which secured the people in the enjoyment of their private and corporate rights, against violation by any law. Grants, charters, and customs, confirmed by parliament, had the force of statutes; and though they could be impaired or annulled by its supreme and trans-, cendant power, in the mother country, where the people were represented; the colonists denied the power, unless they were also represented. They followed the examples of their ancestors, in making a declaration of their rights and wrongs at the commencement of their struggle; in which they claimed and complained as Englishmen, entitled to the benefit of English law. Taking their stand on its principles, they asserted them in all their public acts, which led to the revolution; and when they resolved on renouncing allegiance, and dissolving connection with the English government, congress did what parliament had done at the revolution of 1688. When they declared the throne vacant, and who should thenceforth occupy it, they also declared to whom allegiance was due, and prescribed the form of the oath; and when the change of government was effected in fact, announced it by a solemn declaration of the causes which led to it. Vide 3 Ruff. Statutes, 415, 440. The proceedings of parliament were a guide and the pattern of those of the states, and congress, from 1774, to July, 1776. The same principles pervaded the subsequent proceedings of both, till the present government was established; but their experience had taught them, that two great changes were indispensable, in order to avert, for the future, the perils and evils of the past. That the supreme power of government must not be vested in any legislative body, as it was in parliament; that the power of the people must be absolute and unlimited over all government; and that no power should be exercised, unless by their own authority. That the powers to be exercised by the legislature, as well as those prohibited, excepted, qualified, or reserved, should be defined by a written constitution of government; so that there might be more certainty and safety in ascertaining its meaning as a supreme law, than when it depended on usage, custom, and precedent. These changes were made by all the states but two, during the revolution.

GRANTS TO BE CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO THE LAW, AS IT WAS WHEN THEY WERE MADE.

To understand the constitution then, we must trace its principles, terms and provisions, back through the leading acts of the people, states, and congress, to the great fountain of constitutional, statute, and common law, from which our statesmen traced our whole system of jurisprudence; and by a careful examination of the whole ground, endeavour to discover the intention of those who framed, who adopted the instrument, and its own expressed intention. That it is a charter of government, a grant of power, all admit: it is also an ancient charter, for the federal government rests upon it as a fundamental law; those of the states also, are regulated by it in its grants, as well as its restrictions; it ought therefore, to be expounded, as all

such grants and charters are, according to what the law was at the time of making them. Co. Litt. 9, b; 94, b; 4 D. C. D. 546; and "according to ancient allowance," 2 Co. Inst. 282, a; "Modern methods of conveyancing are not to be construed to affect ancient notions of equity." Amb. 288. by Lord Hardwicke. No subsequent judge can alter or vary from the law, according to his own private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his private sentiment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. 1 Bl. Com. 70. "The common law hath no controller in any part of it;" but by parliament; and if not "abrogated or altered," then it "remains still." "It appears in magna charta, and other ancient statutes." Co. Litt. 115, b.

This Court has declared, that they know no reason why "a rule of interpretation to which all assent," should not be as applicable to the constitution as to other instruments," 12 Wh. 438; that the "interpretation of the terms," depends on "the language of the constitution itself, and the mischief to be prevented; which we know from the history of our country." 4 Pet. 431, 2.

Let whatever meaning be given to the constitution; whether a league, confederation, agreement, compact or treaty, "between the states so ratifying the same," as it expresses itself in the seventh article; its substance, essence, and nature, is a contract between states or nations, 2 Peters, 314; a grant, 9 Wheat. 189; speaking in the words of the grantor, in reference to the thing granted, and the thing reserved, 6 Pet. 741; with exceptions implying the pre-existence of the power excepted, 12 Wh. 438; 2 Pet. 313; 9 Wh. 200, 207; with prohibitions which restrict the grantor himself, 7 Cr. 136; and referring to the grantor all power not granted or prohibited, 1 Wh. 325; which remain in the grantor as before the grant, 4 Wh. 193; operating as an exclusion from the grant of what is excepted, reserved, or retained, 6 Pet. 312, 741. It is a settled rule, that grants by states, of things, to which the grantor has no right or title, are void, 9 Cr. 99; 5 Wh. 303; 6 Pet. 730: and that no external power can restrict a state, 7 Cr. 136.

THE MEANING OF THE TERMS STATES AND PEOPLE.

It must then be ascertained, what is the constitutional meaning of the people, and the states. In the main position which I assumed, and have endeavoured to maintain, that each state was "a single, supreme, sovereign, power," exclusive, and absolute, within its own. boundaries; unless by its own grant by the constitution, and the restraints it has thereby imposed on itself; I can understand it in all its parts.

The people of a state, who had by their state constitution, granted the power of legislation to their state legislatures; had plenary power, to take from them such portions as they pleased, and by their grant vest them in a federal legislature.

The same people could, by the same power which made their con

stitution the supreme law of the state, make that of the United States, the supreme law of the land, embraced in the Union; by each declaring it so within their respective boundaries, and uniting all the constituent parts, by a deed, signed and executed by the people of each. They could grant and modify the powers they parted with, while the grant was in fieri; when consummated, they had no further power over it, for, by their own consent, a case arising under it could be decided only by the judicial power, as in a case arising under a grant of land by A. to B. So, when a state renounces all power to emit a bill of credit; to make a compact with another state, without the consent of congress; to impair the obligation of a contract, and declares its exercise to be prohibited; the consequence is plain. Limitations are imposed by itself, which it cannot pass; the act is declared by the people to be void, by being a violation of a supreme law, by which they have bound themselves. By this law, they order their judges to obey it; and by which, this Court must adjudge the act of the state to be void, for the want of power, in obedience to the command of that "single sovereign power," which could bind and had bound itself, to refer all cases arising under its own supreme law, to the judicial power of its own creation.

If a state has thereby became "shorn of its beams," and thenceforth shines with less than "its original brightness;" it is by its own act: and for the future, it must move within the circle by which it has confined its own action, until it shall be enlarged by another power, to which each state has bound itself to appeal. The amending power, existing in "the states, respectively, or the people," to be exercised pursuant to the fifth article of the constitution; which must be taken and construed as a clause of revocation, in a deed, grant, or charter, by an individual, the king, a proprietary, a colony, a state in its legislative capacity, or by the people as the sovereign thereof. It is a declaration by the grantor, that he reserves, and in the mode he has prescribed, will exercise his right to modify or revoke whatever he has granted; will remove any restrictions he has imposed on himself, whenever the requisite number of the separate parties concur, with such exceptions as are specified in the revoking clause. Subject to this power of revocation, the sixth article declares what the effect and obligation of the grant shall be; then the tenth amendment is added by way of a proviso, a condition and limitation, operating on the whole constitution; declaring that what is not granted or prohibited, is reserved to the organic power; "the states respectively, or the people," (respectively).

THE RESPECT PAID TO THE OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURt of THE UNITED STATES ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

Such is the meaning of these terms, according to the language of the instrument in which they are used, the precedent acts of the people, the states, and the congress, the convention, and this Court, which, in any other cases than those arising under the constitution, would have been held to be conclusive, and closed all discussion.

There will not be found in judicial history, an instance of a question arising on the words or terms of a will, a deed, contract, law, or treaty, that would have been deemed an open one, after such a course of adjudication on their construction as has been already shown. Nor is there any other country, in which the decisions of its own supreme judicial tribunal would be overlooked, and the interpretation of its fundamental laws be sought in the opinions of foreign writers, or the adjudications of the inferior courts of foreign nations. In England, one judgment of the house of lords settles the law; and it is not suffered to be again discussed in an inferior court. Here too, the same effect is given to a final adjudication of this Court on any other question arising on a written instrument, save on the constitution. Yet their repeated definitions of the terms states, and people, of contracts, their obligations, cessions of territory, of jurisdiction, by deeds and laws of states, or treaties with foreign powers, have been unavailing. All profess to respect this Court, as competent to the high functions it exercises, as the constitutional arbiter of cases arising under the constitution: all profess to revere that instrument, as the best and most perfect emanation of human wisdom: but practically it would seem, that neither its framers or its constituted expositor, have expressed their intention in intelligible language. We find that every thing which has the semblance of judicial opinion, whether from the bench or bar of Westminster Hall, at this day; is pressed upon us as evidence of the meaning of a grant made fifty years since, without an inquiry how the law which bears upon it, was then. We are asked, in effect, to overlook its great feature as the supreme law of the land, speaking in the same language, from the time it was proposed to the present, and through the whole intervening period; and to make its construction accord with the fluctuations of judicial opinions in England, which we well know have been very great within the last fifty years.

