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513 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
ently with the requirements of such title. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518.
KEETON, District Judge.
The United States has applied for an order authorizing interception of oral communications in accordance with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., and for simultaneous videotape surveillance. The application seeks authorization for surreptitious entry into a private dwelling and implantation of monitoring devices within the dwelling, subject to the limitations of the proposed authorization.
The proposed surveillance is extraordinarily intrusive. The supporting affidavits, however, present compelling evidence of probable cause to believe that ongoing criminal activities, violations of Title 21 of the United States Code, are occurring within the dwelling, that each of the occupants of the dwelling participates in these criminal activities, that investigative procedures thus far used have been without substantial success and that, unless video surveillance as well as oral interception is used, available alternative investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed in identifying particular participants in these activities and evidencing the extent and nature of their participation. These circumstances present an issue, unresolved in statutes and precedents, as to whether the court may properly authorize video surveillance as well as oral intercep
Title III, providing in stated circumstances for "interception" of "oral communication," 18 U.S.C. § 2518, makes no explicit reference to video surveillance. government argues that authority for video surveillance is derived from two sources, separately or in combination: (1) the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 and 57(b) and (2) the court's inherent authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, in aid of its jurisdiction founded in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, as amended. In substance, if not explicitly, the government contends that it need not comply with the strict conditions that Title III imposes in relation to applications for a court order authorizing oral interception.
Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., repeatedly refers to "interception" of "oral communications" and nowhere explicitly addresses video surveillance. Thus, a candid reading of the statute discloses that Congress did not consider and answer questions regarding video surveillance. This gapthis absence of any mandate in the statute as to video surveillance-apparently extends to the legislative history as well; counsel for the Government has not called the court's attention to, nor has the court found, any reference in the legislative history to video surveillance.
 Given that neither the statute nor the legislative history addresses issues regarding video surveillance, the views that might be urged upon a court fall into three general categories: (1) the absence of any provisions in Title III regarding video surveillance implies that no strictures like those of Title III are to be imposed, and the court may authorize video surveillance as long as it is not forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, the Rules of Criminal Proce dure, and precedents; (2) the absence of provisions in Title III for video surveillance implies that video surveillance is forbidden; (3) the absence of any provisions in Title III regarding video surveillance leaves all questions about video surveillance unanswered by Title III, with the consequence that courts must of necessity fashion answers to all such questions in light of whatever guidance is available in the constitution, in laws, and in judicial decisions. The first and second of these three approaches give little if any weight to the concern that Congress manifested, in enacting Title III, that investigative methods be chosen with due regard both for investigating effectively and for safeguarding individual rights. The third is the more appropriate approach to questions that are unanswered both in the statute
WHITTAKER v. RAMSEY
Cite as 513 F.Supp. 423 (1980)
and in the legislative history. gress has not directly addressed and answered a question, courts-including lower courts, until the Supreme Court has spoken-in answering, by necessity, should nevertheless be guided by the aims, principles and policies that manifestly underlie enacted statutes. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487, 71 S.Ct. 456, 463, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.); Mailhot v. Travelers Insurance Co., 375 Mass. 342, 377 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1978).
It seems clear that, when Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was under consideration by Congress, "interception" of "oral communications" was the most intrusive form of investigation under scrutiny. Video surveillance, then less well known and less used, has become increasingly significant during intervening years. Most observers would regard it, standing alone, as even more intrusive than interception of oral communications. Clearly, the combination of oral interception and video surveillance is more intrusive than oral interception alone. In these circumstances, judicial deference to aims, policies and principles manifestly underlying Title III's strictures in relation to interception of oral communications should lead to strictures no less severe in relation to video surveillance.
 When the Government's pending application was first presented, the court expressed concern that the authorization for this application from the Attorney General's designate, in compliance with Title III, referred only to "interception" of "oral communications" even though the application sought an order for video surveillance as well. The application is now supported by an authorization from a designate of the Attorney General to seek approval of video surveillance as well. The person so acting for the Attorney General, however, is not the same one who authorized the application for oral interception and is not shown to be one designated by the Attorney General to authorize applications for oral interception. In form, the authorizations would
have made a stronger case for the order if a single authorization had been issued by a person duly designated by the Attorney General to approve Title III applications. The court concludes, however, that Title III is not formally applicable to video surveillance and that in the present case substantive safeguards at least as rigorous as those required by Title III, and perhaps more so, have been observed. Moreover, the application represents that the agents implementing the video surveillance will be directed that the video surveillance component be turned on after it has been determined from the audio component that communications involving illegal activities or illegal activity itself, within the scope of the proposed investigation, is taking place and that the video component remain on only as long as and under the same constraints as are imposed on oral interception for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion consistently with the requirements of Title III.
