these airports. Approximately 90 percent of these passengers are boarded at 87 airports, with nearly 70 percent of the enplanements taking place at the 33 larger airports.

The range of activity at many of the remaining 444 air carrier airports would allow one or two local officers to add another stop_on their assigned patrol to be present during the boarding process. For example, some 200 airports board approximately 50 passengers a day. From these data, we can see that in terms of the numbers of passengers whose boardings must be supervised by a law-enforcement officer, there simply is not a significant problem at the vast majority of airports located throughout the country.

In addition, once such a Federal force is created it would prove very difficult to reduce or eliminate it, if, as we hope, the hijacking problem subsides.

By this discussion, I, by no means, intend to deny the proper Federal enforcement responsibility in this area. The FBI will respond immediately to actual hijackings with the hope of aborting them, as they have in many cases, without the loss of life or property.

The FBI will, exhaustively, investigate all air piracy incidents and subsequently bring to justice all violators. On the other hand, we do not feel the Federal Government should get into the day-to-day crime prevention business at our airports. This should properly be managed by local law-enforcement officers.

The administrative views the creation of yet another Federal enforcement arm for this sole purpose as presenting a very dangerous precedent. We all should be sensitive to the ever-increasing pressures on the Federal Government to expand and intrude into local and State affairs. To do so in the law-enforcement area would be particularly unfortunate.

It is my sincere belief that much of the controversy concerning the relative responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local governments in this area stems from a concern over the cost and funding of this law-enforcement support.

Let me state as simply and as strongly as I know how, the policy of the administration on the funding of armed law-enforcement personnel at airports.

The administration believes in the principle that the users of the air transportation system should pay for its costs, and that the cost of providing police officers at airports must be considered as part of the system's costs. Indeed, all costs related to the Federal aviation security program should be considered an integral part of the total

system cost.

These costs should be considered no differently than costs such as aircraft maintenance, flight crew training, pilots' wages, and crash and fire services.

These new security-related costs should not be considered as a separate cost item and should not be borne solely by the local community or by the local airport, or by the air carriers. Any additional charges necessary to protect passenger and crew should be reflected in

the fare structure.

The administration is well aware of and sensitive to the pleas of State and local representatives that they not be required to divert local tax revenues from other priority community projects to pay for the presence of law-enforcement personnel required by our new regulations.

These concerns, however, reflect an honest misunderstanding of our policy. The administration is not asking local communities to pay for the provision of law-enforcement personnel at airports. We recognize that this new presence of law-enforcement officers at every boarding checkpoint during the boarding process may present initial financial problems for some airports.

Of course, financial arrangements will vary among the airports, depending on local circumstances. We have advised the airport operators, however, that their avenue for recovering costs is through the adjustment and renegotiation of existing cost formulas, or contracts with tenant air carriers, or through the negotiation of new contract covering payment for security services rendered by the airport operator.

It is then up to each airline either to absorb the costs or to take the necessary procedural steps to request changes in the fare structure from the CAB. A number of airlines have already filed petitions with the CAB. The CAB has asked for additional justification for the amount of the increase requested, and has notified the carriers that requests for fare increases, based on airport security costs must be filed by January 19. Answers to the proposed fare increases are due by February 2. The Department intends to file comments with the Board on this issue.

I will depart briefly, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to emphasize two additional, fundamental concepts, which, I feel, in rereading my statement last night, warrant just a little elaboration. In attempting to combat the serious threat presented by aircraft hijackers, and saboteurs

we are dealing with a viable air transportation system which serves over 185 million people, annually.

The actions we have taken were consistently based on the premise that the efficiency of that system and the services provided the traveling public could not be derogated.

We could have, but we did not, bring air transportation to a halt. We could have, but we did not impose unwarranted and unfair burdens on the traveling public. I believe the actions we have taken were prudent, reasonable, and effective.

We believe that the hijack/sabotage threat has proven to be more than a passing phenomenon, and that a comprehensive security system is required to meet that threat.

The responsibility for this security system is shared by the Federal Government, the airlines, the airports, and local law-enforcement personnel.

Within this framework: Airlines are responsible for the inspection of passengers, baggage, and cargo, as well as the safeguarding of their aircraft.

Airports are responsible for the protection of operational areas at air carrier airports, to prevent access by unauthorized persons and vehicles.

Law-enforcement personnel must be in place to support airline and airport security programs, and to provide immediate response to actual, or suspected violations of law.

The Federal Government must prescribe, by regulation, the security measures required of airlines and airports, and must vigorously enforce those regulations throughout the national air system.

Thus, in conclusion, I wish to assure you that the Federal Government is committed to a policy designed in the past, changed when change of circumstances required it, and will continue to be designed to protect air travelers.

We are committed to the closest of ties and cooperation with the aviation industry and local communities. We are committed to support airports and airline moves, to pass on, as necessary, the increased costs of a strengthened security program to the direct beneficiaries, those who fly and we are commmitted to the proposition that no local community will lose air service because of security costs.

