ogies as state-of-the-art microelectroncs, lasers and so forth.

A steadily increasing share of these technologies has both military and nonmilitary applications; there in substantial difficulty in controlling leaks in non-military rystems.

▷ Recent American foreign policy has multiplied the number of routes for leakage. Significant expansion of East/Weat trade in the 1970s, for example, has resulted in a variety of agreements that further encourage the transfer i technology.

..ding further to the alarm is a :nast at the Soviet Union is making a concerted effort to acquire scientific and technical information. This view was expressed strongly by Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in a speech before the intelligence community last March. He said:

Operating out of embassies, consulates, and so-called business del egations,' KGB operatives have blanketed the developed capitalist countries with a network that op eraton like a gigantic vacuum cleaner, sucking up formulas, patenta, blueprints and know-how with frightening precision. We believe the operations rank higher in priority even than the colleotion of military intelligenco... This network seeks to exploit the "soft underbelly"-the individ uals who, out of idealizm or greed, fall victim to intelligence schores;

our traditions of an open press and
unrestricted access to knowledge;
and finally, the desire of academia
to jealously preserve its preroga
tives as a community of scholars
unencumbered by government re-
gulation. Certainly, these free-
doms provide the underpinning of
the American way of life. It is
time, however, to ask what price
we must pay if we are unable to
protect our secrets?

The question of what price the Administration is willing to pay to keep information out of the hands of adversaries, particularly the Soviet Union, is perhaps the central concern of the scientific community. And now this concern has been heightened, primarily because of recent events and what they imply regarding further restrio tions on scientific communication.

Notable among these events have been efforts to elicit the cooperation of universities in restricting the movements of visiting Soviet scientista. In addition, there have been repeated instances in which the Pentagon or the Department of State has sought to prevent scheduled papers from being presented at scieutile confaranosa. One such incident that recently ro ceived wide publicity took place at the Society of Photo-cptical Instrumentation Enginoor conference in San Dig in August: The Pentagon had nearly 150 papers withdrawn coveral days before the meeting. It now ap pears that many of these papers will, after all, receive clearance and bo included in the published proceedings from this meeting. Similar incidants in which scheduled papers have been withdrawn from scientific meetings have taken place before and apparently will continue to take place, as the Optical Society of America discovered in November when several rapera were withdra from its meeting in Tucson. Thore evits stem, in part, from a confusion over how to apply the Federal regulations to the aentific and academic community.

Panel studica key lasua;

Our panel of 19 peor'e included a former Under Secretary of Defense, a former Under Secretary of Energy, a former Director of the National Science Foundation, a former Presidential Science Advisor, four former members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, five members or former members of the National Science Board, sia current or former university prosider ta, one former Director of the National Security Agency, four execu

tives of high-technology industry, sereral present or former members of the Defense Science Board and two lawyers.

Our charge included four tasks ▸ An examination of national-cecurity issues and scientific communication interests within the context of certain fields of science and technology

▷ A review of the controls used in restricting scientific communication es well as identification of the issues arising from the use of the controls

A rigorous evaluation of the critical issues concerning the application of controls, and

The development of ways to make the system operate more effectively.

Although the panel's mission was to investigate the effects of restrictions on scientific communication in general, it found in reaching its recommendations that the university requires separate consideration within the contest of the US research community. Restrictions on open communication have categori cally different implications for univer sities than they do for industrial, gon erumental and other realone of the community, there are two main resBons for this distinction:

► Universition integrata research and education; thus, any adverse effects on ressarch will also adversely affect the quality of education for the next gener ation of scientists and enginsta

Unlike other research instituti za universitics have never crablished broad controls on socess to inform Noa to ensure that sensitive information be protected. Such restrictions, therefore, would present an unfamiliar and upwelcome challenge to the university.

Because the potential national security concerns are most likely to are in work that is funded by the government, the panel'a concluziona conecotrate on government-supported research

While much of cur report applies to basic industrial reesarch just as reuch es it applies to university rearch, there are important questions boaring on industry that we have not addressed at all. For example, how does one treat the problem of communication with a multinational company that bes laho retorics abroad and foreiga tubeidar ies? For many, this may be the most importent question of all; I regret 1 cannot help, for this question requires study by a new group constituted in a different way.

Due to both the current level of concorn and the panel's Ihnited time and resources, study focus on techno logy transfor to the USSR frein US To try these issues, the panel had

nature of the technology-leakage problem was. We realized early on that we would have to operate on a classified basis, consequently we arranged for security clearance for all panel members at the secret level. In addition, six of our members, who held security clearanes at the highest level, arranged for intelligence briefings and discussions at the very highest security levels and reported back to the full panel at the secret level. They also produced a Secret report which is on file in the National Acadamy of Sciences. In addition, they produced an unclassified report, which is included in our panel report as an appendix, and which gives a clear picture of the technology-leakage problem.