THE EFFECTS OF BEING INFLUENCED BY LATE DECISIONS IN

ENGLAND.

If we follow this course in our opinions, and it should appear on investigation, that within this time the law has been reformed in England by judicial power, and we follow the example, one of two consequences are inevitable. The constitution will have one meaning in its application to the old states, and a different one as to the new ones; according to the law as laid down by some of the courts in England, a judge at nisi prius, or some elementary writer, at the different periods when each state became a party to it: or the law, as laid down at this day, must be incorporated into the constitution, as "a fresh infusion;" and it be made to speak retrospectively, in a language wholly unknown to its framers, and those who adopted it; nay, wholly different from what was understood, and universally accepted at the time, as declared by this Court in one uniform series of decisions for forty years. In either case, we give to these opinions of foreigners, which have no reference to our constitution, of

men who know not its principles; not only a weight which they have not at home, but we virtually make this tribunal subject to the appellate power of foreign courts.

If, as an individual, I could be willing to waive the quantum of colonial dependence, which would be implied in thus recognising any judicial authority over us, as yet remaining in the land of our ancestors; I would expect at least, that it should be only that of a court of as high authority there as this Court has here; not of a court whose judgment may be reversed by the king's bench, exchequer chamber, and house of lords; the opinion of a single judge, which may be overruled in bank; or of a writer, whose lucubrations are read in neither court, or at nisi prius. As a judge, I am bound to take the law of a grant or charter as it was "at the time of making them, and their ancient allowance;" in the administration of the system of jurisprudence which pervades the land, I take it as it was when it was adopted, by the consent of the people, or their legislatures, by the constitution, congress, and this Court. As a constituent member of a court of the last resort, I feel bound by its solemn and deliberate expositions of the law, in cases involving the collisions of power between the state and federal governments; restraints on either, or the rights of individuals or of corporations, secured by either. The same rule must be the law in the thirteen old, and the thirteen new states, which have been admitted into the Union. If we suffer our minds to be influenced by other authority, we must expound our supreme law, our great bond of union, not by the rules and principles which were taken as settled law, at the time of its adoption, but as it now appears to be the doctrine of the day in foreign courts, which may be changed before the next term.

If the constitution is to be taken as a certain grant, an uniform line of power, one law, regulating old and new states alike, operating over the whole territory, whether within the original boundaries of the states, or late acquisitions by treaty; it must speak in the same language, and its terms have, in 1837, the same interpretation as they had in 1787, otherwise it must forever remain unsettled.

Judicial reformations of the existing law, are as much liable to be reformed, and the law restored to what it was, as present law is subject to future reforms; if we do not respect the opinions of our pre-/ decessors, it cannot be expected that our successors will respect ours. We must, therefore, look with a single eye to what the law was in 1787, as declared by this Court; and carry its settled principles into new cases as they arise: if we do not, it will become impossible to sustain the principles of the constitution against the assaults which will be made upon it. Our only safety is, in its being received as a standard rule of action and judgment, the same through all time, directing the government of the Union, and of the present and future states, as this Court say, "We cannot comprehend that train of reasoning which would maintain that the extent of power granted by the people is to be ascertained, not by the nature and terms of the grant, but by its date. Some state constitutions were formed before,