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"10. Had NSA examined any of the materials at the Marshall Library before learning of James Bamford's plans to publish a book on NSA?"

Yes. NSA and the Marshall Library have had a long and mutually beneficial working relationship dating back to our assisting in the transport of the Friedman collection to the Library in 1970. Marshall Library officials have long looked to NSA representatives to periodically review documentation in the Library. This review serves not only to ensure that classified or sensitive information is properly protected, but also to declassify as much of this information as possible so that the interests of the Library, the Marshall Foundation and the public can best be served.

"11) Has NSA ever provided any funds to the Marshall Library? Is NSA now considering providing any funds to the Library?"

No funds have been provided to the Library, nor is it anticipated that any will be.

"12) Did William F. Friedman enter into a secrecy or prepublication agreement with NSA, its predecessor organization, or with any other government agency? If so, please provide a copy."

We can only answer this question as it relates to NSA and its predecessor organizations. It is believed William F. Friedman signed a secrecy oath similar to that signed by all employees of this agency and its predecessor organizations. All records which would include Mr. Friedman's oath have been retired. We are attempting to retrieve a copy of that oath for you and will provide it to you when it is available.




Serial: N0352

17 March 1983

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA (Ret)

655 Bear Paw Lane North

Colorado Springs, CO 80906

Dear General Carter:


appreciated your coming up to Denver last month that we could talk. It is obvious that we share a common desire that collections of papers not be exploited unreasonably by researchers to expose classified or sensitive information, although this is often difficult to enforce. As a part of our continuing review of research materials used by author James Bamford, Mike Levin, Chief of the Information Security Division, and Russ Fisher, of our Archives and History office, propose to visit the George C. Marshall Research Foundation during the period of 6-8 April 1983 and would like very much to take this opportunity to review your papers. The review would be for potential classification and historical reference purposes but obviously requires your approval since your files are closed. They will also be taking another look at the William Friedman collection. We would, of course, share with you the results of our review.




Lieutenant General, USAF

Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you may already know, I have declined an invita-
tion to appear before your subcommittee Nov. 2 in
Washington, D.C. There are several reasons for my
non-appearance, including the fact I am a Canadian
citizen who feels he ought to play no direct role
in the U.S. legislative process.

T2P 0W7

In addition, my recent experience as the target of
a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence
inquiry in connection with my duties in Washington,
D.C. as a reporter for Southam News has been capably,
accurately and fairly reported in segments of the
American, Canadian and British press.

Anything I could add now about the episode would
probably be redundant, leaving me open to criticism
that I'm a promoter for myself or worse, a re-
porter who flogs old news.



Moreover, any solutions to American freedom of speech
or press issues raised by my case lie in the hands
of concerned Americans, not foreign-based journalists
such as myself.

I would, however, be remiss if I did not tell you

that the experience with the F.B.I. and the U.S. Justice Department caused considerable anxiety among my friends and family. Certainly, the episode darkened the final two months of my four-year assignment in Washington, and placed me under a cloud of suspicion and innuendo.

It is, of course, flattering for any reporter to discover that he or she has caused unease somewhere in a government by exposing a dirty little secret or by illuminating a subject of public interest. This happens routinely in Washington, where an army of journalists works relentlessly to reveal the damning facts, often aided by courageous informants inspired by a sense of public duty.

But in my case, the flattery accorded my work consisted of a businesslike telephone call from an F.B.I. agent who invited me in for what seemed a mandatory discussion at the Washington, D. C. Field Office, Buzzard Point. I can assure you it's no picnic when two F.B.I agents ask you to name your sources, and then ignore your request for clarification of your status in their interview room.

There is also little joy three weeks later when you hear an officiallyspread rumor that you are facing imminent indictment by a federal grand jury. Equally worrisome is the knowledge that your copy transmissions by computer and long-distance telephone can be legally intercepted and monitored by the National Security Agency. And when you catch the NSA at it one day, there is only a curt "no comment" from the agency. Forgive me, but this seems an abuse of technology that is unworthy of the United States. For 25 cents, the United States Embassy in Ottawa could obtain the same information, albeit a day or two later, when it's published by the Ottawa Citizen.