The panel is unanimous in its conclusions and recommendations.

Major suggestions and conclusions The evidence from all sources suggests that indeed there is a substantial and serious technology-transfer problem. There is a continuing flow of products, processes and ideas from the US and its allies to the Soviet Union, through both overt and covert means. Although much of this unwanted trans fer has mattered little to US security, either because the US did not enjoy a monopoly on a particular technology or because the technology in question had little or no military significance, a substantial portion of the transfer has been damaging to national security (See the table for some evidence presented by the Central Intelligence Agency). These damaging transfers have taken place through the legal es well as illegal sale of products, through transfers via third countries and through a highly organised espionage operation.

turn depends on effective communica tion among scientists, and between scientists and engineers; the short term security achieved by restricting the flow of information is purchased at a price.

After weighing the alternatives, the panel concludes that the best way to ensure long-term rational security lies in a strategy of "security by accomplishment," and that an essential ingredient of technological accomplish ment is open and free scientific communication. Such a policy involves risk, because new scientific findings will inevitably be conveyed to US adversaries. Nonetheless, the panel believes the risk is acceptable because American industrial and military institutions are able to develop new technology swiftly enough to give the US a continuing advantage over its military adversaries.

Against this general background, the panel comes to three specific conclusions:

> The vast majority of university research programs, whether basic or applied, should be subject to no limitations on access or communications.

Where specific information has direct military relevance and must per force be kept secret, it should be classified strictly and guarded careful

classified research projects, or to establish off-campus classified facilities, is a matter to be decided by individual universities.

There are a few gray areas of research that are sensitive from a security standpoint, but where classification is not appropriate. These areas are at the ill-defined boundary between applications and basic research and are characteristic of fields where the time from discovery to application is short. (At present, a portion of the field of microelectronics is the most visible of these technologies.)

While it is impossible to specify these gray areas with precision, there are some broad criteria that help to define the few areas in question. The panel recommends that no restrictions of any kind that limit access or communica tion should be applied to any area of university research, basic or applied, unless it involves technology meeting all of the following four criteria:

The tochnology is developing rapidly and the time from basic science to application is short; and

The technology has identifiable direct military applications, or is dua!. use, and involves process or produc tion-related techniques, and

Transfer of the technology would give the USSR a significant near-term

Acquisitions from the West affecting Soviet military technology
Key technology area
Computare

Microelectronics

Signal Processing Manufacturing

Lasers

Notable success

Purchase and acquisitions of complete systems designs, concepte, hardware and software, including a wide variety of Viestern general purpose computers and minicomputers, for military applications.

Complete industrial processes and semiconductor manufacturing equipment cspable of meeting al Soviet military requiraments, if acquisitions were combined. Acquisitions of processing equipment and know-how.

Acquisitions of automated and precision manufacturing equipment for electronics, materiala, and optical and future isaer weapons technology, acquisition of Information on manufacturing technology related to weapons, ammuntion, and aircraft parts including turbine blades, computers, and electronic components, soquiation of machine tools for cutting large gears for ship propulsion systains. Acquation of low-power, low-noise, high-sensitivity receivers.

Acquistion of optical, pulsed power source, and other leser-related compon ents, including spacial optical mirrors and mirror technology Bullable for futu legor weapons.

Guidance and Navigation Acquisitions of marino and other navigation receivers, advanced inertial-guid ance components, including miniature and lasor gyros, soquisitions of missile guidance subsystems; acquisitions of precision machinery for ball-bearing aro duction for misale and other applications, acquisition of missile test-range in strumentation systerns and documentation and precision cinetheodolites for collecting data critical to postlight balistic-missile analysis.

Structural Materials

Propulsion

Acoustical Sensors Electro-optical Sensors

Raders

Purchases and acquisitions of Westem titenkam alloys, welding equipment, and moss for producing titanium plate of large size applicable to submarine c struction.

Missile technology, some ground-propulsion technology (diesels turbines, and rotaries), purchases and acquisitions of advanced jet-engine fabrication technology and jet-engine design information.

Acquisitions of underwater navigation and direction-finding equipment
Acquisition of Information on satellite technology, leser rangefinders, and un-
derwater low-light-level television camares and systems for remote operation.
Acquisitions and exploitations of air defense radars and antenna d'aigns for
missile systems.

Te deprod from a Central inelliance Agency report enstad "Soviet Acquisition of
Western Techiclogy.” Apri 1602.

0031-8228/23/0200 43-05/801.00 1983 American intacts of Proptice

military advantage; and

Either the US is the only source n' information about the technology, or other friendly nations that could also be the source have control systems at least as secure as ours.