In these distinctive circumstances and with these special provisions for minimizing intrusion, the application will be allowed and the proposed order will be entered.
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
Gerald David WHITTAKER, Petitioner,
Charles "Buck" RAMSEY et al, Respondents.
Civ. No. 4-80-32.
United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.
Sept. 15, 1980.
County jail prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court, Neese, J., held that, even if petitioner waived his right to extradition hearing only
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ALEJANDRINA TORRES, et al.,
Appeal from the United States District Court
ARGUED JUNE 8, 1984-DECIDED DECEMBER 19, 1984
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, CUDAHY and POSNER, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal by the United States raises two novel and important questions: whether the federal government may ever secretly televise the interior of a private building as part of a criminal investigation and use the videotapes in a criminal trial, and if so whether the warrants under which television surveillance was conducted in this case complied with constitutional requirements. A federal grand jury indicted the four defendants, who are members of the FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena), on charges of seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 2384) and related weapons and explosives violations. On the eve of trial, the district judge ordered the suppression of videotapes that the FBI had made as part of its
surveillance of two FALN safe houses. 583 F. Supp. 86, 99105 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The government appeals this order under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The videotapes had no sound track; but at the same time that the FBI was televising the interior of the safe houses it was recording the sounds on different equipment. The judge refused to order suppression of the sound tapes, and they are not in issue in this appeal.
The FALN is a secret organization of Puerto Rican separatists that has been trying to win independence for Puerto Rico by tactics that include bombing buildings in New York, Chicago, and Washington. The bombs are assembled and stored, and members of the organization meet, in safe houses rented under false names. The bombings have killed several people, injured many others, and caused millions of dollars of property damage. See 583 F. Supp. at 91; In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Archuleta, 561 F.2d 1059, 1060 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Breasted, 3-Year Inquiry Threads Together Evidence on F.A.L.N. Terrorism, N.Y. Times, April 17. 1977, at p. 1; Donner, The Age of Surveillance 459 (1980) (the FALN "is notorious for its unique indifference to personal injury and possible death randomly inflicted by bombs planted in public places"); Motley, US Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism 18, 76 (1983).
The background to the present case is the arrest in 1980 in a Chicago suburb of several members of the FALN, one of whom agreed to help the FBI's investigation of the organization. He identified as members two of the people later charged in this case. FBI agents followed one, who unwittingly led the agents to an apartment in Chicago that was being used as an FALN safe house. The U.S. Attorney obtained from Chief Judge McGarr of the Northern District of Illinois an order authorizing the FBI to make surreptitious entries into the apartment to install electronic "bugs" and television cameras in every room.
The FBI wanted to see as well as hear because it had reason to believe that the people using the safe houses, concerned they might be bugged, would play the radio loudly when they were speaking to each other and also would speak in code, and that the actual assembly of bombs would be carried on in silence. The television surveillance of the first apartment paid off: the FBI televised two of the defendants assembling bombs. On the basis of these observations the FBI obtained a search warrant for the apartment and found dynamite, blasting caps, guns, and maps showing the location of prisons. Tailing the same two defendants led to the second safe house involved in this appeal. Again a warrant was obtained to conduct electronic, including television, surveillance; and it was by televising meetings in this safe house that the other two defendants in this case were identified.
The trial judge held that there was no statutory or other basis for Chief Judge McGarr's order authorizing television surveillance of the safe houses and that therefore the fruits of the surveillance, including the videotapes, would be inadmissible in the defendants' forthcoming trial. 583 F. Supp. at 105. The defendants and amici curiae advance the following additional grounds for this result: television surveillance in criminal investigations (other than of foreign agents) is forbidden by federal statute; it is in any event so intrusive-so reminiscent of the "telescreens" by which "Big Brother" in George Orwell's 1984 maintained visual surveillance of the entire population of "Oceania," the miserable country depicted in that anti-utopian novel-that it can in no circumstances be authorized (least of all, one imagines, in the year 1984) without violating both the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause; and even if all this is wrong, still the particular orders ("warrants," as we shall call them) in this case did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause.