Its

that it received views from all sides of the issues. membership included several former national security officials as well as university and industry scientists. Furthermore, the Panel solicited evidence and differing views of many outside groups.

The Panel in its report, entitled Scientific Communication and National Security, offered 15 specific These recommendations rested on four

recommendations.

basic findings:

First, although there is substantial evidence of both unwanted transfers of military technologies to the Soviet Union and of Soviet interest in acquiring Western science by both overt and covert means, the Panel found that "in comparison with other channels of technology transfer, open scientific communications involving the research community does not present a material danger from near-term military implications." evaluated both published and highly classified information on known technology losses, and found no examples of damage to U.S. military interests from academic sources.

The Panel carefully

Second, the governmental effort to control technology transfer is, generally, diffuse. Many separate agencies are involved, and the effort is spread widely over many scientific and technological fields. Enforcement personnel cannot hope to accomplish effective control across all fields. Also, their knowledge of the possible

applications of particular scientific subfields (to say nothing of knowledge about the relative status of U.S., European, and Soviet progress in each) is also limited.

The Panel suggested explicit criteria for narrowing the reach of controls, and encouraged the government to endorse a strategy of "tall fences around narrow areas". For example, the Panel concluded that the vast majority of university research should be free of controls, and that only in a very small number of "gray areas", may control be appropriate. Such gray areas, the Panel argued must satisfy four criteria:

The technology is developing rapidly, and the
time from basic science to application is short;
The technology has identifiable direct military
applications; or it is dual-use and involves

process or production-related techniques;
Transfer of the technology would give the

U.S.S.R. a significant near-term military
benefit; and

The U.S. is the only source of information about
the technology, or other friendly nations that

could also be the source have control systems as

secure as ours.

Third, export control regulations are normally not

appropriate tools for the control of scientific

communication. Our export control system was assembled to

prevent the unwarranted shipment of physical devices, not of information. When control of unclassified research

results is necessary, the government should try to use contractual obligations in funding agreements, not export control regulations. Such contract provisions stipulating, for instance, that the government's contract

-

officers concurrently receive for comment materials

submitted for publication

-

provide researchers with

relatively clear, advance information on their

obligations, in contrast to controls based on export regulations.

And fourth, we need more reliable and complete information about the nature of the overall technology loss problem and the most effective means of staunching

it.

The Panel was somewhat discouraged at the imprecise understanding of the extent and nature of lost technology, the relative contribution of the many channels by which adversaries acquire Western military technologies, and the adverse effects of control measures. Obviously, the nation need not fully understand such factors before it moves to stem losses; but in the current situation any control policy is likely to involve unnecessary costs and uncertain benefits. Therefore, the Panel felt the problem a whole should be further evaluated.

as

The Corson Panel report was released in October 1982. There have been some encouraging events since.

For example, two of the Panel's specific

recommendations have been implemented.

First, the

intelligence community has moved to establish a scientific advisory committee to assist it in reviewing prospective scientific exchange visitors from adversary nations.

Second, the Academy itself has established a new Government-University Round Table that will serve as a forum for give-and-take discussions of areas, such as the control of scientific communications, in which there are conflicts between the government and the research community.

There has also been proposed legislation that drew on the Panel's report. I am pleased that both the Senate and the House have seen fit to incorporate into their proposed revisions of the Export Administration Act the following language: "It is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous scientific enterprise. To do so requires protecting the ability of scientists and scholars freely to communicate their research findings by means of publication, teaching, conferences and other forms of scholarly exchange." This language closely reflects the views of the Corson Panel and other scientific groups on scientific communication, views I have expressed earlier. Further, I understand that there has been a constructive series of meetings of a special working group of representatives from the Association of American

Universities and the Department of Defense regarding the formulation of DoD policy.

The terms of

However, these initiatives do not really address the major provisions of the Panel report, and will not, themselves, achieve the major changes that are needed to effect a clear, overall policy. Shortly after the completion of the Panel study, the National Security Council initiated an interagency effort to see if and how the Panel's report could be implemented. reference for this initiative were set forth in a National Security Study Directive. An ambitious 2-month completion schedule was set. I am somewhat disappointed that delays have occurred, and that, for various reasons, the Administration has not in the course of its review consulted with the outside research community. understand that the government still hopes to complete its review in the coming months. I am sure that the scientific community would be happy to cooperate, if

asked.

I

Moreover, it is important that the results of such a review when complete be openly and widely communicated. In any event, I hope the process is a fruitful one. The currently diverse and ad hoc policies are creating considerable apprehension among scientists, who have been, and should continue to be, active partners in keeping U.S. military technology strong.