search under some private foundation contract-are so revealing that a level of information will pass into the hands of the Soviets in this kind of exchange, that there should be some prepublication review or a potential to stamp on to that document classified, or at least classified as to foreigners or classified as to Soviet scientists. What is the process? Dr. PRESS. As I understand it, except for atomic energy, the Government has the right to classify only those things that it pays for. So we're talking about Government contracts for research. Those contracts for research with universities are carefully defined, carefully spelled out, and with all research universities they are unclassified contracts or else the universities would not accept them. So there is a clear charge to the researcher, or there is a clear proposal by the researcher-"I will work in these fields, and this is what I intend to do." Almost all of the time that work stays on the unclassified side. Once in a very rare experiment, a very rare result, the university researcher may walk across a line where his research becomes useful in the very near term in a military system. There might be justification for classification at that time. The process we have, and it's a good one, is that the Government contract official usually knows what's going on on the university campus. There are progress reports that are made, there is commu-nication, and most of the time that excursion into the classified area is recognized by both sides. At that point there is a decision to be made. The Government can classify it, in which case the university will stop doing that research-to the detriment of the Government-or the Government will take its chances and not classify it because it becomes very excited about its potential. But there are mechanisms and means for doing these things. The problem is with research mutually agreed to be unclassified. A new category is being invented ad hoc when the Government takes unclassified research and treats it as if it were classified by prohibiting its presentation. Mr. BERMAN. The last question I have is for Professor Magrath. Some people apparently, including Admiral Inman, have argued that the type of prepublication review urged by the executive branch is virtually parallel to that imposed on researchers supported by corporate funds, and apparently accepted by those researchers. You may have touched on this in your answer to the chairman's question, but I would just throw that out. Dr. MAGRATH. Well, Mr. Berman, I can't speak for other universities, but I know that at the University of Minnesota we do notand we have some very close linkages with industrial firms and corporations-we do not and will not agree to prepublication restrictions. Most of the relationships that I'm familiar with at least, involving research universities and corporations, are very much within the traditions that, generally speaking, historically have worked well between universities and the Federal Government. In fact, I happen to believe that there are many good models that historically have existed between the Federal Government and university researchers and that they are part of the answer to some very difficult questions involving corporate-university relationships. But 40-209 - 85 - 4 we would not agree to prepublication agreements that in any way are different from the kind of situation that Dr. Press has outlined. Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. KASTENMEIER. The committee wants to thank you both for your contributions, Dr. Press and Dr. Magrath. It has been very helpful and very informative for us and contributes-not only your presentations but your answers to our questions-to our understanding of the problem and hopefully to the public discussion that we trust will ensue. Dr. MAGRATH. Thank you, sir. Dr. PRESS. Thank you very much. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Our next witnesses will make their presentation as a panel. The first member of the panel is Prof. George Davida of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. He is an expert in matters relating to computer science in general and cryptography in particular. He has had some personal experience relating to restrictions on the publication of scientific information. Our second witnesses represent the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. IEEE is a national professional organization that frequently sponsors scientific conferences and exchanges. Representing IEEE will be Professor Karl Willenbrock from Southern Methodist University. Accompanying Professor Willenbrock is Ellis Rubenstein, managing editor of the organization's magazine "Spectrum." Mr. Rubenstein will relate his testimony of personal experience with attempted restrictions on publication by the Department of Defense. The final member of our distinguished panel is Prof. Stephen Unger of Columbia University. Professor Unger is also an expert in computer sciences and has been actively involved in the subject on a number of panels of the American Association of University Professors, the AAAS, and has also written extensively on the subject of academic freedom. Gentlemen, you may proceed. Professor Davida, you may proceed first. Professor DAVIDA. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to refer to my report. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Without objection, your statement will be received and made a part of the record, and you may proceed as you wish, professor. TESTIMONY OF PROF. GEORGE I. DAVIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE; PROF. F. KARL WILLENBROCK, CHAIRMAN, IEEE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY ELLIS RUBENSTEIN, MANAGING EDITOR, "IEEE SPECTRUM"; AND PROF. STEPHEN H. UNGER. COMPUTER SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Professor DAVIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My own experience with the Government's classification powers occurred in 1977 and 1978. We had been funded at the time by the National Science Foundation, in one of those grants that was referred to earlier by Drs. Press and Magrath. It is an unclassified research grant, although my understanding is that a lot of the award letters that are being issued now are being perhaps tightsened up to allow possibilities of classification even under NSF-sponsored proposals. But, in any case, in 1978, as a result of a patent application, we were issued a secrecy order that, among other things, contained penalties of 2 years in jail and $10,000 fine for unauthorized disclosure of a subject matter we had invented on our own, without any reference to classified information. What that seems to imply, Mr. Chairman, is that there are some things that some regard as being born secret-in other words, regardless of how you arrive at them, somehow you cannot disclose them. I don't know how these concepts came about to be accepted by some, but I do find them to be contrary to the principles of this country. I don't accept them. I don't know about my other colleagues, but I don't think we should be subscribing to the theory that there is some knowledge that simply cannot be talked about. Now, the problem that I see really is twofold: what is the impact of the classification powers of the Government, and will it, in fact, achieve the desired effect of denying our adversaries the fruits of our labor? When one considers other models of secrecy that we practice in this country, I'm not entirely convinced, Mr. Chairman, that secrecy has really done a lot for us. I have asked physicists who worked on nuclear weapons whether the secrecy they practice has, in fact, prevented any country from introducing a nuclear weapon if it had the resources. The answer has always been that it has not. In other words, the research that is being conducted and the secrecy that is being practiced in areas where there is effective control, not only is the transfer of technology not necessarily as controlled as we would like, the results are not exactly all that encouraging. In the nuclear weapons industry, I understand that people in the highest levels of Government seem to say that we're either at about the same level in terms of destructive capacity as the Soviets, or that they are slightly ahead. If that's the case, I would hate to see what would happen to our other technological advances in non-DOD areas. Perhaps if we practiced secrecy we would be just as mediocre as the Soviets. It is clear that secrecy appears to have nothing really in store for us except mediocrity. I don't think that we will in any way keep our lead or even make advances if we continue on this path of restricting the flow of information among the scientists. Now, there are some other issues that this business of classification brings up. I remember when we first received the secrecy order, one of my colleagues came up to me and said that we should be honored that our research was classified. In other words, there was a tendency on the part of some to think that if the research is classified it was important. I would hate to see that kind of thinking creep into the academic process. For example, in one case, it is my understanding, one of the Government agencies that was interested in some of the research actually interceded on behalf of a faculty member, I guess writing some kind of a letter to his department chairman or somebody, in effect telling the institution that his work was so important that that person ought to perhaps be granted tenure. I don't wish to see such involvement of Government agencies, particularly intelligence agencies, in the issues of academic freedom and issues of tenure and the publication of our results. I think that would obviously be contrary to the way we do research at universities and not in any way enhance our research capabilities. Finally, I do think that the Government has the obligation to be consistent. On the one hand, we do have exchanges with our adversaries. We sell them all kinds of products, food and other technologies, and at the same time the Government turns around and tells us that we should not communicate among ourselves to prevent the Soviets from learning what we know. If I may summarize, the Government must get its act together. I find the current regulations, both export control regulations as well as the secrecy act, to be rather confusing, and chilling. I don't think that we can live with the kinds of vagueness that has been referred to by others. With that I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman. [The statement of Professor Davida follows:] |