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Mrs. Allende is neither the first nor the last foreigner
to be denied entrance into the U.S. On June 7, 1983, it was learned that the State Department would bar a visit by Bernadette Devlin McAlisky, an Irish nationalist and former member of British Parliament who has been making visits to the U.S. twice a year for the last ten years. Other victims include:
--Rev. Ian Paisley, Protestant leader from Northern
--Owen Carron, I.R.A. leader;
--Trevor Monroe, Jamaican Marxist scholar;
--Julio Garcia Espinosa, Deputy Cultural Minister
--Several Cuban philosophers;
--Approximately 320 delegates from Japan, Australia,
The Reagan Administration's use of the Walter-McCarran Act is a paradigmatic illustration of its fear that an informed citizenry is a threat to its reign. By barring visitors, the Administration hopes to shut out views it does not want Americans to hear.
Free Speech, 1984: The Rise of Government Controls on Information, Debate and Association was written by Loren Siegel, special assistant to ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser, with the assistance of the following ACLU staff members: Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies; John Shattuck, director of the national legislative office; Burt Neuborne, legal director; Jerry Berman, legislative counsel; and Charles Sims, staff counsel.
American Civil Liberties Union
132 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
ACLU National Legislative Office
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20003
Center for National Security Studies
(a project of the ACLU and the Fund for Peace)
122 Maryland Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
Volume 1 Number 1 1984
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY
An International Journal of Resources, Services, Policies, and Practices
Shrouding the Endless Frontier-Scientific
HAROLD C. RELYEA
Various normal and essential scientific communication activities, including unclassified research dissemination, publication, and exchanges in the open classroom and among scholars, have been limited recently by the Federal government through more vigorous enforcement and stringent application of existing national security controls. These actions are prompted by a growing anxiety about the acquisition of American science and technology by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Such controls, however, may have a restrictive effect not only on scientific communication, but also on scientific achievement and advancement in the United States. Recognizing this danger, certain countervailing ideas are recounted and discussed here as points of balance both to justifications for these recent limitations and to arguments favoring even broader government authority to constrain scientific communication for reasons of national security.
During the past few years, various government actions and statements by officials have reflected a growing anxiety about the transfer of American science and technology to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Consequently, not only is more vigorous enforcement and stringent application of existing control authority being pursued to curtail this flow, but also new national security powers are being sought to thwart Communist bloc acquisition of our scientific information and technology having a potential for conveying a military or strategic advantage. These efforts, however, may result in a restriction of both scientific communication and scientific achievement in the United States.
Although American scientists are willing to concede that such transfers have occurred, their objections to increased government control of scientific communication should not imply that they underestimate the external dangers facing the United States, are unmindful of the need for limited official secrecy or national security safeguards, or are unaware of the potential military applications of their research and discoveries. Indeed, in taking issue with new national security limits on scientific communication, American scientists
Government Information Quarterty, Volume 1, Number 1, pages 1-14
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0749-634X.
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY Vol. 1/No. 1/1984
appear to be neither politically naive about nor unappreciative of the position of their country in the continuously tense international arena. Certainly they are disturbed about the effect of such restrictions on the scientific process. Ideally, all scientific findings, conclusions, and interpretations should be publicly and generally available, open to criticism as well as improvement, and, if necessary, rejection. The vague nature of the controls being advocated by officials also is troubling. Not the least of their worries, moreover, is the pragmatic effect of new national security restrictions on scientific communication. The strength and safety of the nation will not be maintained or improved if scientific and technological progress and innovation are inhibited as a result of limitations on the dissemination of scientific information.' This point was well stated in the now famous report on a program for postwar scientific research which Dr. Vannevar Bush submitted to the President in 1945:
Basically there is no reason to believe that scientists of other countries will not in time re-discover everything we now know. A sounder foundation for our national security rests in a broad dissemination of scientific knowledge upon which further advances can be more readily made than in a policy of restriction which would impede our further advances in the hope that our potential enemies will not catch up with us.'
Indeed, national security results from achievement in science, not from concealment.' And "science" and "national security" are not necessarily antagonistic to one another. In the past, scientists and government leaders have demonstrated a broad appreciation of the national security concept, including not only military applications and preparations, but also economic, cultural, and psychological considerations. In its most meaningful context, national security is not defined by Soviet military capability alone.
THE BALANCE SHEET CONCEPT
Some years ago, in analyzing the tension between national security and individual freedom, the late Harold D. Lasswell concluded that American security measures should be the outcome of a comprehensive process of balancing the costs and benefits of all policies in the foreign and domestic fields.” A national security determination, he wrote, "...is properly a policy judgment rather than an expert opinion." Many complex considerations must be assessed. “Judgments of security," counseled Lasswell, “are balance sheets of our present and prospective position as a nation under all thinkable conditions and policies.***
The balance sheet on increased national security control of scientific communication is under formulation. The issue, it may be argued, was opened for consideration by recent government actions, assertions, and policy recommendations. Moreover, the development of such a balance sheet seemingly is prompted by current efforts to rewrite the International Traffic in Arms Regulations' and by the necessity to renew the automatically expiring Export Administration Act.* Both of these authorities have been used more stringently of late to limit scientific communication.
The formulation of a balance sheet on national security restriction of scientific communication, as some may recall, is not unprecedented. Although his portrayal has a very contemporary character, the late Lloyd V. Berkner was describing the situation as it was three decades ago when he wrote that "all the important ideas of science have military implications and, under our present policies, must therefore fall inevitably under the cloak