The panel recommends that in the limited number of instances in which all of the above criteria are met, but where classification is unwarranted, the values of open science can be preserved and the needs of government can be met by written agreements or contracts no more restrictive than the following

►Prohibition of direct participation in government-supported research pro jecto by nationals of designated foreign countries but with no attempt to limit physical access to university space or facilities or to limit en.ollment in any classroom course or study. The danger to national security lies in the immer. sion of a suspect visitor in a research program over an extended period, not in casual observation of equipment or research data.

► Submission of stipulated manuscripts simultaneously to the publisher and to the Federal agency contract officer, with the contract officer having 60 days to seek modifications in the manuscript if he so wishes.

The review period is not intended to give the government the power to order changes. The right and freedom to publish remain with the university as they do with all unclassified reorarch. The government nonetheless is a powerful negotiator in these discussions; it has the ultimate power to classify the research or to cancel the contract.

Knottler problems

The panel recognized the difficulty of limiting the access of foreign visitors on campuses to sensitive information, particularly when universities typically have people who are not working on federally-funded projects but who have free access to the laboratories and all that goes on within the university.

Let me simplify the problem by suggesting what might happen in a specific case. Visitors come to univer sitics with restictions on their visas Such restrictions may include travel restrictions, restrictions on what they can work on, and currently there might also be restrictions on what they can see. The contract officer occasionally checks up on the visitor and he also asks the university to report on what these particular visitors are up to. Certainly, according to our recommendations, the university would be alerted to the problem and notified what the visitors should not be supported with project funds over an extended period of time.

In the case of the similar research laboratory next door, performing non

government-funded research, we suggested that it would not be inappropriate for the university to respond affirmatively to requests from govern ment agencies for information about Fossible attempts by the visitors to gain support to work with the nongovernment-funded project over an extended period. We reasoned that if the researchers did obtain that type of sup port, in doing so they would be presumably violating the terms of their visrs. Thus we think it's appropriate for the university to respond affirmatively if asked, when those visa restrictions are being violated. Such requests, however, should not require surveil lance or monitoring of foreign nationals by the universities.

It is important for the welfare of the country that universities' educational and research programs remain vital. The procedures recommended by the panel for dealing with the gray areas of research are intended to protect university interests, and at the same time to be responsive to the government's requirements.

The panel believes that the provisions of Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms Regulations should not be invoked to deal with these gray areas in government-funded university research. Rather, the appropriate procedure should be incorporated in research contracts or other written agreements in those rare cases where some mea sure of control is required. Further more, the panel believes that universities and industrial research laboratories should be treated in exactly the same way insofar as EAR and ITAR are concerned.

Writing the contract ahead of time poses two problems. The first is that one never knows what is going to happen; perhaps something will come up that was not anticipated in the contract. The second is that Federal contracting officers may act overzealously in protecting themselves by writ ing in restrictions that, are unneccssary. Both are real concerns. To address the first problem-not know ing what's going to come up-we'd like to have the rules clearly understood ahead of time, insofar as they can be, so that everybody knows what the rules are and can play by the same rules. When cases come up where it is necessary to elaborate, we believe that constructive discussion can take place and problems can usually be resolved if there exists an atmosphere of good communication.

As an example of such a resolution, I can cite the situation that began saver. al years ago in the field of cryptography. There were several instances, one in particular occurred in about 1978. A young researcher at the University of

Wisconsin in Milwaukee applied for a patent on a cryptographic invention be had made. He didn't hear from the Patent Office for a long time. Eventually be received a post card as the only response to the applicationpost card saying that his research program had been classified Secret and that he was not to talk to anybody about it. This action was authorised under the Invention Secrecy Act.

Admiral Inman played a major role in resolving that issue and reducing a tense situation to one that is DOW handled on a voluntary basis. The American Council on Education also played a lead role by convening a study group on the cryptography problem, in which the mathematicians participated. I also participated in the very first discussion of that problem at the American Council on Education, where I first met Inman. As a result of these discussions, people working in cryptog raphy now submit their papers to the National Security Agency for com ment; simultaneously they submit their papers to the publisher. Some 50 papers have been submitted under this voluntary arrangement. I think changes or suggested changes have been proposed by NBA in a couple of cases, but I have not heard of any great dissatisfaction. I also believe that there are some people working in the field who have declined to cooperate and are going ahead on their own. We spoke both with the National Security people and with people from universitics with researchers in the field, and all of them expressed satisfaction with the current system. This is an example of what can happen when people get together and talk about the problem.

The panel believes, however, that one cannot extend this particular sys tem to other research. Cryptography is a very narrow field in which everybody working in it knows everybody else working in it, and the focus of the research is limited and generally welldefined. This is not true for most other fields of research.

