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together to produce an approved version of the manuscript.

I accepted the offer. We held three long sessions at my office, so we would have instant access to my books and files. The battle over chapter one had been completed, so we concentrated on the remaining chapters that I had turned over in the preceding months. Chapter two, dealing with my tours in Japan and the Philippines, according to the earlier PRB decision could not be used, but in the interim I had stumbled upon one of the lesser-known books by ex-CIA officials, Howard Hunt's Undercover. In it, to my joy, was a chapter dealing with his assignment as a case officer to Japan; the same chapter also discussed the Agency's base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. His book had been approved by the Agency and when I pointed this out to Bob he agreed that I should also be permitted to discuss my activities in those countries. Even so, I was not allowed to include details of my work. I could only give information no more explicit than that given in Undercover.

Chapter three also presented major problems. Many of my specific designations for places were deemed classified, but by making minor changes I was allowed to retain some points. The discussions of my work at Headquarters processing clearances and file traces were marked classified and many sentences had to be deleted. Although the Marchetti-Marks and Colby books had discussed the requirements for clearances and traces, they had not gone into any detail. Unable to locate other coverage of these procedures, I could not retain my material. But I was allowed to quote information on that topic given in Philip Agee's book, Inside the Company.

Chapter four, about my tour on Taiwan, gave information in general terms of an agent operation directed at mainland China. Someone had objected to this major element of the chapter. I protested that other approved Agency authors had been allowed to discuss agent operations, some with a great deal more specificity than my account. This argument was finally accepted.

Bob and I reviewed each of the many points in the remaining chapters. In this process I conceded a number of points where the law was clearly on my side. I did this to speed the clearance process and to avoid a long, time-consuming lawsuit.

John Marks and Victor Marchetti's book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, published in 1974, was the last approved critical book written about the Agency by an ex-employee. In light of my own experiences the reason is obvious: the secrecy agreement and the way it is abused by the Agency. It is virtually impossible to write in an atmosphere where everything is secret until it is deemed otherwise. The PRB, taking its responsibilities seriously, labels just about everything secret until an author who is critical of the Agency can prove this not to be the case. But the situation for ex-employees who are advocates of the CIA is the opposite. They are given almost carte blanche to discuss operations and techniques, and in some instances they are assisted in the research and writing of their works.

Does the secrecy agreement work to protect legitimate classified information? Probably to some small degree it does. But the price we pay for this minor protection is enormous. The Vietnam War is a prime example. This Agency-produced disaster was sold to the American people through massive disinformation operations. Would it not have been better if we had known the truth at an early stage? Similarly, would the American people not be better off knowing the truth


203 about the CIA's current secret war in Latin America? Don't we deserve to know about reckless and phony covert operations, including Agency-planted "Communist" documents, that help determine our foreign policy?

It is clear that the secrecy agreement does not halt the flow of information to our enemies, for It does not affect the CIA employee who sells information. Look, for example, at England, which has a strict official secrets act and probably the most porous security service in the western world. What the CIA's secrecy agreement does quite effectively, however, is to stop critics of the Agency from explaining to the American public what the CIA is and does. It is sad to say, but the truth is that the primary purpose of the secrecy agreement is to suppress information that the American people are legitimately entitled to. For this reason, I am opposed to the secrecy agreement as it is now written and administered.

Because the major portion of my CIA career revolved around Southeast Asia, where CIA operations were well publicized and even officially disclosed, the Agency could not stop release of much of the information in this book. But my experience should sound a warning. Agency officials show no hesitation in trying to censor embarrassing, critical, or merely annoying information. I cannot speak for the legal aspects of the various laws, but it is obvious that national security has Little to do with how the Agency administers the secrecy agreement. As the CIA becomes more adept at applying the law under President Reagan's executive order on classification that went into effect August 1, 1982, all critical Information about the Agency will probably be forbidden.

I do not expect that the executive branch or the Supreme Court will be upset by the Agency's attempts to censor information that the public is entitled to. The American people, however, should be worried. Once the Agency is unleashed and the iron curtain of official disclosure falls, we will all suffer its consequences.




Letter from Professor George I. Davida, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier dated October 28, 1983. Attachment: "American Council on Education, Report of the Public Cryptography Study Group," February 7, 1981.

Letter from Jonathan Knight, Associate Secretary, American Association of University Professors, to David Beier, Esq., Counsel, House Committee on the Judiciary, dated October 31, 1983. Attachment: "American Association of University Professors, Government Censorship and Academic Freedom."

"American Association for the Advancement of Science, Project on Secrecy and Openness in Scientific and Technical Communication," October 1983.

Letter from William D. Carey, Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science, to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, dated February 15, 1984. Letter from A. Bartlett Giamatti, President, Yale University, to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, dated December 12, 1983.


"American Civil Liberties Union, Free Speech, 1984: The Rise of Government Controls on Information, Debate and Association," July 1983.

Relyea, "Shrouding the Endless Frontier-Scientific Communications and National Security: Considerations for a Policy Balance Sheet," 1 Gov't Information Q. 1 (1984).

Gelbspan, "U.S. Tightening Access to Information" (3-part series), Boston Globe, January 22, 23, 24, 1984.

