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A few years before, the director of the National Science Foundation Richard C. Atkinson, and Inman had begun privately discussing whether the role of the spy agrocy in supervis ing cryptographic research should be expanded. The precise outcome of the talks remains murky, but the N.S.A. apparently won the debate. Today, the National Science Foundation rou tinely allows the N.S.A. to review any request for the funding of crypta graphic research. The N.S.A. also has begun providing financial support for related unclassified civilian re search. The first recipients of such support were two Stanford professors of electrical engineering. John T. Gill 3d, and Martia E. Hellman, a code expert who for many years had been sharply critical of the N.S.A.
"Five years ago, I was very much on the opposite side of the fence from N.S.A.." said Heilman. "I wouldn't say I bave been co-opted. As a resus of them being more friendly and coming part w I felt I should be more triendly. I guess I am now the first guinea pig."
Hellman is sure why the agency was interested in funding nonciassi fed research, and he acknowledges potential problems. "One of the fears is that they are trying to buy people If they support you, then they own you, and you really are going against them if they ask you not to publish something and you do."
There are, of course, many ways to influence men. In early 1979, Inman spoke to the Armed Forces Communi cations and Electronics Association, the first public speech ever given by a top N.S.A. official. Speaking in the guarded language of his profession Inman noted that the agency's mis sion could "no longer remain entirely in the shadows." One reason for this change, he explained, was that the protection of communications was no longer of interest just to the Geverment; It also had become a major concern to private institutions. Be cause of this new interest, tensions which he did not define, had devel oped between "the national-security Interests of the Government and the telecommunications-security inter
ests of both the public and private sec tor." The time had come, he said, to begin a dialogue between the N.S.A and the academic and industrial worlds.
The result of this dialogue so far has been the recommendation by a spe cial committee of the American Coun cil on Education, a prestigious organ sation of over 1,400 colleges and uni versities, that all researchers e gaged in cryptographic research sub mit their work to the N.S.A before publication. Only one of the nine members of the special committee opposed this "voluntary" system of prior restraint, George Davida
Davida, who believes such system
This letter responds to your letter of May 5 1983, to me concerning the New York Times article of Thursday, April 28, 1983 about the visit and actions of representatives of this agency to the George C. Marshall Research Library. I will attempt to address your questions about the events reported in the article.
The Marshall Library has a government-authorized secure storage facility and government-approved security clearances for archivists to permit the Library to hold classified and otherwise sensitive government-originated information contained in the collections entrusted to it. The Library holds the collections of two former National Security Agency officials: former NSA Director, LTG Marshall S. Carter (who is currently the President of the Marshall Foundation, the Library's parent' organization) and Mr. William F. Friedman, a former cryptologist at NSA. Both of these collections contain some classified and otherwise sensitive information.
The NSA and the Marshall Library have had a long and mutually beneficial working relationship which has, among other things, involved the declassification by NSA of much information contained in the Friedman collection as well as the provision by NSA to the Library of related historical material and the loan of certain government-owned equipment. This relationship has resulted in what we believe to be the best possible means of making the maximum amount of this material available to the public for historical research while at the same time protecting valid national security-related information as required by law.
Enclosed are our answers to your specific questions.
LINCOLN D. FAURER
Lieutenant General, USAF
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM REP. GLENN ENGLISH
"1) What prompted NSA to review the papers at the Marshall Library?"
NSA's most recent review of materials at the Marshall Library was occasioned by revelations in the book, The Puzzle Palace, by V. James Bamford. The book disclosed certain information obtained from the General Marshall S. Carter and William F. Friedman collections at the Library.
We concluded that the papers of General Carter, a former Director of NSA, should be reviewed because they could contain sensitive information, i.e., information which is classified, classifiable, or otherwise protected pursuant to statutory authority, derived by him as a result of the conduct of his duties as Director. It was necessary, therefore, that his papers be reviewed to ensure that the materials were properly identified as those which are classified/protected information and those which could be made fully available to the public. Before conducting a review of the Carter collection we sought General Carter's permission to do so (the Carter collection had been closed after the publication of The Puzzle Palace). General Carter granted NSA permission to conduct a review of his collection at the Library and also advised NSA that it had been his intention all along that his collection be closed to all but the General George C. Marshall biographer.
We had reviewed the Friedman collection from time to time since it was first provided to the Library in 1970 for purposes of declassification of information where possible and also to confirm the sensitivity and assumed removal from public access of other information it contained. Bamford's book made reference to materials in the Friedman collection that NSA had understood, based on a previous review, to be closed to the public.
"2) Which collections were reviewed and how were they selected for review? When were the reviews conducted?"
The Friedman and Carter collections were both reviewed for the reasons set out in the response above. No other collections were reviewed because we knew of no other collections that might contain any sensitive information related to NSA. The reviews took place on April 4-7, 1983.
"3) Which papers were reviewed and how were they selected for review?"
The review focused on the correspondence files of William Friedman and those files of the Carter collection concerning his years at NSA.