We are committed to the extension of international cooperation in the field of security, and, we are committed to bringing every air pirate, every air saboteur, and every person who attacks an aviation facility to justice.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer any questions that you, or the members wish to

ask.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

In light of your statement on those commitments, I find it very, very difficult to understand, one, your statement that local lawenforcement officers should carry out the enforcement of the regulation when you say you are committed to the Federal Government enforcing the regulations and, second, I find it very difficult to understand when you say you are committed to the proposition that no local community will lose air service because of security costs when you have arbitrarily now notified four communities that they are

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subjected to a thousand-dollar-a-day penalty for failure to file their proposed security regulations by January 6.

Now, I will get into some of those things in greater detail a little later on. My first question, Mr. Secretary, is prior to December 5 when you with great fanfare, on television, announced your new emergency security regulations, did you or your staff consult with, contact or attempt to work with the airport operators and carriers in determining the feasibility and practicability of the emergency regulations?

Secretary VOLPE. General Davis heads up an interagency committee that meets monthly. He also meets on frequent occasions with members of industry and from time to time as we altered the security program because of a change in the pattern of hijacking, we have kept industry informed of our proposals.

As a matter of fact, in testifying before this committee last August, I believe we made our position rather clear. Except for the one item in which we are not in agreement, I think that all of these other items were covered very thoroughly, and in general, we were supportive of the measure as passed.

Senator CANNON. Now, Mr. Secretary, let's not bring a red herring in here. I am talking specifically about the emergency regulations that you announced on December 5 and my question is, Did you or your staff consult with, contact or attempt to work with the airport operators and the carriers in determining the feasibility and practicality of the emergency regulations?

I ask that because we had a number of witnesses yesterday representing carriers and representing airport operators, all testifying that there was no advanced warning at all and no consultation. I am asking you if that is correct.

Secretary VOLPE. I did not consult with local airport operators or the airport operators' council, per se.

Senator CANNON. Did any member of your staff consult with them concerning these proposed emergency regulations, if you know?

Secretary VOLPE. General Davis can answer that question because he heads that committee and can speak to that question.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, to be very specific, everything except the time elements involved in the December 5 regulations had been discussed over a period beginning more than 2 years ago with airport operators and with other members of the aviation community.

At the encouragement of FAA, for example, many airports have established local law enforcement operations. Many of these have been in existence for more than a year.

With respect specifically to the establishment of local law-enforcement capability at all airports, I introduced this subject to a meeting of Government and industry persons last June, and I specifically requested that airport operators and airlines which were closely associated with local communities, attempt to achieve local law-enforcement support for passenger screening at that time.

The effort that we made last summer to achieve this on a voluntary basis was unsuccessful. So, Mr. Chairman, specifically, the time elements involved in the regulations were not checked with the industry. But the substantive portions of the regulations were not new to the industry.

Senator CANNON. Well, then, if I understand your testimony, the carriers or the operators were neither given any advance notice that new requirements would have to be met under a very stringent timetable-that is, a 60-day notice is that correct?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CANNON. All right, Mr. Secretary, given the far-reaching implications of the emergency regulations and difficulty, if not impossibility, of complying with them, why wasn't a rulemaking procedure used in which all segments of the aviation community were given a chance to testify about the proposed standards prior to adoption?

Secretary VOLPE. Mr. Chairman, as a result of particularly the two incidents which I described in my testimony, and in consultation with the President and members of the Office of Management and Budget, and the FAA, we determined that an emergency existed and that we should not wait as we did on two or three other occasions when we had eight or nine, I think, successive jumps from planes from the rear door.

We immediately took action on an emergency basis, and we haven't had a single type of that kind of hijacking since then. We thought this was of a sufficient emergency so that the action should be taken immediately.

Senator CANNON. What role did the Office of Management and Budget play in determining whether that was an emergency?

Secretary VOLPE. Well, they determine and pass on all legislation that we submit to the Congress as a department.

Senator CANNON. This was not legislation submitted to Congress; this was a regulation that you promulgated, in an emergency fashion. Secretary VOLPE. If it involves funding, Mr. Chairman, it is something we send to OMB.

Senator CANNON. This did not involve funding; you made it clear it would not involve funding; you were assuming no Federal funding responsibility.

Secretary VOLPE. We certainly just wanted to clarify exactly where we stood and to insure that they stood on the same ground. We had had a difference of opinion as to the purchase of magnetometers, if you remember; we finally said we thought the Federal Government ought to purchase the magnetometers.

Senator CANNON. But that issue was over with and gone when this came up. I am just wondering what the emergency regulation provisions had to do with OMB. Magnetometers were not involved; you have already made the determination that you are going to require local law enforcement; you are not going to assume the Federal law enforcement responsibility; and you are going to make the airport operators provide a security proposal to you by January 6, and provide local armed guards by February 6. What role did OMB play in that?

Secretary VOLPE. They played a very small role, as a matter of fact. It was mostly a question of keeping them informed as to the actions that we were taking because this was an emergency action, and certainly we felt it was proper to keep them informed about it.

Senator Cook. In relation to what you are saying, I might surmise, Mr. Chairman, what they had a meeting with the OMB about, be