Throughout my experience, I was left to wonder whether the United States government was sending a message to me, or simply trying to frighten the sources of my information. Talk by U.S. Justice officials of possible Espionage Act or Theft-of-Government-Property Act charges has a chilling effect on the entire information process.

At one point, I suddenly wondered whether the time had come to inject a more diplomatic tone into my writings about events in Washington. Fortunately, this silly temptation lasted about 30 seconds and vanished, unfulfilled. The more general atmosphere of intiridation remained, however, until my family returned to Canada in mid-summer.

Today, I am free to consider from afar the plight of my informants who remain in the U.S. and who must try to live in that intimidating climate. I often think about public servants who are confronted by the increasing threat of polygraph tests whenever a secret tumbles out of the bureaucracy and onto a front page or a TV screen.

And when I do, I wonder what, if anything, anyone will do about it.
Yours truly,

Don Sellen

Don Sellar,

Prairie Correspondent
Southam News of Canada


Thursday, September 1, 1983


FBI Quizzes Canadian Correspondent About Source of Defense Information

By Howard Kurtz

Washington Post Staff Writer

When Donald Sellar, Washington correspondent for Canada's largest newspaper chain, was called by the FBI in June, he was more than a little concerned.

Sellar knew that officials in the U.S. intelligence community were upset about his articles for the Southam Inc. chain on Pentagon weapons testing. But he said he had not expected to be questioned by two FBI agents, who asked him to identify the source of his documents.

"It became immediately evident that they were not just trying to track down leakers, they were investigating me," Sellar said.

The incident highlights the Reagan administration's determination to crack down on unauthorized leaks. Concern about that was underscored yesterday by disclosure that President Reagan warned federal employes Tuesday that they could be prosecuted for disclosing classified information.

.The FBI interview of Sellar was approved by Attorney General William French Smith. It was followed by a newspaper report that the Jus1 tice Department was considering

seeking an indictment of Sellar, a Canadian citizen, under a statute dealing with theft of government property. This prompted complaints from the Canadian Embassy and media.

Justice and FBI spokesmen would neither confirm nor deny that Sellar is or was under investigation. Justice spokesman Mark Sheehan said department guidelines require the attorney general to approve all questioning of reporters.

Sellar, 37, who has returned to Canada, caused a stir with a report in October about secret negotiations to allow U.S. testing of cruise missiles and other weapons in Canada.

The day after he filed the story by computer transmission over a telephone line, an intelligence source

warned him that U.S. officials were upset and that "there was a witch hunt under way for my sources," Sellar said.

Sellar said he was disturbed even more that the source quoted at length from the article, even though it had not yet been published. Sellar later reported that the National Security Agency apparently had intercepted his transmission of the story.

When FBI agent Douglas Gregory requested an interview, Sellar said, Gregory noted that Sellar had a White House press pass. Sellar said he wondered whether his credentials were in jeopardy.

Sellar said he refused to tell the FBI his sources for several military stories. He said,they showed him the cover sheet of a classified document called "Air Force 2000," a military planning paper about which he had written, and asked whether he had obtained a copy from a federal employe. Sellar said he told them he

had not.

The agents then asked if he had met with any Soviets, Sellar said. He said he told them two reporters had invited him to lunch with a reporter

for the Soviet newspaper Izvestia. "They [the agents) were either trying to send me a message or send a message to my sources," Sellar said.

"If this had happened in Canada to an American journalist," he said, "there would be a huge public outcry in the U.S."

"We had to register our concern on this," said Patrick Gossage, the Canadian Embassy's information minister. "We were very concerned about a Canadian national being investigated for an alleged possession of documents that also were in the hands of American reporters. Why pick on a Canadian when these things go on all the time?"

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