The

Records and to cancel the presentation of certain papers. Conference chairman responded that he might agree to do so if the estimated cost of between $25,000 to $50,000 were borne by the Air Force. A day later, the Air Force representative withdrew his request. Later a Navy representative made a similar request which was also withdrawn after the costs were described.

In view of these incidents, it has become evident to the IEEE that it needed to develop a practical procedure to handle such cases. Typically the chairman of an IEEE technical Conferences program is an engineer employed by company or a university who undertakes this additional responsibility as a part-time voluntary professional society task. The IEEE is presently working on a "hot-line" procedure which will make available, to any Conference program manager or journal editor, access to the IEEE general manager's office so that previous experience with this type of situation is available. IEEE is also seeking to develop appropriate points of contact within DOD so that reasonable decisions can be reached in short periods of

time.

The IEEE does not have a complete record of how many incidents of this type have occurred since they are not all reported to the IEEE General Manager. However there have been incidents in which papers have been withdrawn at the request of military representatives.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the impact on the electrical/electronics community of incidents such as these.

Certainly they have a chilling effect on the science and technology community. I should like to cite two examples of such effects. One relates to an IEEE committee and the second relates to the research choices of an IEEE member who is a very capable Junior engineering faculty member.

A number of IEEE members who are members of the Solid-State Circuits and Technology Committee canvassed their members to determine which topics would generate the most interest as focal points for proposed workshops in the Spring of 1982. Two topics selected were High Speed Technologies and the Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) program which the DOD has sponsored. Before going ahead with planning for a workshop on VHSIC, the DOD program manager's office was contacted. The manager's representative indicated that VHS IC was controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Therefore, if the workshop included information on chip fabrication and processes, chip architecture, internal details of the chip, and the performance details of chips, all workshop attendees would be required to present proof of U.S. citizenship. Such proof would not be required if only topics such as brass boards and the names of chips were to be covered. The IEEE group decided that those were too many constraints; the result was that the workshop was not held. Whether this decision was an advance, or a loss for U.S. national security is hard to decide. However, it is possible to assert that planners of this workshop, which included engineers

from Bell Laboratories, IBM, and the University of California at Berkeley, are among the most productive and capable engineers in

the U.S. in this field.

A fellow faculty member at SMU, who recently completed his PhD at Princeton in communication theory, described to me several areas in which he felt very challenging technical problems existed.

However, in his choice of topics on which to work, he

has carefully avoided topics which are close to DOD interests because he feared his work might be classified. He considered this possibility disastrous because he would not be able to publish his results or communicate with his professional colleagues. Thus the effect of current classification procedures in this case may well be the opposite of the intended purpose. The nation's security can be weakened rather than strengthened if bright engineers and scientists avoid working in defense-related fields or holding meetings on subjects which are close to defense

interests.

In summary, I should like to make the following points:

1) An open communication system is an essential element in the operation of the U.S. engineering and science

2)

community,

It is possible for industrially employed professionals to operate with both restricted and unrestricted information and still be active and effective participants in an open communication system,

3)

An open communication system is vulnerable to improper or careless applications of classification procedures,

4) Those responsible for policy-making and policy

5)

implementation in classifying engineering and scientific

information should be aware of the very substantial damage they can do to the U.S. technological enterprise.

While decisions about specific situations will depend both on overall government policies as well as on judgments made by individual representatives of Federal agencies, wise decision-making will depend on having technically sophisticated people in the Federal agencies involved.

6)

It should be recognized that the U.S. must ultimately
depend on the strength and accomplishments of its
scientific and technical community for its national

security. This community needs the freedom to

communicate openly to retain its vitality.

Thank you for giving me an opportunity to testify. If there

are any questions, I shall be happy to respond.

11/2/83

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Thank you, Dr. Willenbrock, for such an excellent statement. It was a very useful statement.

Now we will hear from Professor Unger next, although I understand that Mr. Rubenstein could expand further on your testimony. Perhaps during the question and answer session we will have a need to refer to that.

The Chair would therefore like to call on Prof. Stephen H. Unger from Columbia University.

Professor UNGER. Mr. Chairman, I have also submitted a written statement and I will therefore not read it in detail. What I will do is elaborate on selected parts and make some comments that were stimulated in part by testimony of some of the preceding witnesses.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Without objection, your statement will be received and made part of the record, and you may continue as you wish.

Professor UNGER. One of the focal points of my statement that I will come to toward the end will be a set of proposals for legislative action. It is my opinion that this situation calls for congressional action.

First I would like to say that the problem has frequently been falsely put in the form of a conflict between the personal rights and privileges of scientists and engineers and the national security. I submit that this is a false conflict in that there is no contradiction between these two interests.

As has been started by previous witnesses, the national security, to the extent that we define it in terms of military technology, is served by openness, not by secrecy. The same openness that enables scientists and engineers to exchange ideas freely with one another promotes the national security in the sense of enhancing the technological basis for that national security.

I would further submit-and in this case I agree with the chairman's earlier remarks-that national security should not be narrowly defined in terms of military technology or military power. There is a good deal more to it than that.

I would also argue that, given the strength of the U.S. military establishment, its enormous potential for retaliatory strikes, for example, with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we are not in a situation where some marginal changes in technology would truly endanger the balance of power in the world. I don't see that at all. We are in a situation where the greatest danger is that unfortunate policies may precipitate a conflict that would destroy all concerned, not that we're going to be overwhelmed as a result of some technological advance made by the Soviet Union.

I shall skip over the discussion of why it is that the free exchange of information is vital to progress in science and technology, since I think this has been amply covered by previous speakers. There is no doubt that a great deal of technology originating in the United States has been utilized by the Soviet Union to enhance its military strength. This is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the United States has originated most of the major technological advances in what is generally referred to as high technology. You cannot build a sophisticated missile system without using solid state technology that was originated in the United States. But any effort to shut off the flow of information in these fields would be