The second problem the overzealous contract officer writing in unneces sary restrictions-is harder to deal with. I suspect that this problem is part of what happened at the San Diego SPIE Conference in August. In that instance, however, it wasn't the contract officer who was overzealous, but rather it was somebody in the Pentagon; I don't know how to protect against Pentagon intervention.

The Defense Department supports a significant amount of first-rate basic research, their so-called 6.1 research. Traditionally, research supported by 6.1 funding is unclassified, unrestrict ed, and free for publication. I suspect that now there is a move to restrict 6.1 supported research in various ways,

and there are many contract officers who are writing individual contracts for this research. Consider, for example, a situation in which somebody in the 6.1 office in the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency decides to support a certain program but he personally doesn't write the contract. Somebody at Wright-Patterson Air De velopment Center writes the contract. The person who writes the contract is eager not to get in any trouble, so be writes restrictions in. I don't know how to deal with that problem, except by starting at the highest level, setting major policy issues and establishing educational programs for contract r cers. I am glad that the Office of Science and Technology Policy is now interested in this kind of problem.

Although those are major problems, and we recognize them, the panel felt that if we could write the agreements ahead of time, so that everybody knew the rules, we would have gained something.

The panel has studied the control system now in effect, and the report has some substantial discussion of the system and its problems. The panel's suggestions apply equally to industrial and university research. The current system is undergoing rapid change. Because the perceived nature of the technology leak problem has shifted only recently, government control me chanisms themselves are still being adjusted to meet the new perceptions

In a fundamental sense, government is still in the early stages of the learning process as it reorients existing laws, policies and programs designed for other purposes-to achieve a new objective, the dimensions of which are not yet fully determined. The adjust ment is particularly dincult because the current effort to understand and control unwanted technology transfer is unavoidably fractionated within the

Federal establishment. Four intelligence agencies-the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency-share the job of gathering intelligence on the nature, extent and significance of unwanted transfers.

Major regulatory authority is also split among three separate offoes: the Department of Commerco's EAR ad ministrators, the Department of State's ITAR administrators, and the Depart ment of Stato's Visa Processing Office. Those offices depend heavily on outside units in the defense and intelligence commanities for advice as they reach their judgments.

Similarly diffuse is the government's authority for classifying information and for monitoring results from the research and development that it funds. Regulatory enforcement shows similar diversity and includes yet another agency, the Department of Treasury's Customs Service. The panel discovered, not surprisingly, that few people inside or outside the govern ment truly understand the govern ment's technology-transfer control effort.

The panel believes that there is much room for improvement in targeting the government's efforts to prevent un wanted technology transfer. Priorities must be set and communicated. The panel believes that the government should concentrate on the most feasible forms of control and should avoid regulations that impose compliance burdens without significantly affecting leakage. The government should concentrate its resources more systematically on those technologies that are of greatert relevance to near-term Soviet military strength.

Finally, the panel addressed problems of inadequate staffing in agencies that deal with control measures, as well as problems of inadequate com

munication between the research community and the Federal agencies. The panel also identified areas where the research community might help the government assess the nature of the technology-transfer problem more reli

ably.

In assessing the current policies and procedures, we heard the word "confusion" from just about everybody we spoke to about both the ITAR and EAR.

Let me give you an example of the complexity of the system. In the Export Administration Act of 1979, an act which has been revised regularly and is the underlying legislation for EAR, it was specified that the Commodity Control List should be based on something called the Militarily Critical Technologies List. The Commodity Control List is the basis for licensing exports and the Militarily Critical Technologies List is now undergoing its second revision. The third version of this list is going to be issued some time in the immediate future. The second version was a 700-page book, all of which is classified decret. If one wants to take this to its logical end, it means that the people who are going to be subject to heavy fines through the implemente tion of these regulations will not be able know what it is that the violation is based on. The regulations are administered somewhat more intelligently than this sounds, but nonetheless individual parts of the Commodity Control List are classified individually. For example, some are Confidential, some are Secret and some are Unclassi fed Ragardless of clarification, all are subject to export restrictions deter mined by EAR. Among the unclassi fled technologies are such things as high-vacuum technology, or manufaoturing techniques for the maza produotion of ultra-high frequency generators, and techniques for making certain kinds of magnets which industrial people are making every day of the week.

The list has been developed by dedicated people who have taken a military system apart place by piece to see what went into it; those people have taken their work seriously and they've done an excellent job of finding what underlies every military system that exists.

Due to the comprehensiveness of this list and its classification, however, there seems to be no way to start from that list and arrive at a straightforward and clear definition of what it is that the regulations are going to apply to. Thus one of our recommenda tions is to streamline the MCTL. Our general suggestion was to build high walls around narrow areas that are clearly defined, with priorities estab lished in words that everybody can understand. I don't have any great hope, however, that tomorrow's mail will bring such a list to my deak. O