Ehlke & Relyea, "The Reagan Administration Order on Security Classification: A Critical Assessment," 30 Fed. Bar News & J. 91 (1983).

"American Association for the Advancement of Science, Scientific Freedom and National Security," June 1984.

"Federal Restrictions on Research: Academic Freedom and National Security," Academe, September/October 1982 at 19.

Gray, "Technology Transfer at Issue: The Academic Viewpoint", IEEE Spectrum, May 1982, at 64.

Wallich, "Technology Transfer at Issue: The Industry Viewpoint," IEEE Spectrum, May 1982, at 69.

Pyle, The Invasion of Privacy, 34 Proc. of the Acad. of Pol. Sci. 131 (1982).

Kamen, “Appeals Court Upholds CIA Censorship of Article, “Washington Post, October 5, 1983.

"National Security and Scientific Freedom," AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Bulletin, September 1982.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Interim Report of the Committee on the Changing Nature of Information, March 9, 1983.

Unger, "The Growing Threat of Government Secrecy," Technology Review, February/March 1982 at 31.

R. Park, Scientific Freedom: Where Does Congress Stand? (unpublished paper). Chalk, "Commentary on the NAS Report," 8 Science, Technology, & Human Values 21 (1983).

Rosenbaum, Tenzer, Unger, Van Alstyne & Knight," Academic Freedom and the Classified Information System," 219 Science 257 (1983).

American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, National Security and Scientific Communication (June 1982).

W.D. Cooke, T. Eisner, T. Everhart, F. Long, D. Nelkin, B. Windom, E. Wolf, Restrictions on Academic Research and the National Interest (unpublished paper). Ferguson, "Scientific Freedom, National Security, and the First Amendment," 221 Science 620 (1983).

Ferguson, "Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First Amendment Theory," 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 519 (1981).

Corson, "What Price Security?," Physics Today, February 1983, at 42.

Pike, "When Science is Outlawed," Inquiry, March 29, 1982, at 21.

Harvard University, Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow of Academic Information nd Ideas, January 1985.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE/P.O. Box 784, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201


(414) 963-4677

October 28, 1983

The Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier

The House of Representatives

2232 Rayburn House Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Kastenmeier:

This is in response to your inquiry regarding my experience with the government's classification power.

In 1977 the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation filed for a patent on behalf of myself and a graduate student for a data protection device that resulted from research funded by the National Science Foundation. The research was unclassified and was based on materials publically available. In 1978 we were issued a secrecy order by the Commerce Department which, unknown to us at the time, had done so at the request of the National Security Agency.

Upon careful reading of the secrecy order, we became concerned since the order contained penalties of two years in jail and $10,000 fine for unauthorized disclosure of the subject matter of the patent application, which, I would like to emphasize, was based on publically available material.

Upon informing the University of the secrecy order, the Chancellor became quite concerned that the order infringed on academic freedom, not to mention the First Ammendment. After the resulting press coverage, the Chancellor communicated with the then Commerce Secretary Krepps and NSA director Admiral Bobby Inman. A short time later, the order was rescinded.

In 1979 the Americal Council on Education undertook a study of the issue of publication of research in Cryptography and its relation to national security. The group, called the Public Cryptography Study Group (PCSG), met for about two years and in 1981 issued a report in which the majority of the members recommended a system of "voluntary" prior review. I dissented from this recommendation and issued a minority report in which I outlined my reasons for opposing what I saw as nothing more than censorship.

The People of Wisconsin's Urban Engineering College

Serving Milwaukee, the State and the Nation

My opinion has not changed. I still oppose the system of prior review. My concern has grown as I have seen my predictions, that the government's interest in classification of research would grow to include other areas, come true.

The secrecy orders and the PCSG's recommnedations raised issues that had a direct bearing on the Nation's political, scientific and economic health. More specifically, the secrecy orders and prior review raised questions regarding:

1. Constitutionality

The secrecy order that was issued to us was for material that we had discovered without knowledge of classified information. The government seemed to regard this subject to be what some have called "born secret." Such concepts have no place in our democracy.

2. Impact on Basic and Applied Research

Secrecy orders and censorship of results deemed by some in the government to be a danger to the national security would inevitably lead to the removal from the public domain of interesting results. There is no doubt that this would seriously harm the quality and direction of research.

The PCSG's recommendations were equally disturbing. It was without any basis since the committee had no evidence to suggest that publications in cryptography were harmful to the nation's security. The committee did not consider the critical importance of cryptography in data protection. Our nation is changing. The most intimate details of our lives are being stored and manipulated by computers. Medical databases, credit files, insurance files, employment records are being constructed and connected to computer networks. These technological changes can potentialy destroy not just privacy, which is already gravely threatened, but freedom itself. It is difficult to conceive of freedom without privacy.

Economically, our society is changing in such a way that our assets are no longer physical, but logical. Disks and not vaults are the repository for the new wealth. Wealth is being reduced to just "bits" and "bytes" in some computer. Electronic funds transfer would make it possible to move this wealth at unprecedented speeds.

The need for protection technology was made abundantly clear in the reported Soviet evesdropping activities. More recently young computer buffs raided computer systems all over the country. What caused these weaknesses? In the case of

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